Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1547-13T3
07-08-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CARMEN MATOS, a/k/a MARIA DEL CARMEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Gaetano T. Gregory, Acting Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Gioiella Ann Mayer, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges St. John and Rothstadt. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 09-07-01250. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Gaetano T. Gregory, Acting Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Gioiella Ann Mayer, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Carmen Matos appeals from the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder after she and her co-defendants, her son and his friend, used a baseball bat to beat to death a man who was staying at her home. In her petition, defendant argued that her counsel failed to properly investigate her contention that the victim had sexually abused her, and counsel pressured her into accepting the plea bargain.
On appeal, defendant argues she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes about the abuse she experienced from her victim and how her attorney pressured her to take the plea bargain. Specifically she argues:
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL UNDER THE STANDARDS ARTICULATED IN STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, STATE V. FRITZ AND STATE V. PRECIOSE, UNDER R. 3:22-2 CRITERIA, THE PCR COURT MISAPPLIED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT CONDUCTING A FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
The State responds to defendant's arguments by claiming the PCR court properly denied defendant's petition as she did not establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because the evidence supported a finding that defendant "knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty" and her "[t]rial counsel conducted a complete, thorough and adequate investigation."
We have considered these arguments in light of our review of the record and applicable legal principles. We affirm.
Defendant was indicted along with co-defendants her son, Hector Lugo, and his friend, Christopher Gonzalez, by a Hudson County grand jury, which charged her with first-degree murder of Tyrone Counts, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); third-degree possession of a weapon, a baseball bat, for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); third-degree possession of a weapon, a knife, for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and third-degree hindering of prosecution by way of concealment or destruction of evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1).
Defendant's indictment arose from events that occurred on December 11, 2008, when she, along with Lugo and Gonzalez, killed Tyrone Counts by beating him with a baseball bat. Counts had been a guest in defendant's home for about three days. That afternoon, an argument started between Counts and Lugo, about Lugo bringing his friend Gonzalez to stay over at the house. Counts then tried to have sexual relations with defendant but she rebuffed his advances.
Defendant's boyfriend subsequently came to her apartment. After the boyfriend left, Counts became angry with defendant. According to defendant, Counts called her a "bitch" and a "whore." Defendant went to her bedroom and got a bat. Counts followed her into the bedroom. Defendant hit Counts on his head with the bat. Defendant then took turns with Lugo and Gonzalez hitting Counts with the bat. Defendant stated that the second time she hit Counts, she hit him on the head with all her strength, which caused him to start bleeding from his head. Counts died as a result of the beating.
Defendant left the body in her apartment and went to work. When she returned from work, she began drinking. She cut the victim's clothes off with scissors and cut his neck with a kitchen knife. Defendant, Lugo and Gonzalez put two bags on the body and then put it in a shopping cart in the living room and went to sleep.
The next day, defendant turned herself in to the police and confessed to killing Counts. She told the police that she had sexual relations with Counts one time, two days after he started staying at her home, but before this incident. After sleeping with him, she found out that he had Hepatitis C.
Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, which required her to plead guilty to first-degree murder and to inculpate Gonzalez and testify against him at trial, if needed. In exchange for her guilty plea and testimony, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and recommend a thirty-year prison sentence with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.
At the plea hearing, the judge confirmed with defendant her plea was voluntary and no one threatened, coerced or promised defendant "anything in order to enter [the] guilty plea, other than the agreement . . . placed on the record." The court also made sure defendant thoroughly examined the plea agreement, understood what she was pleading to, was satisfied with her attorney's representation and reviewed "the facts of the case, police reports, statements and confessions with [her] attorney." Defendant's counsel also made sure defendant understood the recommended sentence.
The court later sentenced defendant to the one count in accordance with the plea agreement. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. No direct appeal was filed.
On October 1, 2012, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. An attorney was assigned to represent defendant, who filed an amended petition. In her amended petition, defendant alleged her trial counsel was ineffective because he induced her to plead guilty, which she would not have done had counsel not told her she would be convicted at trial. She also alleged her attorney did not adequately investigate her case or proceed to trial on a theory of self-defense. The PCR court denied the petition, finding defendant understood the plea agreement, did not present a colorable claim of innocence, and did not present evidence that defense counsel inadequately investigated any defenses. This appeal followed.
"Our standard of review is necessarily deferential" to the factual findings of a PCR court so long as the findings are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (citations omitted). However, when the PCR court has not held "an evidentiary hearing, we may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the [PCR] court has drawn from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App. Div. 2014). Also, we do "not defer to a PCR court's interpretation of the law; a legal conclusion is reviewed de novo." Nash, supra, 212 N.J. at 540-41 (citations omitted). See also State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005).
New Jersey has adopted the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel handed down by the United States Supreme Court in the companion cases of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). See, State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting Strickland's two-pronged test for PCR review). In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate the reasonable likelihood that his claim will ultimately succeed on the merits under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992). "A petitioner must establish the right to such relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Id. at 459.
The first prong requires a "showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. The test is whether "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Thus, the "test requires [a] defendant to identify specific acts or omissions that are outside the 'wide range of reasonable professional assistance' . . . ." State v. Jack, 144 N.J. 240, 249 (1996) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 698). "'Reasonable competence' does not require the best of attorneys, but certainly not one so ineffective as to make the idea of a fair trial meaningless." State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 351 (1989).
Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense to the extent that the defendant was deprived of a fair and reliable trial outcome. Strickland, supra, at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. "[A] defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ibid.
In the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea, the first Strickland prong is satisfied when a defendant establishes a reasonable probability he or she would not have pled guilty but for counsel's errors. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1454, 185 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2013). The second prong is met when a defendant establishes a reasonable probability he or she would have insisted on going to trial. Ibid.
The mere filing of a PCR petition does not require the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing. The decision is left to the PCR court's discretion. State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 138 (App. Div. 2000). Generally, "[a] defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of post-conviction relief, a determination by the court that there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record, and a determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief." R. 3:22-10(b); see also State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 ("If the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief, or that the defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing, then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S. Ct. 140, 139 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1997).
A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless he presents legally competent evidence to support his claim, see O'Donnell, supra, 435 N.J. Super. at 370, and generalized, bald assertions do not suffice. See also, State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.) cert. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (referring to statements that are "too vague, conclusory, or speculative" to warrant a hearing (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In particular, "'when a petitioner claims his trial attorney inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification.'" Ibid. (quoting Cummings, supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 170).
Applying these standards, we address defendant's claim her attorney failed to conduct an adequate investigation of her claims and defenses and forced her to accept the plea agreement. In support of her argument that her attorney failed to adequately investigate a theory of self-defense, defendant stated in her PCR petition that she told her attorney that Counts sexually molested her and, therefore, was justified in the use of deadly force to protect herself in her own apartment, or, alternatively, that she had a legitimate passion or provocation defense. Defendant argues that her PCR petition was based on disputed facts regarding matters that were outside of the record, regarding the extent of her attorney's investigation into a self-defense or a provocation defense. She similarly asserts a hearing was necessary to examine the events that induced defendant to plead guilty. Defendant maintains that she presented the requisite prima facie case in support of her PCR petition and that the PCR court erred by denying her request for an evidentiary hearing.
The State argues that defendant's statements are all unsupported assertions about how counsel should have pursued an argument of self-defense. It maintains that there are no facts which justify using deadly force because there was no immediate threat to defendant and she in fact went out of her way to get a bat to beat the victim. The State also maintains that the trial court ensured that the defendant was not coerced into pleading guilty.
Defense counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation or to make reasonable decisions that a specific investigation is unnecessary. State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004). Defense counsel neglecting to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation can give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Porter, supra, 216 N.J. at 350, 357 (finding that submitting a certification with specific facts and affidavits from two witnesses established a prima facie case that counsel performed an inadequate investigation for PCR); see also Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 456-58, 464 (stating defendant's detailed affidavit provided enough evidence to establish a prima facie case that counsel performed an inadequate investigation for PCR). The failure to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation may result in the reversal of a conviction. Russo, supra, 333 N.J. Super. at 139-41. Further, defense counsel "fail[ing] to present mitigating evidence or argue for mitigating factors" in a plea agreement may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 154 (2011).
The premise to defendant's argument about her attorney's failure to investigate is that she acted in self-defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) provides "the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." Defendant, however, never offered any evidence to demonstrate that she maintained a "reasonable belief that [her] action[s were ]necessary to prevent . . . her death or serious injury." State v Urbina, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2015)(slip op. at 20). Significantly, defendant never mentioned to the police in her confession or to the court during her plea or sentencing hearings any facts to support her claim she acted in self-defense when she repeatedly struck Counts with the bat. Had she raised the issue both her counsel and the court would have been obligated to make further inquiry into the allegation to determine if she could assert and the defense and, if so, whether she knowingly and intelligently waived her claim of self-defense, after consultation with her attorney. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 24-25)(holding that a mere "suggestion of self-defense raised . . . in a plea colloquy" requires further inquiry by the court). Similarly, in her PCR certification, defendant did not offer any details about her trial counsel's representation or Counts' alleged abuse and simply referred to points two and three in her brief in support of her petition for PCR. Even if defendant certified that Counts had previously assaulted her on an earlier occasion, there was no evidence that Counts did anything to defendant on the day of his murder. Any claim of self-defense or justification, therefore, could not have been successful. In any event, defendant's unsupported allegations are insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance.
We conclude from our review, defendant did not present prima facie evidence to demonstrate her counsel was deficient as needed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Similarly, defendant did not establish a prima facie claim that counsel's alleged deficient performance would have changed the outcome of this case. Defense counsel negotiated a plea bargain with the State, avoiding a life sentence for defendant, which established he acted within the "wide range of professionally competent assistance" as required by Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695.
Further, as to her guilty plea, the record demonstrated defendant's plea was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Defendant stated on the record that she was not coerced into accepting this plea bargain and that she understood the plea. After the judge accepted the plea, defendant's attorney also made sure on the record that defendant understood her plea. Nothing filed by defendant in her PCR petition contradicted her statements made under oath before the court at her plea hearing, nor did she raise any claims at her sentencing.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION