Opinion
No. 2014AP108–CR.
2014-12-23
STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Charles V. MATALONIS, Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Kenosha County: Wilbur W. Warren III, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions.
Before BLANCHARD, P.J., HIGGINBOTHAM and SHERMAN, JJ. ¶ 1 SHERMAN, J.
Charles V. Matalonis appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of manufacturing or delivering tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(h)1. Matalonis argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after police officers searched his home without a warrant and without his consent. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the search was justified under the community caretaker exception to the general rule that warrantless searches and seizures violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree and, therefore, reverse the court's denial of Matalonis's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 32 Examining the first factor, the degree of the public's interest and the exigency of the situation, this case is more similar to Maddix and Ultsch than it is to Pinkard or Gracia. The officers in this case responded to a medical call at a residence and followed a trail of blood from that residence to Matalonis's home. There, officers were informed that Matalonis and his brother had gotten into a fight and that his brother had left. In Pinkard, the officers had information that the door was open and the occupants were apparently vulnerable, and in Gracia the officers observed significant damage to a vehicle and Gracia's brother expressed concern for Gracia's safety, the facts in this case do not point to the likelihood of hidden injury or danger. Here, however, as in Maddix and Ultsch, nobody expressed concern for the welfare of another individual. We acknowledge that the officers in this case observed blood in the foyer and near the stairwell in Matalonis's residence when Matalonis opened the door to the officers. However, there was no objectively reasonable basis to believe that the blood belonged to anyone other than Matalonis's brother, whose blood trail they had just followed to that location. Even if that initial observation had been sufficient to lead the officers to believe that the situation was exigent, the exigent nature of the situation diminished significantly once the officers were informed by Matalonis that he had been involved in a fight with his brother and that his brother had left. Additionally, as in Maddix, by the time the officers reached the locked door, which at best revealed only very minor streaks of blood on the door's surface and on the doorknob, a reasonable officer would have suspected that Matalonis was the only person in the residence. The slightly blood-streaked door and doorknob do not support an objective suspicion that an injured person may be in the room with the locked door.
¶ 33 The second factor is the attendant circumstances. “These include the time, location, and the degree of overt force and authority displayed.” Ultsch, 331 Wis.2d 242, ¶ 26, 793 N.W.2d 505. Although the officers did not control the time or location, the degree of authority and force displayed by the officers in this case was considerable. Officer Ruha conducted a warrantless search of Matalonis's residence without Matalonis's consent, which the supreme court has described as “more suspect” than other warrantless entries, Matalonis was detained in his living room with Officer Yandel, and Officer Ruha threatened to break down the locked door on the second floor if a key to the door was not provided. See Pinkard, 327 Wis.2d 346, ¶ 20, 785 N.W.2d 592.
¶ 34 The third factor, whether the search took place in an automobile, does not apply in this case because the search took place in a residence. See Gracia, 345 Wis.2d 488, ¶ 27, 826 N.W.2d 87 (“[t]he third factor is irrelevant because the search was not of an automobile”).
¶ 35 The fourth and final factor evaluates the alternatives that were available to the action taken. We conclude that this factor does not weigh strongly in either direction. The primary alternative available to the officers in this case was to ask Matalonis whether there was anyone injured (or uninjured) in his home. As we observed in Maddix, the officers “would not have been required to accept at face value” Matalonis's answer to that question. Maddix, 348 Wis.2d 179, ¶ 36, 831 N.W.2d 778. However, the officers could have questioned Matalonis further on the topic. “It is relevant to the overall question of reasonableness that the officers looked for people ... without consent, apparently without first asking ... whether anyone else might be there” and after Matalonis had told officers that he lived alone. Id.
¶ 36 Having reviewed each of the four factors, we conclude that in this case, the public's interest in the intrusion was minimal and that it did not outweigh the substantial intrusion upon Matalonis's privacy interest in his home.
CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the officers' search in this case did not fall within the community caretaker exception to a warrantless search. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment of conviction and order denying Matalonis's motion to suppress, and remand for the circuit court to suppress evidence resulting from the warrantless search.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
¶ 38 BLANCHARD, P.J. (dissenting).
Not I would affirm, because I conclude: (1) based on the circumstances as they unfolded, which included at least one seriously injured person and conflicting accounts of how that person became injured, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that a warrantless, unconsented search of the residence for other injured persons, including the search behind a locked door with blood droplets on it, was necessary to address a serious safety concern; and (2) the public interest in the search outweighed the intrusions on Matalonis's privacy. That is, applying the principles set forth in the case law cited by the majority, I believe that the State carried its burden to demonstrate that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to act as community caretakers through the search. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I do not address the alternative basis to affirm argued by the State, which relies on the protective sweep doctrine.
¶ 39 Unlike the majority, I see the similarities between the facts here and those in State v. Maddix, 2013 WI App 64, 348 Wis.2d 179, 831 N.W.2d 778, as being mostly superficial and the differences as being significant. In my view, the following significant differences between the facts of the two cases support the circuit court's decision here to deny the motion to suppress:
• Evident acts of physical violence? In Maddix, officers responding to a domestic disturbance call were presented with what was by all appearances a loud verbal dispute between two persons, with no signs of violence. Id., ¶¶ 2–10, 28–29.
In contrast, in this case, officers responding to a medical call were presented with what by all appearances was an incident involving recent, serious physical violence. Matalonis's heavily bloodied brother, Antony, was taken away in an ambulance.
• Conflicting accounts of the violence? In Maddix, both interviewees gave statements that were apparently not only internally consistent but also consistent with each other, to the effect that nothing violent was afoot, and the incident involved only an argument between the two of them. The two witnesses appeared to account for all pertinent evidence, such as who in the apartment had screamed within hearing of the officers. Id., ¶¶ 5–6, 29.
Here, officers were given two sharply contrasting versions of what the violence had involved. The first witness interviewed told police that he had received his injuries at the hands of a group of individuals, while Matalonis said that only the two of them had fought.
• Consented entry to residence? In Maddix, officers forced open a locked back door of Maddix's two-flat house, and, when Maddix responded to a knock on the door of his unit, grabbed his arm and ordered him to “stay right there.” Id., ¶ 4.
Here, Matalonis does not challenge the circuit court finding that Matalonis consented to the officers entering the house.
• Timing? In Maddix, we concluded that it was significant that “the officers were present in the apartment for twenty-five to thirty minutes prior to initiating the search of the rooms in the apartment.” Id., ¶¶ 28, 33.
Here, Matalonis does not challenge the circuit court finding that one of the officers conducted an immediate, brief search of the rooms of the house for any injured person, focusing only on locations where blood suggested that a person might be found.
• Evidence of an unknown, potentially injured person? In Maddix, there was nothing to suggest that any person was in the room searched, and there was “virtually no” evidence that any person other than Maddix and the female might be located anywhere in the apartment. See id., ¶¶ 8, 28. We explained in Maddix that the “primary basis” for the search there was that the officers were “ ‘not satisfied’ with the female's explanation as to why she screamed,” but there was nothing about her screaming, nor any other evidence, to suggest that any third party might have been involved in the incident. Id., ¶¶ 18, 26–30. Put differently, there was no evidence supporting a suspicion that the inadequately explained scream involved any persons other than the female and Maddix.
Here, officers were given one account that the violence involved five or more persons. Officers then observed blood at the residence and, as the search progressed, physical evidence pointing to the reasonable possibility of an injured person behind the locked door: blood smeared along the wall leading upstairs and on the handrail; a broken mirror, seeming to confirm violence occurring within the house; and blood droplets on the door of a second floor room, which was locked.
¶ 40 This last point of difference between Maddix and the instant case is particularly significant, because in both cases, the question is whether the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe there was a person in the area searched, unlike, for example, in State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 32–35, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, or State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 17, 345 Wis.2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87, where the question was whether the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the person or persons known to be in the area searched needed medical assistance. If the facts in Maddix were changed, so that the 911 caller had told the police that the caller had heard the voices of three different people arguing in the apartment, the scenario would be more similar to the facts here.
¶ 41 The majority takes the position that, as soon as Matalonis suggested to the officers that all of the blood visible around his house belonged to Antony and was the result of a fight between the two men, the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis for concern that any other injured party might be in the house, and the officers were required to leave without conducting a search. Majority, ¶ 24. In my view, however, reasonable, prudent officers could have viewed with skepticism elements of Matalonis's account as compared with elements of Antony's account.
¶ 42 After the officers first made consensual entry to the house, they observed the scene and they observed Matalonis. He “seemed out of breath” and was shirtless, and appeared uninjured. There was blood on the foyer floor and blood near a stairwell. At this time, it was an objectively reasonable possibility that Antony had been involved in a serious physical fight with multiple people, which had occurred at least in part in Matalonis's residence, resulting in persons in addition to Antony being injured. One evident dynamic was that Antony was badly bloodied, and there was blood around the house, while Matalonis appeared uninjured. This suggested that the incident might not have involved violence between two persons, as Matalonis said, but instead had involved more people, as Antony said.
¶ 43 Then, as the search for any additional injured person progressed, following the signs of blood, one officer discovered blood droplets on the locked door of a room on the second floor, arguably compelling a prompt check of the room for the presence of any person who might be there, injured. See Pinkard, 327 Wis.2d 346, ¶ 59, 785 N.W.2d 592 (“Principles of reasonableness demand that we ask ourselves whether ‘ “ ‘the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise.’ ” ' ” (quoted sources omitted)).
The circuit court concluded:
[I]t was reasonable for [police] to extend their search for injured parties to [the locked room]. [W]ith someone who is bleeding, ... taken away by ambulance, to have a locked door in a house with blood on that door and not search behind that door and to later find that there's a dead body or a bleeding body or a person in need of medical assistance behind that door I think would not only be improper, it would be a sign of poor police work.
¶ 44 The majority places weight on the following facts: Antony told the officers that he had been beaten; Antony “did not give any indication that any other individuals had been harmed in the fight”; and Antony's account was internally inconsistent. Majority, ¶ 24. It is true that the officers testified that Antony gave conflicting accounts, including that he had been beaten (implying that he did not injure anyone else) and that this occurred outside a bar (implying that no violence had occurred in a residence). However, the officers were obligated to rely on their judgments, as events unfolded, to assess which parts of what Antony told them might be accurate and which might be a lie or the product of confusion. For the reasons explained above, I believe that an objectively reasonable inference arose from the combination of Antony's statements and the physical evidence observed at the house that, at some point during or after the fight, Antony and the person or people with whom he was fighting were at the house, and that an injured person might still be there.
¶ 45 I turn now to the question of whether the public interest in the search conducted outweighed the intrusions made on Matalonis's privacy. The intrusions were significant, in that they involved searches of different rooms of his residence while the officers required Matalonis to sit in the living room, including entering a locked room without consent. A warrantless, unconsented search of a residence has great constitutional significance. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).
¶ 46 However, while significant, the intrusions here were limited in several respects, according to the facts found by the circuit court and not challenged on appeal. The intrusions were limited in time, did not involve threats, handcuffing, or pointing weapons at Matalonis, were focused on areas suggested by signs of blood, and did not include searches of spaces, containers, or items that would not be justified by a search for one or more injured persons. Thus, the intrusions were reasonably limited in time, space, and purpose to a search for any injured person, and the degree of overt authority and force displayed matched the public safety purposes. As to the availability of alternatives, given that someone might have been significantly injured, the officers could have concluded that they did not have a reasonable, viable alternative, consistent with public safety, to making a prompt search of the house, including entry to the locked room.
The circuit court found, in part, that the officers “searched only in areas where there was blood found and they didn't search drawers or places where obviously people could not hide but only in rooms and larger areas where bodies might be found.”
¶ 47 Matalonis argues on appeal that “[t]his case would ... be different” if the officers could have analyzed the blood in the house and determined that none of it was Antony's blood. However, this was not a feasible alternative, and the officers had to make immediate decisions based on evidence that included Antony's statements.
¶ 48 The majority includes references to evidence regarding marijuana use or possession that the officers became aware of during the course of the search, but does not address this evidence in its analysis. Majority, ¶¶ 5–6. This implies a concern that this was not a bona fide search for any injured person, but was instead predominantly a search for marijuana or drug paraphernalia. This is a valid topic of concern, because the subjective intent of officers may be a pertinent factor in evaluating whether they acted as bona fide community caretakers. See State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 36, 315 Wis.2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598. However,
if the court concludes that the officer has articulated an objectively reasonable basis under the totality of the circumstances for the community caretaker function, he [or she] has met the standard of acting as a bona fide community caretaker, whose community caretaker function is totally divorced from law enforcement functions.