Opinion
CD-CR-16-1233
01-11-2016
STATE OF MAINE v. THURLOW MASON, Defendant
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Robert E. Mullen, Deputy Chief Justice Maine Superior Court
This matter came before the undersigned on 9/27/16 with respect to Defendant's Motion To Suppress filed 8/16/16. After hearing, and after the Court has had an opportunity to review relevant case law and statutes, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon which the Order set forth below is based:
I. Findings of Fact:
1. On or about May 29, 2016 at approximately 8:53 p.m. Officer Lowell of the Augusta Police Department was dispatched to 66 Court Street in Augusta, Maine to investigate a call concerning a possible disturbance at that address.
2. The officer was told that an occupant of the residence had "escaped" through a window of the residence in an effort to get away from the Defendant and had made her way to the local jail to complain.
3. Upon arrival at the residence the officer observed the Defendant sitting in a vehicle. The Defendant was addressing cuts on his hand. The Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and his speech was slow and slurred. There was an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. Defendant acknowledged that Defendant had consumed one beer previously in the evening.
4. The officer administered the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test and witnessed cues from the Defendant concerning Defendant's sobriety. The officer also administered the so-called "one leg stand test" as well as the "heel to toe test" to the Defendant. The Defendant's performance on these two tests also called into question Defendant's sobriety.
5. Although it was not mentioned in the officer's report, the officer testified at the suppression hearing that Defendant acknowledged that
Defendant had operated the motor vehicle in question. Furthermore, the officer testified that the alleged victim had told law enforcement that Defendant had driven to her residence earlier in the evening, was intoxicated, and then driven away, only to drive back a second time to the residence.
II. Conclusions of Law:
6. The probable cause standard for requiring a person to take a blood alcohol test has a very low threshold. A person is guilty of operating under the influence if his or her senses are "impaired however slightly" or "to any extent" by the alcohol that person has had to drink. For there to be probable cause to arrest someone for operating under the influence, therefore, an officer must have probable cause to believe that the person's senses are affected to the slightest degree, or to any extent, by the alcohol that person has had to drink. A reasonable suspicion to support probable cause can exist independent of any evidence of actual impaired driving. See State v. Eastman, 1997 ME 39, P9, 691 A.2d 179, 182; State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 919, 920-921 (Me. 1995); State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115; State v. Morrison, 2015 ME 153.
7. Here the Defendant was behind the wheel of a motor vehicle, exhibited classic signs of intoxication, and acknowledged drinking one beer earlier. When performing field sobriety tests the Defendant exhibited "cues" that were consistent with intoxication. According to the officer's testimony Defendant admitted to operating the motor vehicle. Clearly the probable cause standard was met.
8. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.