The absence of a severability provision is not determinative. See State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Ala. 1999): "To be sure, `[t]he inclusion of a severability clause is a clear statement of legislative intent to that effect, but the absence of such a clause does not necessarily indicate the lack of such an intent or require a holding of inseverability.'
We agree that the exclusion of the three counties from the provisions of § 28–2A–1 and § 28–2A–3 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156 (Ala.1999) (noting that, although the parties stipulated that part of a statute was unconstitutional, it was not for the parties to determine the proper construction or interpretation of the statute). The State has a legitimate interest in regulating the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages within its borders.
That is so, because courts will strive to uphold acts of the legislature." State ex rel. Pryor ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin , 735 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (Ala. 1999) (citing City of Birmingham v. Smith , 507 So. 2d 1312, 1315 (Ala. 1987) (quotations omitted)).
The Act does not contain a severability clause, but Alabama has a comprehensive severability statute that applies to all Alabama laws. See Ala. Code § 1–1–16 ("If any provision of this Code or any amendment hereto, or any other statute, or the application thereof to any person, thing or circumstances, is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions or application of this Code or such amendment or statute that can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end, the provisions of this Code and such amendments and statutes are declared to be severable."); see alsoState ex rel. Pryor ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin , 735 So.2d 1156 (Ala. 1999) ("[T]he judiciary's severability power extends only to those cases in which the invalid portions of an act are not so intertwined with the remaining portions that such remaining portions are rendered meaningless by the extirpation.")(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Therefore, the unconstitutionality of the first portion does not relieve the Court of its duty to presume the constitutionality of the rest of the statute. In State ex rel. Pryor v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Ala. 1999), this Court held that the Legislature had expressly intended for courts to "sever and save statutory provisions not tainted by the unconstitutionality of other provisions in the same statute," by its enacting of Ala. Code 1975, § 1-1-16. This Court stated: "'[T]he authority of a court to eliminate invalid elements of an act and yet sustain the valid elements is not derived from the legislature, but rather flows from powers inherent in the judiciary.'"
As the Alabama Supreme Court has explained, “We regard § 1–1–16 as an expression of legislative intent regarding the general power and duty of the judiciary to sever and save statutory provisions not tainted by the unconstitutionality of other provisions in the same statute.” State ex rel. Pryor v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Ala.1999). Additionally, the Women's Health and Safety Act, as it was passed, contained its own severability clause:
Severability is a matter of state law, and Alabama directs courts to “strive to uphold acts of the legislature.” State ex rel. Pryor ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Ala.1999) (citing City of Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So.2d 1312, 1315 (Ala.1987)). Because the Alabama Legislature expressed its intention that ASORCNA's provisions be severable through the inclusion of a severability clause and because ASORCNA can be given effect absent the constitutionally violate requirements, the remainder of ASORCNA remains “intact and in force.”
City of Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So.2d 1312, 1315 (Ala. 1987). See § 1-1-16, Ala. Code 1975)("If any provision of this Code or any amendment hereto, or any other statute, or the application thereof to any person, thing or circumstances, is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions or application of this Code or such amendment or statute that can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end, the provisions of this Code and such amendments and statutes are declared to be severable."); and State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Ala. 1999) (" ‘[I]f the remaining portions of an Act are complete within themselves, sensible and capable of execution, the Act will stand.’ " (quoting Mitchell v. Mobile Cty., 294 Ala. 130, 134, 313 So.2d 172, 174 (1975) ) ). Therefore, we do not disturb the remaining provisions of Act No. 2017-65, and we express no opinion regarding their validity.
" State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Ala. 1999). Because, in the absence of the operative portion — paragraph (d) — the Act cannot give sufficient guidance to the courts regarding visitation proceedings, we declare the entire Act unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable.
However, the unconstitutional provision in the Act is its overbroad and unreasonable definition of the "practice of interior design," which is "so intertwined with the remaining portions" of the Act that the Act would be meaningless without it. State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Ala. 1999) ("Under these well-established principles, the judiciary's severability power extends only to those cases in which the invalid portions are ` "not so intertwined with the remaining portions that such remaining portions are rendered meaningless by the extirpation."' Hamilton v. Autauga County, 289 Ala. 419, 426, 268 So.2d 30, 36 (1972) (quoting Allen v. Walker County, 281 Ala. 156, 162, 199 So.2d 854, 860 (1967)).