Opinion
COA22-501
11-07-2023
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER LEE MARTIN, JR., Defendant
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Henry, for the State. Kimberly P. Hoppin, for Defendant-Appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2023.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 7 April 2021 by Judge V. Bradford Long in Randolph County No. 19 CRS 52131 Superior Court.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Henry, for the State.
Kimberly P. Hoppin, for Defendant-Appellant.
CARPENTER, Judge.
Roger Lee Martin, Jr. ("Defendant") appeals from judgment entered after a Randolph County jury convicted him of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motions to dismiss his second-degree murder charge; (2) allowing certain lay testimony concerning Defendant's demeanor; and (3) giving an inappropriate jury instruction. After careful review, we disagree and discern no error.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
On 28 January 2013, Nova Nicole Robinson ("Victim") was murdered at her home in Asheboro, North Carolina. That same day at 6:04 p.m., Defendant, Victim's boyfriend, called 911 to report discovering her body. Victim and Defendant lived together in Asheboro.
At trial, evidence tended to show the following: Defendant and Victim's relationship was allegedly violent. Victim gave Defendant a black eye in the past. Their relationship was plagued by financial issues and Defendant's drug problem. Defendant developed a cocaine habit, costing thousands of dollars, much of which he allegedly stole from Victim.
Victim was a student at Randolph Community College ("RCC"). On 28 January 2013, Victim attended class at RCC until 2:40 p.m., stopped for food on her way home, and arrived home shortly after 3:00 p.m. Defendant was at their home, alone. Around the time Victim came home, a neighbor saw Defendant leave the house, walk across the street, climb the front steps of another house, look around, and return to his house. Minutes later, the neighbor saw Defendant "on [Defendant's] front porch pacing back and forth." The neighbor knew Defendant as generally "upbeat" and "positive," but noted he appeared "stressed," "worried," and "really upset."
At 4:08 p.m., Defendant drove Victim's Mustang to the home of Victim's mother. Victim kept her savings at her mother's home. Defendant told Victim's mother that they needed access to Victim's savings because they were considering purchasing another vehicle, but Victim did not call to authorize access to her savings. Without getting the money, Defendant left at 4:28 p.m. to get food.
According to Defendant, after leaving Victim's mother's house and before getting food, he returned to his house to use the bathroom. He came and went without speaking to Victim. He eventually arrived at Hop's Bar-B-Que, waited for his order, then returned home. At 6:04 p.m., Defendant called 911 and reported that he discovered Victim, dead. He stated there was "blood everywhere," and that he had not "messed with nothing" at the scene.
First responders arrived almost immediately and found Defendant on the floor of the computer room, holding Victim's body. Victim had deep punctures in her neck and face, blunt-force injuries to her forehead, and defensive wounds on her hands. Her injuries were consistent with a "knife" or other "sharp, bladed instrument." A friend of both Victim and Defendant testified that Defendant owned a knife with a distinctive "dragon handle." No such knife was ever found after Victim's murder.
It was a "brutal murder," one officer described as "over kill." Victim's blood was spattered and pooled throughout the computer room, including on the walls, floor, and "all over" Defendant. Much of Victim's blood was congealed and coagulated, and her skin was cool to the touch. Defendant's food was also cold, as was the hood and tail pipe of Victim's Mustang.
No one else was in the home, and there was no sign of forced entry. Other than the blood Defendant tracked from the murder scene, the computer room, no blood was apparent elsewhere in the house. The kitchen floor, however, appeared "extra clean" relative to the rest of the house, and testing suggested the presence of blood in the kitchen.
A collection of items was stacked in the threshold of the computer-room doorway, including "a photo album and other pictures." They "looked like they were put there on purpose." Although Defendant denied touching these items, expert analysis determined a "bloody boot print" beneath the pile matched Defendant's boots.
At the scene, Defendant was crying, "unsteady on his feet," and "visibly upset." "[A]utomatically and from the beginning," however, he volunteered a specific story about waiting in line at Hop's for an unusually long time. He was "very adamant."
Autosomal DNA testing was the only form available to the State's crime lab when Victim's fingernail clippings were submitted in 2014. The initial autosomal results revealed a mixture of DNA found under Victim's fingernails, but not Defendant's DNA. In 2017, the crime lab gained access to Y-STR DNA testing, which is "more sensitive" than autosomal testing. In 2018, the Y-STR results found DNA under Victim's fingernails that matched Defendant's DNA. Defendant's expert at trial agreed.
Lieutenant Byron Hill, with the Asheboro Police Department, was among the first responders on the scene. Lieutenant Hill testified at trial, over objection, that it "just seemed odd" that Defendant "automatically from the beginning" seemed to be "trying to give [Lieutenant Hill] an alibi" by detailing his lengthy time at Hop's and repeatedly emphasizing that he came home and "found [Victim] like this."
Officer Eric Snodgrass, another responding officer, transported Defendant to the Asheboro Police Department for an interview. Detective Phillip Hall interviewed Defendant. During the interview, Defendant described entering and exiting the computer room multiple times after discovering Victim, moving things around, touching Victim, and pacing around before calling 911. Then Defendant held Victim's body until first responders arrived. Detective Hall also testified, without objection, that he found these behaviors "strange."
On 15 April 2019, officers arrested Defendant for Victim's murder. Defendant initially declined to come to the door, stating he was "writing [his] family a letter" and holding a "gun to his throat." He eventually surrendered. Over six years after Victim's murder, the State charged Defendant with second-degree murder.
At trial, Defendant testified and denied killing Victim. Defendant maintained that Victim was alive when he went to her mother's house, that he waited with her mother for about half an hour, and that he called Victim twice while at her mother's house, but Victim did not answer.
Defendant stated he then returned home and-without asking why Victim had neither answered nor returned his calls-used the bathroom for five to fifteen minutes, then went to Hop's. Defendant testified his trip to Hop's was unusually long because of an argument in the restaurant. He then returned home, placed his food on the stove, and saw the "pile of stuff in the doorway" of the computer room and Victim "laying there." Defendant "mov[ed] her arm," "mov[ed] some objects," "almost went blank," "paced around," and finally called 911 while "holding her."
Defendant stated that several witnesses gave false testimony, including testimony that Victim gave him a black eye in the past, that he walked across the street and was visibly upset on his porch on the day of the murder, and that he owned a dragon-handled knife. Defendant also presented expert testimony that, although his DNA was indeed under Victim's fingernails, his DNA may have been the result of cohabitation.
Both at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss his second-degree murder charge because of insufficient evidence. The trial court denied both motions.
At the charge conference, the State requested using North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction-Criminal 105.21. The instruction states a jury may consider conflicting statements "as a circumstance tending to reflect the mental process of a person possessed of a guilty conscience, seeking to divert suspicion or to exculpate the person." N.C. P.I.-Crim. 105.21. Defendant objected to the instruction, but the trial court overruled the objection, noting Defendant's statements "were conflicting as to actions that he took" at the scene, and that "several portions" of his statements to law enforcement and trial testimony "conflicted with one another."
After receiving instructions, the jury deliberated for two-and-a-half days and returned a guilty verdict on the charge of second-degree murder. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 240 to 300 months. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021).
III. Issues
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (1) denying Defendant's motions to dismiss his second-degree murder charge; (2) allowing lay testimony concerning Defendant's demeanor; and (3) giving an inappropriate jury instruction.
IV. Analysis
A. Motions to Dismiss
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence to prove that he, rather than someone else, murdered Victim. We disagree.
"[W]e review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo." State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717, 720, 782 S.E.2d 878, 881 (2016) (citing State v. Cox, 367 N.C. 147, 150-51, 749 S.E.2d 271, 274-75 (2013)).
"'In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the defendant is the perpetrator.'" State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 574, 780 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2015) (quoting State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301, 560 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2002)). "Substantial evidence is [the] amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion." Mann, 355 N.C. at 301, 560 S.E.2d at 781.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence concerning a motion to dismiss, the evidence must be considered "'in the light most favorable to the State; the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom ....'" Winkler, 368 N.C. at 574-75, 780 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). In other words, if the record developed at trial contains "substantial evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a combination, 'to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.'" Id. at 575-76, 780 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988)).
"Second-degree murder is defined as '(1) the unlawful killing, (2) of another human being, (3) with malice, but (4) without premeditation and deliberation.'" State v. Arrington, 371 N.C. 518, 523, 819 S.E.2d 329, 332 (2018) (quoting State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 47 (2000)). Concerning sufficient evidence that an accused murderer is the perpetrator of the crime, although not elements to be proven by the State, a trial court may consider motive, opportunity, and capability. See State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1988).
Here, concerning motive, the evidence tended to show that Defendant and Victim were both dissatisfied with their relationship, their relationship was violent in the past, and Defendant's cocaine use caused financial strain on their relationship. Concerning opportunity, the evidence tended to show that Defendant was the only other person in the home around the time of the murder; and although Defendant claimed to call 911 within minutes of returning from Hop's, Victim, her Mustang, and Defendant's food were all cold. Concerning capability, the evidence tended to show that Defendant owned a distinctive knife that was never found, and Victim's injuries were consistent with a "knife" or other "sharp, bladed instrument."
This evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, creates a "reasonable inference" that Defendant was the person who murdered Victim. See Stone, 323 N.C. at 452, 373 S.E.2d at 434. There is enough "relevant evidence . . . to persuade a rational juror to accept" that Defendant is the perpetrator. See Mann, 355 N.C. at 301, 560 S.E.2d at 781. Therefore, there is "substantial evidence" that Defendant is the perpetrator, and the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to dismiss his second-degree murder charge. See Winkler, 368 N.C. at 574, 780 S.E.2d at 826.
B. Lay Testimony
Next, Defendant asserts the trial court erred in admitting lay-opinion testimony from Lieutenant Hill concerning Defendant's demeanor at the crime scene. We disagree.
We review the trial court's decision to admit lay-opinion testimony for abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689, 701, 686 S.E.2d 493, 501 (2009). "Abuse of discretion results where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).
North Carolina Rule of Evidence 701 states that lay-opinion testimony "is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2021). "Opinion evidence as to the demeanor of a criminal defendant is admissible ...." State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 321, 406 S.E.2d 876, 900 (1991).
Here, Lieutenant Hill testified that it "just seemed odd" that Defendant "automatically from the beginning" seemed to be "trying to give [Lieutenant Hill] an alibi" by detailing his lengthy time at Hop's and repeatedly emphasizing that he came home and "found [Victim] like this." Defendant's immediate insistence of an alibi was rationally related to Lieutenant Hill's perception of Defendant's crime-scene demeanor, and it likely helped the jury understand Defendant's crime-scene demeanor. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701.
Therefore, because "[o]pinion evidence as to the demeanor of a criminal defendant is admissible," see Stager, 329 N.C. at 321, 406 S.E.2d at 900, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Lieutenant Hill's testimony, as doing so was "a reasoned decision," see Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.
C. Jury Instruction
Last, Defendant argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could consider Defendant's inconsistent or contradictory statements. Again, we disagree.
We review a trial court's decisions regarding jury instructions de novo. State v. Epps, 231 N.C.App. 584, 585, 752 S.E.2d 733, 734 (2014). "'Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment' for that of the lower tribunal." State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).
"It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the substantive features of the case arising on the evidence ...." State v. Robbins, 309 N.C. 771, 776, 309 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1983). And "false, contradictory or conflicting statements made by an accused concerning the commission of a crime may be considered as a circumstance tending to reflect the mental processes of 'a person possessed of a guilty conscience seeking to divert suspicion and to exculpate [himself].'" State v. Myers, 309 N.C. 78, 86, 305 S.E.2d 506, 511 (1983) (quoting State v. Redfern, 246 N.C. 293, 297-298, 98 S.E.2d 322, 326 (1957)).
Here, between Defendant's 911 call, law-enforcement interviews, and trial testimony, Defendant made conflicting statements. For example, on the 911 call, Defendant stated that he had not "messed with nothing" at the scene, but during interviews and at trial, he stated that he moved Victim's body and various items. Accordingly, it was proper for the jury to consider these, and any other conflicting statements made by Defendant, as circumstantial evidence "tending to reflect the mental processes of 'a person possessed of a guilty conscience seeking to divert suspicion and to exculpate [himself].'" See Myers, 309 N.C. at 86, 305 S.E.2d at 511 (quoting Redfern, 246 N.C. at 297-298, 98 S.E.2d at 326).
Therefore, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on Defendant's conflicting statements because doing so "instruct[ed] the jury on the law applicable to the substantive features of the case." See Robbins, 309 N.C. at 776, 309 S.E.2d at 191.
V. Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motions to dismiss, allowing lay testimony concerning Defendant's demeanor, or instructing the jury concerning Defendant's conflicting statements.
NO ERROR.
Judges DILLON and GORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).