Summary
holding that there is no exception to the exclusionary rule under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Connecticut for evidence seized under the putative authority of a constitutionally defective warrant which was applied for and executed in good faith
Summary of this case from State v. HowellOpinion
(14553)
Argued February 9, 1993
Decision released March 9, 1993
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before Ford, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Bieluch, O'Connell and Stoughton, Js., which remanded the case for a determination of the applicability of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule; on remand, the court, Ford, J., determined the rule to be applicable; thereafter, the Appellate Court, Spallone, O'Connell and Stoughton, Js., affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, which reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to the Appellate Court, Dupont, C.J., O'Connell and Foti, Js., which reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court for a new trial; thereafter, the Appellate Court, Dupont, C.J., O'Connell and Foti, Js., granted the state's motion for reargument of the appeal and affirmed its reversal of the trial court's judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; new trial.
Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
C. Robert Satti, Jr., assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
This court decided, in State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 151, 579 A.2d 58 (1990), that "a `good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule is incompatible with the constitution of Connecticut, article first, 7 . . . ." The defendant's conviction rested in part on evidence that had been seized pursuant to a search warrant validated by the trial court in reliance on such a good faith exception. Because the Appellate Court had agreed with the trial court's upholding of a good faith exception, our decision required us to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. Our rescript noted the reversal and directed that the case be remanded to the Appellate Court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." Id., 172.
The Appellate Court thereafter identified an ambiguity in our rescript. It observed that this court might have intended the Appellate Court to pursue one of three possible agendas. First, the Appellate Court might have been directed to reconsider the defendant's claim as to the sufficiency of the evidence and to look at the evidence that had not been seized pursuant to the invalidated warrant to determine whether, on the basis of the record as it existed at trial, the defendant's conviction should be vacated. State v. Marsala, 26 Conn. App. 423, 425, 601 A.2d 542 (1991). Second, the Appellate Court might have been directed to reconsider the validity of the search warrant in light of the subsequent decision of this court in State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917 (1991). State v. Marsala, 27 Conn. App. 291, 294, 605 A.2d 866 (1992). Third, the Appellate Court might have been directed to remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. State v. Marsala, supra, 26 Conn. App. 425.
After the Appellate Court's decision to pursue the second alternative, we granted the defendant's petition for certification. State v. Marsala, 223 Conn. 902, 610 A.2d 177 (1992). We regret the lack of clarity in our original rescript and now direct a new trial.
We granted certification limited to the following issues: "1. Whether the Appellate Court correctly treated a motion for reargument as a motion for reconsideration, and in thereafter deciding a question of substance, which reversed a trial court conclusion, without the benefit of either briefs or oral argument? "2. Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the search warrant affidavit should be evaluated under the principles of State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917 (1991)? "3. If the principles of State v. Barton, supra, are applicable to this case, must the validity of the warrant first be reviewed by a trial court, rather than an appellate court? "4. Did the Appellate Court have jurisdiction/authority to issue, sua sponte, an amended rescript ( 26 Conn. App. 423) approximately sixteen months after the issuance of its initial rescript? "5. Did the state waive or forfeit its right to assert the warrant's validity in light of the state's prior concessions and prior failure to raise this claim as an alternate ground?" State v. Marsala, 223 Conn. 902, 610 A.2d 177 (1992).
In light of this amended rescript, certified issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 have become moot. At the retrial, the trial court will have to decide the remaining issues about the applicability of State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917 (1991), in the circumstances of this case.