The Court of Appeals held that, regardless of Mares's probation violation, the trial court was limited by the plea agreement to impose a maximum of twenty-four-months incarceration. State v. Mares, 118 N.M. 217, 218, 880 P.2d 314, 315 (Ct.App. 1994). Finding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the twenty-four-month cap was conditioned upon the satisfaction of probation conditions, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
State v. Palmer, 1998-NMCA-052, ΒΆ 4, 125 N.M. 86, 957 P.2d 71. {26} Defendant mainly contends that due process requires a court to enforce a plea agreement as it is written once the agreement is approved, citing State v. Mares, 118 N.M. 217, 880 P.2d 314 (Ct.App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 119 N.M. 48, 888 P.2d 930 (1994), for the proposition that due process requires enforcement of a court-approved plea agreement. Thus, he argues that, because his plea agreement contained no requirement that he register, based on contract principles, the agreement should be enforced as not requiring him to register.