State v. Malo

8 Citing cases

  1. State v. Gallegos

    479 P.3d 631 (Utah Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 8 times

    More recently, however, our supreme court has indicated that appellate courts have "discretion" in this situation to either "raise a preservation issue on our own initiative when it provides an alternative basis for affirmance," or to "decide to address the matter on appeal despite the lack of preservation." See State v. Malo , 2020 UT 42, ¶ 20 n.7, 469 P.3d 982. In this situation, we elect to address the matter despite the apparent lack of preservation; we do so not only because the parties have fully briefed the issue and presented it for our review, but also because we are reversing on the issue of the improperly-admitted shank evidence, and we therefore make an effort to give the parties guidance regarding the sentencing evidence that might be useful on remand.

  2. State v. Smith

    2022 UT 13 (Utah 2022)   Cited 4 times

    While we can, of course, choose to bring up preservation issues sua sponte, "the State's failure to make the [preservation] argument" meant that Smith "could not address the argument in his reply." State v. Malo, 2020 UT 42, ¶ 20 n.7, 469 P.3d 982. We have said before that "such failure could mean we would decide to address the matter on appeal despite the lack of preservation."

  3. In re Sex Change of Childers-Gray

    2021 UT 13 (Utah 2021)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The plain language of the statute is "the first step of statutory interpretation." State v. Malo, 2020 UT 42, ¶ 22, 469 P.3d 982 (quoting Garrard v. GatewayFin. Servs., Inc., 2009 UT 22, ¶ 11, 207 P.3d 1227). Here, the plain language of Utah Code section 26-2-11 presupposes judicial authority to adjudicate sex-change petitions.

  4. State v. Arce

    2024 UT App. 43 (Utah Ct. App. 2024)

    It is "well within our prerogative to raise a preservation issue on our own initiative when it provides an alternative basis for affirmance, even if the State failed to brief the preservation argument." State v. Malo, 2020 UT 42, ¶ 20 n.7, 469 P.3d 982. In Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983), our supreme court confronted "[w]hether an objection by one party properly preserves an objection on appeal as to another party."

  5. Lehi City v. Rickabaugh

    2021 UT App. 36 (Utah Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 5 times
    Holding Utah's electronic communication harassment statute, which was limited in scope to communications made in a "manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response" was not overbroad

    See Violent, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violent [https://perma.cc/97HX-Z5XP]; Disorderly, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disorderly [https://perma.cc/7CKU-W6SN]. See generally State v. Malo, 2020 UT 42, ¶ 22, 469 P.3d 982 (explaining that "the first step of statutory interpretation is to look to the plain language" (cleaned up)). In this way, the statute is targeted to encompass a disruptive reaction to incitement, not just "outward manifestations of fear" that an arachnophobic friend might display in response to receiving pictures of spiders.

  6. State v. Wilkerson

    2020 UT App. 160 (Utah Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 10 times
    Refusing to apply the previous version of rule 22(e) in a case in which all relevant events occurred after the 2017 amendment

    When the statutory language is unambiguous, we do "not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent" because "we are guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain language." State v. Malo , 2020 UT 42, ¶ 22, 469 P.3d 982 (quotation simplified); see also Scott v. Scott , 2017 UT 66, ¶ 22, 423 P.3d 1275 ("When we can ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statutory terms alone, no other interpretive tools are needed, and our task of statutory construction is typically at an end." (quotation simplified)).

  7. J.R.H. v. State (In re J.R.H.)

    2020 UT App. 155 (Utah Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 10 times

    In light of the fact that the State does not assert that J.R.H.’s inherent-improbability argument is unpreserved, or that the doctrine does not apply in appeals from bench trials, we simply proceed to address the argument on its merits. See State v. Malo , 2020 UT 42, ¶ 20 n.7, 469 P.3d 982. ANALYSIS

  8. State v. Thompson

    2020 UT App. 148 (Utah Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 2 times

    Our supreme court recently explained that in situations like this, where an issue is unpreserved and the appellee does not brief the preservation issue, appellate courts have discretion to either "raise a preservation issue on our own initiative when it provides an alternative basis for affirmance" or "decide to address the matter on appeal despite the lack of preservation." State v. Malo , 2020 UT 42, ¶ 20 n.7, 469 P.3d 982. In this instance, we exercise our discretion to address this argument on the merits.