Opinion
No. 27742-9-III.
Filed: June 7, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 07-1-00947-8, Michael P. Price, J., entered January 8, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Sweeney, J., concurred in by Kulik, C.J., and Siddoway, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This appeal follows a successful prosecution for aggravated homicide of a child by abuse and neglect. The defendant showed, largely by affidavits from his lawyers, that he had limited or no ability to assist in his defense. But experts who testified for the State suggested he did have the necessary mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist counsel. The trial judge was persuaded by that testimony and concluded that the defendant both understood what was going on and could help his lawyers. We will defer to that decision because it is amply supported by the evidence and the court's findings. We therefore affirm the conviction for aggravated homicide by abuse.
FACTS
A jury found that Jonathan Lytle killed his daughter by neglect and abuse. Four-year-old Summer Phelps died of "bronchopneumonia due to near drowning in [a] bathtub and cumulative blood loss resulting from multiple nonaccidental blunt force injuries" on March 10, 2007. The State charged her father, Mr. Lytle, and his wife, Adriana Lytle, with aggravated homicide by abuse for causing her death. The homicide charge included aggravating factors: "the defendants' conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim, . . . the defendants knew and should have known that the victim of the current offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance, . . . and the defendants used his or her position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1.
The court granted defense counsel's motion to have Mr. Lytle evaluated for competency to stand trial. Following receipt of the competency report, the court set the matter for hearing.
Before the hearing, counsel moved to close the courtroom and argued that public dissemination of Mr. Lytle's behavior and mental health status could taint any potential jury pool. The trial judge concluded that the anticipated testimony would add nothing to what was already available to the public and denied the motion:
Does an open courtroom deprive a defendant a right to a fair and impartial proceeding? That's the test I really have to look at . . . here. I'm satisfied it does not. The fact is, Counsel, that the material in this particular case, commentary that the Court expects to hear in this proceeding, and frankly, if we proceeded to trial, it is difficult. It's, I expect, going to be information and documentation that's going to be difficult for the Court and the prospective jurors to look at. But . . . a good part of that material[] has been observed by the public and has been extensively comment[ed] on by the press.
So really, what would happen today is neither here nor there in terms of adding to that, so I'm satisfied in terms of looking at the [ Bone-Club] analysis, there isn't a basis to seal the courtroom today. I won't be doing that, nor would the Court be sealing the affidavits. The declaration and/or affidavits of medical and or psychological professionals will go in the re[a]d file. That is appropriate. But their testimony will be heard in court today in an open proceeding.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 11.
The court then proceeded to hold the competency hearing in open court. Dr. Randall Strandquist, a psychologist at Eastern State Hospital, had evaluated Mr. Lytle. He opined that Mr. Lytle could understand court proceedings and participate in his own defense:
I find him to have the necessary skills to understand the court proceedings and to participate in his own defense. I see him as capable of doing that. Now, whether he desires to do that is another story, but I see him as capable.
RP at 24. Dr. Strandquist testified that Mr. Lytle understood the charge against him, the possible consequences of conviction, and the roles of the judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel. He also found that Mr. Lytle could engage in dialogue, comprehend facts, maintain attention, and sit in a chair for extended periods of time. Dr. Strandquist concluded from this information that Mr. Lytle could assist in his own defense. Dr. Imelda Borromeo is a psychiatrist at Eastern State Hospital. She also had evaluated Mr. Lytle and agreed with Dr. Strandquist.
Dr. Roy Mays Jr. is a psychologist. He found that Mr. Lytle was "grounded enough and ha[d] an accurate understanding of the situation to form a[] meaningful [legal] strategy." RP at 90. But he also found that Mr. Lytle was "suspicious, almost paranoid, distracted, [and] confused. Some of the things that he talked about were nonsensical. . . . He was not able to listen or to take information in and consider it." RP at 74. Dr. Mays believed Mr. Lytle was not grounded in reality and was confrontational, evasive, and uncooperative. He agreed that Mr. Lytle understood the charge against him and the consequences of being convicted of that charge. But he concluded that Mr. Lytle could not assist with his defense. Mr. Lytle's lawyers filed affidavits that explained their experience with Mr. Lytle and urged that Mr. Lytle was incapable of helping them prepare his defense because of his paranoid thoughts, uncooperative behavior, and implausible defense theories.
The trial court ultimately concluded "that Mr. Lytle . . . understands the nature of the charges and is capable of assisting in his own defense," RP at 156, and was therefore competent to stand trial.
The case then proceeded to trial before a jury. The State produced Styrofoam cutouts of Mr. Lytle, Ms. Lytle, and Summer. A police detective testified that the cutouts accurately portrayed the height and weight of the three people they represented. The trial court overruled Mr. Lytle's objection to the cutouts and admitted them for illustrative purposes:
I'm satisfied State 174 [Styrofoam cutout of Ms. Lytle] should be admitted for demonstrative purposes only. Just to comment on that . . . it's clear that it is — it's not a life form but I think it seems to be a fairly accurate representation in terms of height and to some degree the dimensions, so for demonstrative purposes only it would be admitted.
RP at 1055.
The Court's going to admit 173 [Styrofoam cutout of Mr. Lytle] for demonstrative purposes only. Again, foundation has been laid for it to be an accurate reflection of the defendant's general height and weight, and I will put a colloquy with the jurors on the record later regarding the demonstrative purposes of that.
RP at 1056-57. The jury found Mr. Lytle guilty as charged.
DISCUSSION
Courtroom Closure
Mr. Lytle contends that he was denied the right to a fair trial because testimony and records of his mental health status were made public in the open competency hearing and none of the information would have been admissible at his trial or available to the public. We review the trial court's denial of Mr. Lytle's motion to close a trial proceeding for abuse of discretion. State v. Duckett, 141 Wn. App. 797, 805, 173 P.3d 948 (2007).
Both the defendant and the public have a right to a public trial. State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222, 225-26, 217 P.3d 310 (2009). And that includes pretrial proceedings. State v. Easterling, 157 Wn.2d 167, 174, 137 P.3d 825 (2006). A trial court may limit those rights by restricting access to a legal proceeding but only after consideration of the five Bone-Club factors. Id. at 178. "[T]he trial court must find that the proponent of closure . . . made a showing that the courtroom closure was necessary to protect his right to a fair trial or . . . a separate compelling interest." Id. at 178 n. 10. The court here found that closure was not necessary to protect Mr. Lytle's right to a fair trial because the evidence it expected to receive at the competency hearing would not add to the information already available to the public. That is a tenable ground for this trial judge to deny Mr. Lytle's motion.
State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254, 258-59, 906 P.2d 325 (1995).
The media portrayed Mr. Lytle as a child abuser: "A veteran Spokane police detective compared the apparent abuse endured by the girl at the hands of her father and stepmother to that of a prisoner of war. Shock treatments, sleep deprivations, use of water as torture, beatings . . . there is no other way to describe it but torture." CP at 205 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Other articles suggested Mr. Lytle was indifferent to Summer's well-being by indicating that Mr. Lytle made excuses for the way she was treated and that he tried momentarily to resuscitate her but then stopped to smoke a cigarette. One article quoted Mr. Lytle's former boss as saying that Mr. Lytle was "a pleasant and nice guy." CP at 218. Beyond this, the media apparently did not report on Mr. Lytle's character or personality. But defense counsel did.
Defense counsel filed a memorandum and three affidavits addressing Mr. Lytle's character and personality traits. The memo and affidavits generally describe Mr. Lytle as difficult, uncooperative, egotistical, controlling, and irritable. In particular, the memo said Mr. Lytle suffers "from an adjustment disorder of psychotic proportions." CP at 1310. One affidavit described Mr. Lytle's "rigid, almost slavish, adherence in how he perceives and processes information," "his belief that the speaker system in the attorney booth is constructed in such a fashion that it allows the Jail, as well as the detectives, to listen to our conversations," his "faith in his own infallibility," and his belief "that his knowledge base surpasses that of" his attorneys. CP at 1331-35. All three affidavits mentioned crucifixion and mathematical theories Mr. Lytle created to explain Summer's death. One stated that Mr. Lytle had a "preoccupation" with dictionary definitions. CP at 1341. Defense counsel filed the memorandum and affidavits in the court record and requested that the affidavits be sealed. The court denied that request. And Mr. Lytle does not assign error to that ruling. Thus, most of the evidence offered at the competency hearing added little to the information that was available to the public by way of defense counsel's memo and affidavits or other public documents. And none of those affidavits was necessary to the competency determination. See RCW 10.77.084(1)(a) (court's competency determination is based on report by professional person). The trial court's reason for denying Mr. Lytle's closure request was, then, tenable. Competency
Mr. Lytle next argues that the court ignored the relevant constitutional standard when it concluded that he was competent to assist in own defense and fully understand the proceedings. The constitutional test is whether a defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Lytle contends that he was incompetent to stand trial. Whether or not he was competent is a decision that has traditionally been vested in the trial judge overseeing the trial. State v. Ortiz, 104 Wn.2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985). We do not, then, review the claim de novo. We instead pass on whether there are tenable grounds or reasons for the judge's ultimate conclusion that Mr. Lytle was competent to both assist his lawyers and understand what was going on. Id.; State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679-80, 974 P.2d 828 (1999).
The test in Washington is not new. Nor is it unique to this state. State v. Gwaltney, 77 Wn.2d 906, 907, 468 P.2d 433 (1970) (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. 402). "The test for competency to stand trial is whether the accused is capable of properly understanding the nature of the proceedings against him and whether he is capable of rationally assisting his legal counsel in the defense of his cause." State v. Wicklund, 96 Wn.2d 798, 800, 638 P.2d 1241 (1982).
Here, three experts (Dr. Randall Strandquist, Dr. Imelda Borromeo, and Dr. Roy Mays) examined Mr. Lytle and expressed opinions on his competency. Two of those experts, Dr. Strandquist and Dr. Borromeo, believed Mr. Lytle satisfied both prongs of the test for competency. That expert testimony is substantial evidence that Mr. Lytle was competent. State v. Vasquez, 95 Wn. App. 12, 17, 972 P.2d 109 (1998). And it most certainly amounts to tenable grounds or reasons for the judge's ultimate conclusion of competency. State v. Lewis, 141 Wn. App. 367, 386, 166 P.3d 786 (2007).
Mr. Lytle, nonetheless, urges that the trial court's decision was flawed. His primary concern is the appropriate legal standard for competency and its application here. First, he claims the court based its decision on irrelevant testimony about whether his mental disorder was a mental illness. He complains that federal due process does not require a mental illness diagnosis from a psychiatrist or a psychologist. It may not. But the state due process standard does. That is because Washington law affords even greater protection of a defendant's right not be tried while incompetent than does federal law. State v. Heddrick, 166 Wn.2d 898, 903-04, 215 P.3d 201 (2009).
Chapter 10.77 RCW sets out the required procedures for protecting that right. Id. at 904. It requires that a trial court appoint at least two qualified experts to examine and prepare a report on a defendant's mental condition. RCW 10.77.060(1)(a). That report must include a diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition and an opinion as to his competency. RCW 10.77.060(3)(b), (c). Expert testimony about Mr. Lytle's mental condition, then, was not just relevant but mandatory on the two essential competency criteria — ability to understand and ability to assist.
Mr. Lytle also argues the court ignored the most relevant factual evidence of his competency, his defense counsels' affidavits. He says his lawyers were best qualified to assess whether he was able to rationally understand and assist with the legal proceedings. He also argues that testimony from Dr. Strandquist and Dr. Borromeo did not support a finding that he was capable of assisting with his defense because it shows that his personality disorder affected his ability to assist counsel. But the weight to be given to and the influence of this evidence was for the trial court given the overall circumstances here, including the judge's observations of Mr. Lytle. That is why we defer to the trial judge. State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 662, 845 P.2d 289 (1993); State v. Hernandez, 85 Wn. App. 672, 675, 935 P.2d 623 (1997).
Mr. Lytle next suggests that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings underlying the trial court's competency decision because no evidence supports the experts' testimony that Mr. Lytle's uncooperative behavior was the product of choice.
This claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the expert testimony. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Both Dr. Strandquist and Dr. Borromeo explained why they believed Mr. Lytle's behavior was the product of choice. Dr. Strandquist said, "[a]midst that demeanor of uncooperativeness, hair splitting, things like that, he did complete the [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory]," a 567-statement test. RP at 25. He also offered rational thoughts about his situation at a mental health status meeting in jail, saying he would not have gotten involved with Ms. Lytle if he had it to do over again. Dr. Borromeo agreed with Dr. Strandquist's impressions and added that Mr. Lytle "has the capacity to change demeanor and attitude like he did with us many times while he was at Eastern and when we went to see him in jail. He's had — he has the capacity to answer questions in a straightforward manner to relate chronological events in the best possible way he can, if he wanted to, if he chose to." RP at 131. This evidence easily supports the findings underlying the trial court's competency determination.
Finally, Mr. Lytle maintains that the testimony of Dr. Strandquist and Dr. Borromeo did not adequately address his ability to rationally understand and assist with the legal proceedings. He notes that the mental health experts found rational his belief that Summer's death was due to an iodine injection and analogous to Christ's crucifixion. He, however, argues that, while rational in the abstract, these beliefs do not help him defend a charge of homicide by abuse. "Ability to assist does not mean the defendant must be able to choose or suggest trial strategy." Benn, 120 Wn.2d at 662. And the evidence here not only addresses but also shows that Mr. Lytle is able to think, converse, and process information rationally. The trial court's finding that Mr. Lytle was capable of rationally assisting with his defense is based on tenable grounds.
Courtroom Exhibits
Finally, Mr. Lytle contends the trial court erred by admitting the State's Styrofoam cutouts. He says the cutouts were prejudicial because they implanted in the jurors' minds imaginary representations of the Lytles as "dehumanized blank, white, flat people." Appellant's Br. at 36. He objected to the cutouts on the ground that they did not accurately represent the depth or girth of the Lytles' bodies. We review the decisions to admit evidence for illustrative purposes for abuse of discretion. State v. Allen, 72 Wn.2d 42, 44-45, 431 P.2d 593 (1967).
Objects offered in evidence for purely illustrative purposes should be rejected unless they are (1) relevant to demonstrate an essential element of the crime charged, and (2) supported by evidence that the objects are substantially similar to the real thing. State v. Gray, 64 Wn.2d 979, 983, 395 P.2d 490 (1964).
The cutouts of the Lytles were admissible under this standard. The State had to prove that Mr. Lytle "knew [or] should have known that the victim of the current offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance." CP at 1. That was one of the aggravating factors the State alleged in connection with the homicide by abuse charge. The State sought to prove this factor by showing the size difference between Summer and the Lytles. A detective testified that Summer was 42 1/2 inches tall and 45 pounds when she died. Mr. Lytle was 5 feet 9 inches tall and 200 pounds, and Ms. Lytle was 5 feet 5 inches tall and 236 pounds. The detective then confirmed that the heights and weights of the cutouts were substantially similar to the heights and weights of the Lytles when Summer died. The cutouts, then, were relevant and substantially similar to the Lytles' heights and weights. And we are deferential to the trial court on a question that pits an exhibit's probative value against its potential prejudice to the defendant. State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 768, 168 P.3d 359 (2007). We are unable to say that this trial judge abused his discretion by admitting these exhibits.
We affirm the conviction.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KULIK, C.J. and SIDDOWAY, J., concur.