Opinion
No. 5-651 / 05-0157
Filed December 21, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Lucy J. Gamon, District Associate Judge.
Nicholas Little appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense. AFFIRMED.
Douglas L. Tindal of Tindal Kitchen, PLC, Washington, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, Barbara A. Edmondson, County Attorney, and Eric A. Goers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Nicholas Little appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense. He alleges the district court erred by both refusing to allow him to use the prescribed medicine defense in Iowa Code section 321J.2(7)(a) and (b) and finding he intended to operate a motor vehicle. He also argues section 321J.2 is void because it is both vague and overbroad. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
At seven o'clock in the morning on February 17, 2004, Nicholas Little arrived home from his job at Kalona Plastics, Inc. He drank one twenty-four ounce can of beer, used mouthwash containing alcohol, took Zoloft, Zyprexa, and two one-milligram tablets of Xanax, and went to bed. Sometime later, he got in his car and began driving.
At around 9:45 a.m., Little ran into a vehicle stopped at a stop sign. When Little exited his vehicle to talk to the other driver, his car began rolling forward and nearly hit the stopped car again. According to the other driver, Little was having difficulty getting out of his vehicle, was hanging on the door, and had slurred speech. Because no damage was done to his car and he feared for his safety, the other driver declined to exchange insurance information with Little.
Minutes after the first accident, Little collided with another vehicle stopped at an intersection. When that driver asked Little to back up so she could look for damage to her bumper, he backed up, but pulled forward and hit her car two more times. Little asked her not to call the police and offered her money to pay for any damage. According to that driver, Little was slurring his speech, his eyes looked unusually small, and he seemed nervous. When she tried to move her car out of traffic, Little followed her, nearly hit her again, and drove away.
Police Sergeant Mike Clark stopped Little a short time later. Little told Sergeant Clark his name was Nick Price, he had consumed five or six beers, and was on his way home from picking up a prescription. Little smelled of alcohol and was not wearing a coat. After Little failed field sobriety tests, Sergeant Clark took him to the safety center. He allowed Little to warm up in the center, then administered the sobriety tests a second time. When Little failed again, Sergeant Clark administered a breath test. The test indicated Little's blood alcohol content was .071. Because Little appeared to be more impaired than what the breath test indicated, Sergeant Clark requested a urine sample. Little voluntarily complied. The urine tested positive for alprazolam, sertraline, and alprazolam metabolite. It listed Little's blood alcohol as .073.
Sergeant Clark advised Little of his Miranda rights, then interviewed him. Little told Clark he had last worked at Kalona Plastics in 1993. He also told Clark he was presently at Kalona Plastics, it was five o'clock in the afternoon, and he had not eaten since three o'clock in the afternoon, even though he was in the booking room at the safety center and it was eleven o'clock in the morning. He reported he was taking prescription drugs for depression and repeated he had consumed six cans of beer. At one point during the interview, Little fell off his chair.
Little was charged with operating while intoxicated, first offense, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.1. At trial, Little testified he did not remember any of his actions between going to bed and waking up in the police station on February 17. Dr. Alfred Savage, the doctor who prescribed Little's Xanax also testified. He said that when he prescribed the medicine, he told Little to decrease his alcohol consumption. He did not tell Little not to drink. Dr. Savage explained he believed Little was an alcoholic and did not want him to have trouble with withdrawal symptoms. He also did not tell Little not to drive while he was taking Xanax. Both the Xanax and the Zoloft prescriptions themselves, however, carried warnings about mixing the drugs with alcohol. Little was convicted under section 321J.2. He appeals.
II. Scope of Review
We review the district court's interpretation of a statute for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Kurkowski, 704 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Iowa 2005). We review constitutional claims de novo. Kurkowski, 704 N.W.2d at 690. For the purposes of the statutory claims, the district court's findings of fact are binding on us if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Iowa 1990). For the purposes of the constitutional claims, however, "we `make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.'" State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993)). We give deference to the district court's credibility determinations, but are not bound by their fact findings. Id.
III. Merits A. Prescribed Medicine Defense
First, Little argues the district court erred when it refused to allow him to use the prescribed medicine defense in section 321J.2(7)(a) and (b). Section 321J.2(7) reads:
a. This section [section 321J.2 Operating while under the influence of alcohol or a drug or while having an alcohol concentration of .10 or more (OWI)] does not apply to a person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a drug if the substance was prescribed for the person and was taken under the prescription and in accordance with the directions of a medical practitioner as defined in chapter 155A . . . if there is no evidence of the consumption of alcohol and the medical practitioner or pharmacist had not directed the person to refrain from operating a motor vehicle.
b. When charged with a violation of subsection 1, paragraph c, a person may assert, as an affirmative defense, that the controlled substance present in the person's blood or urine was prescribed or dispensed for the person and was taken in accordance with the directions of a practitioner and the labeling directions of the pharmacy, as that person and place are described in section 155A.3.
We see no error in the district court's interpretation of section 321J.2(7)(a) and (b). By its plain language, the statute prohibits the use of the defense where evidence shows the individual charged consumed alcohol. State v. Wolfe, 369 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Iowa 1985). Little told Sergeant Clark he had consumed five to six beers. Even at trial, he admitted to drinking twenty-four ounces of beer. Because the evidence shows Little consumed alcohol, he cannot use the prescribed medicine defense.
B. General Intent to Operate a Motor Vehicle
Second, Little argues that the district court erred when it found he had the general intent to operate a motor vehicle at the time he was arrested. Little claims that instead of intent, his actions show he was acting automatistically. He argues he was rendered unconscious by the prescription drugs. He urges us to follow the example of states that have held automatism or unconciousness to be a complete defense to a criminal charge.
Though Iowa courts have not ruled on the validity of the automatism defense, we are not persuaded this is the case in which to do so. First, Little mixed multiple psychotropic drugs with alcohol. Even if we suspend the common sense that tells an individual in this day and age that mixing such drugs, let alone mixing them with alcohol, is not a good idea, Little still had ample warning of the dangers of his cocktail from the warnings included with his prescriptions. His was not an unexpected reaction. Second, Little's behavior, though not always logical, evidenced some sort of consciousness. He was operating a motor vehicle. He spoke to witnesses and attempted to persuade one of the motorists he struck not to call police. He also spoke to police and sat through a fifty-minute booking procedure. Finally, other than his claim of unconsciousness, he presented no other evidence pertaining to automatistic behavior. We uphold the district court's finding of general intent.
C. Constitutional Claims
Finally, Little contends that section 321J.2(1)(a)-(c) and (7)(a) and (b) is vague both on its face and as applied to him. He also claims the statute is overbroad. He argues the statute is unconstitutional because an individual taking a prescribed medicine who also consumed alcohol could be both prosecuted under the statute and refused the prescription medicine defense. As a result, he claims, the statute infringes upon his rights to free speech, privacy, fairness in the criminal process, and seek or reject medical treatment. Little, however, only puts forth an argument with respect to his First Amendment rights.
We begin with the presumption that the statute is constitutional. State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306, 314 (Iowa 2000). To show the statute is unconstitutionally vague, Little must negate every conceivable reasonable basis on which the statute must be upheld. Id. To survive a vagueness claim, "a penal statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited and must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it." State v. Bock, 357 N.W.2d 29, 33-34 (Iowa 1984). A statute is overbroad if "it attempts to achieve a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of unprotected freedoms." City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Iowa 1992) (quoting State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 1976)). We note Little's facial vagueness and overbreadth claims survive only because he asserts a First Amendment claim. See City of Maquoketa, 484 N.W.2d at 181; State v. Allen, 565 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Iowa 1997).
We have already found that the OWI statute is not vague. Bock, 357 N.W.2d at 34. We also conclude it is not overbroad with respect to Little's argument. First, the prescribed medicine defense gives individuals taking prescriptions the following notice: if evidence of alcohol consumption is found, the defense is not applicable. Further, the statute gives the following explicit standard to those applying it: if evidence of alcohol consumption is found, the defense is not applicable. Second, Little's First Amendment argument that the statute chills communication between doctor and patient is unpersuasive. Rather, we think the statute encourages a discussion between doctor and patient about the possible interactions of prescription drugs, alcohol, and the operation of motor vehicles. Finally, we conclude that protecting the public from drivers impaired by drugs and alcohol is a rational basis for the OWI statute. See also Iowa Code § 321J.23 (articulating other rational reasons for the statute). We therefore affirm the district court's ruling.