State v. Link

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Hogge

    420 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa 1988)   Cited 1 times
    Stating the district court has authority and discretion to order sentences to run consecutively (citing Jones, 299 N.W.2d at 682-83)

    " Therefore, when Hogge's probation was revoked on June 23, 1987, the court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. The defendant cites State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1983), in support of this theory. In Link, the defendant was placed on probation for two years after a conviction for two counts of burglary in the second degree.

  2. State v. Nail

    743 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 2007)   Cited 48 times
    Recognizing the wide discretion afforded to a sentencing court under section 901.5, which must be read in pari materia with other sentencing provisions found elsewhere in the code

    In light of our recognition of the nature and realities of the legislative process, we have repeatedly emphasized that sentencing provisions in Iowa's criminal code must be read in pan materia with other sentencing provisions found elsewhere in the code. State, 616 N.W.2d at 581; State v. Carstens, 594 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Iowa 1999); State v. Kostman, 585 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1998); State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998); State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990); State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Jenney v. Iowa Dist. CL, 456 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1990); State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Iowa 1979). Through such interpretation, we necessarily operate on the objective assumption that the legislature strives to create a symmetrical and harmonious system of laws. State, 616 N.W.2d at 581; Fitzgerald v. State, 220 Iowa 547, 552, 260 N.W. 681, 683-84 (1935).

  3. State v. DeCamp

    622 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 2001)   Cited 100 times
    Holding "[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims presented on direct appeal are typically preserved for postconviction relief proceedings to all for a full development of the facts surrounding the conduct of counsel"

    Finally, we do not apply the literal meaning of a word if it fails to reflect the manifest intent of our legislature. State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1983). The purpose of enhanced sentencing provisions in a statute is to deter and punish recidivism.

  4. State v. Iowa District Court for Mahaska County

    620 N.W.2d 271 (Iowa 2000)   Cited 7 times

    The ultimate goal is "a reasonable interpretation and construction which will best effect the purpose of the statute, seeking to avoid absurd results." State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1983). III. Issue on Appeal

  5. State v. Robinson

    618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000)   Cited 44 times
    Explaining void-for-vagueness doctrine requires a criminal statute to define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement

    This court has recognized that "we . . . seek a reasonable interpretation and construction which will best effect the purpose of the statute, seeking to avoid absurd results." State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1983) (citations omitted). I find that applying child pornography to the exemption does not create an absurd result for the following reasons.

  6. State v. Neary

    470 N.W.2d 27 (Iowa 1991)   Cited 35 times
    Holding express terms of section 901.10 do not include prior out-of-state convictions

    The court, in sentencing defendant, initially applied section 902.9(3) which requires that persons found guilty of a class "C" felony must be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term not to exceed ten years. See State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1983). The court then analyzed whether it could appropriately impose a mandatory minimum prison term less than that required by section 204.413 which states that a person sentenced pursuant to section 204.401(1)(a) "shall not be eligible for parole until the person has served a minimum period of confinement of one-third of the maximum indeterminate sentence prescribed by law."