State v. Lieberman

Full title: STATE OF MINNESOTA, Respondent, v. BROCK DOUGLAS LIEBERMAN, Appellant

Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Date published: Dec 16, 1997

No. C6-97-321 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997)

Opinion

No. C6-97-321.

Filed December 16, 1997.

Appeal from the District Court, Stearns County, File No. T6967103.

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, (for respondent).

Jan Peterson, City Attorney, Gary Gustafson, Assistant City Attorney, (for respondent).

John D. Ellenbecker, (for appellant).

Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Thoreen, Judge.^_

_ Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. sec. 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge.

Brock D. Lieberman appeals his conviction for violating the terms of a harassment restraining order. Because there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we affirm.

DECISION

We review an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to determine "whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn * * *, a [factfinder] could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged." State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978). When a case is decided on stipulated facts, the only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Fingerhut Corp. v. Suburban Nat'l Bank , 460 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Minn.App. 1990).

The district court issued a harassment restraining order against Brock D. Lieberman on April 5, 1996, which provides in part:

If in a public setting other than those outlined below, the respondent (Lieberman) comes into contact with the petitioner (Julie Kalahar) by chance, the Respondent would immediately leave the area. No direct or indirect contact would take place between the parties in the eventuality of a happenstance contact.

If the petitioner comes into a facility, e.g., MC's Dugout, Howie's or the Radisson restaurant, after respondent is already there and participating in an activity such as dining or as a regular customer, the respondent would still leave the premises as soon as reasonably possible after his business or pleasure is accomplished at said facility.

Lieberman was charged with violating the harassment restraining order based on the events that occurred on June 14, 1996. The district court found Lieberman guilty of the charged offense.

Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(a) (1996) provides that "[w]hen * * * a restraining order is granted under this section and the respondent knows of the order, violation of the order is a misdemeanor." To obtain a conviction for violation of a restraining order to cease harassment the state must prove (1) there was a restraining order to cease harassment; (2) the defendant violated a term or condition of the order to cease harassment; and (3) the defendant knew of the order. 10A Minnesota Practice , CRIMJIG 24.48 (1990). The existence of a harassment restraining order and knowledge of the order are not disputed.

Lieberman argues that (1) he was in the Red Carpet Bar prior to Kalahar's arrival, and that according to the terms of the order, he was permitted to remain until he had completed his business or pleasure as a regular customer; and (2) the stipulated facts do not demonstrate he left the Red Carpet Bar prior to Kalahar's return or that Lieberman had completed his activities at the bar.

The restraining order states that if Lieberman comes into contact with Kalahar by chance, in a public setting, Lieberman must immediately leave the area. Here, Lieberman entered the Red Room, saw that Kalahar was present, and then sat down close to her. Lieberman's argument assumes that because he had been present in the Red Carpet Bar earlier during the evening, he could later enter the Red Room while Kalahar was present and remain until his business or pleasure was accomplished. The order requires Lieberman to immediately leave the area if he comes into contact with Kalahar by chance. If Kalahar enters, on the other hand, a facility after Lieberman, the order contemplates permitting Lieberman to remain until he is finished.

The facts indicate that Lieberman was at the Red Carpet Bar earlier in the evening, but they do not indicate that he was also present in the Red Room. Because Lieberman didn't leave the Red Room; instead, he deliberately sat down only two stools away from Kalahar, the district court did not err in finding that Lieberman had violated the restraining order.

Affirmed.

RANDALL, Judge (concurring specially)

I concur in the result.