Opinion
I.D. No. 0812009803
03-13-2012
STATE OF DELAWARE v. ALFRED M. LEWIS, JR. Defendant
Mark A. Denney, Jr., Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State. Alfred M. Lewis, Jr., Wilmington, Delaware, pro se.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief.
DENIED.
ORDER
Mark A. Denney, Jr., Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State. Alfred M. Lewis, Jr., Wilmington, Delaware, pro se. COOCH, R.J.
This 13th day of March 2012, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Alfred M. Lewis, Jr. filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief claiming three grounds for relief - illegal search and seizure, coerced guilty plea resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel, and double jeopardy. Defendant is foreclosed from presently addressing his search and seizure claim, and has failed to meet the appropriate burden on both the guilty plea claim, or on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
2. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony in September 2009 and was sentenced to ten years at level V followed by six months of level III probation. At all relevant times, Defendant was represented by Robert M. Goff, Jr.
3. Defendant appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court in October 2009. The Supreme Court affirmed the plea and sentencing in May 2010.
4. Prior to entering the guilty plea, Defendant engaged with the Court in a plea colloquy. The colloquy proceeded as follows, in pertinent part:
The Court: Have you freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in your written plea agreement?
Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
. . .
The Court: Has your lawyer, the State, or anyone threatened or forced you to enter this plea?
Defendant: No, Your Honor.
The Court: Do you understand that because you're pleading guilty you will not have a trial, and you therefore waive or give up certain constitutional rights?
Defendant: Yes, I do, Your Honor.
The Court: Do you understand that those constitutional rights include each of the following rights: one, to have a lawyer represent you at trial?
Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
. . .
The Court: And to appeal, if convicted, to the Delaware Supreme Court with the assistance of a lawyer?
Defendant: Yes, I do.
The Court: Do you wish to waive or give up all of those constitutional rights?
Defendant; Yes, I do, Your Honor.
. . .
The Court: Do you understand that all defenses to the case--to this case will be forever waived; any legal defenses you might have asserted at trial, any claims about suppression motions not being heard before the trial, etc., all legal defenses are given up forever? Do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes, I do, Your Honor.
. . .
The Court: Do I understand that you do understand there's a jury there and the jury trial is one of the rights that you waive up?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: I've tried to be particularly careful during this plea colloquy to make sure that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently offered. And based on the demeanor of the defendant, my observation of the -- and understanding of the dynamics of seeking time to negotiate a plea - and this obviously was a plea that's ended up being different than what was originally said before the lunch recess to be the plea -- to be
knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently offered. It's accepted.
5. Defendant claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel which hindered Defendant's trial prospects and pressured Defendant into accepting the offered guilty plea. Specifically, Defendant asserts that his attorney:
[F]ailed to investigate the case; showed no interest in Defendant's case; had no trial strategy; coerced (forced) Defendant to have to take a plea; subject[ed] Defendant to being convicted and sentenced twice on weapons charges for one gun; failed to seek treatment for defendant's [drug] addictions; subjected Defendant to two separate prosecutions for essentially the same crimes; never challenged duplicity of charges plead to.
. . . [after the plea] Defendant asked Mr. Goff to file an appeal, but Mr. Goff advised, Lewis had waived his right to appeal by pleading guilty.
6. Additionally, Defendant contends trial counsel failed to file both a necessary suppression motion and to properly prepare for trial. In light of the alleged failures by counsel, Defendant asserts, "he was held to an extreme disadvantage, due to no factual hearings taking place. Therefore, to limit the dangerous exposure of a lengthy sentence defendant contemplated a plea agreement." Defendant contends that his trial counsel misrepresented what was included within the plea and Defendant relied upon his attorney's assertions.
7. In response to Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Goff avers as follows, in pertinent part:
[Defendant] was [originally] made a combined offer of twenty years incarceration to resolve this case as well as his pending charges in the separate attempted murder case. I advised [Defendant] that he faced a minimum of twenty-
five years on this case . . . He faced many decades of minimum mandatory time on the other case.
...we discussed the suppression issue Mr. Lewis believed existed. Although I am certain that we discussed this matter before, I reiterated my view that such a motion would [be] legally baseless. . . . I did, however, promise to look at case citations he provided me. I later did so and again determined that I would not file a suppression motion. . . .
On the trial date, I advised my client that I just did not see a viable suppression issue. Eventually, however, I relented and made a request of this Court for a continuance and leave to file a suppression motion. This application was denied and the defendant thereafter accepted a plea resolution to ten years of incarceration. In view of the strength of the case and the twenty-five minimum years [Defendant] faced, I had recommended he accept the offer. I did not coerce or force the defendant to accept the offer. [Defendant] was fully aware because I told him that pleading guilty was his decision, not mine, to make.
Thereafter, defense counsel filed under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) complete with [Defendant's] voluminous submissions a brief on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. The Court nevertheless affirmed. ...
[Defendant] makes many, many more allegations concerning defense counsel performance of his duties in this and his other cases. However, they do not seem to have anything to do with the basis of this Rule 61 Motion for postconviction relief.
8. The State contends that Defendant's claims regarding the suppression are insufficient because they were waived during the plea colloquy. The State notes that the purported suppression's lack of merit is demonstrated by counsel's research as described in counsel's affidavit. The State asserts Defendant cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, the State argues that Mr. Goff's affidavit demonstrates the plea was not coerced because counsel merely explained the plea's implications. Finally the State argues that Defendant's Motion demonstrates a misunderstanding regarding
double jeopardy because Defendant's assertions are based upon two separate guilty pleas to Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. The State asserts that both were based upon different underlying offenses, and as such are not double jeopardy.
9. To assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was unreasonable, and that but for counsel's deficient performance, the defendant would not have entered the guilty plea.Unless a defendant proffers clear and convincing contrary evidence, a defendant is bound by his answers during the plea colloquy and provided on the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. When a Defendant enters a valid guilty plea, Defendant waives his ability to assert particular claims including claims that evidence should have been suppressed.
10. Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not fulfill the appropriate burden because when Defendant's claims are considered together with counsel's affidavit, Defendant fails to demonstrate that counsel's performance was unreasonable. While Defendant explains his unhappiness with counsel in great detail, at its core Defendant simply contends that his counsel recommended Defendant accept the plea, and that Defendant disagreed with his attorney's trial strategy. However, counsel is responsible for decisions involving trial tactics and strategy. While the client retains sole responsibility for decisions regarding pleas, an attorney's encouragement of a Defendant to accept a plea is not valid grounds for plea withdrawal. Conversely, it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if an attorney fails to provide professional advice regarding whether to accept a proposed plea.
11. Defendant contends that his attorney suggested it was in Defendant's best interest to accept the plea. However, it is entirely appropriate for
defense counsel to explain the unlikelihood of success at trial and the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence. If counsel were to do more than simply suggest Defendant take a plea, such as to force the plea upon Defendant, it would validate plea withdrawal. However, no such force or coercion is alleged by Defendant.
12. Furthermore, during the plea colloquy, Defendant expressly denied that his attorney or anyone else forced Defendant to accept the plea. It is understandable that Defendant felt some pressure when considering whether to accept the plea or pursue a jury trial, but such "pressure" is inevitable in the criminal justice system. However, the inherent pressure of a stressful situation combined with his attorney's plea advice fall short of the threshold required for plea withdrawal.
13. Defendant asserts that the pressure to take the plea was a direct result of ineffective counsel. However, none of Defendant's assertions constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Although counsel and Defendant disagreed about trial strategy, the motion to suppress, and various aspects of the case, the disagreement does not constitute deficient representation. While the disagreement may have been ongoing, Defendant has not proffered that the guilty plea would not have been entered absent the disagreement with counsel. Additionally, Defendant provides insufficient evidence demonstrating any misrepresentations by counsel about the guilty plea that require the plea withdrawal.
14. Notably, Defendant explicitly answered each question appropriately during the plea colloquy and did not address any of the issues that Defendant currently advances. By failing to proffer sufficient clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Defendant is bound to his responses during the colloquy and his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing forms. Additionally, Defendant has not met his burden of establishing counsel's ineffectiveness.
15. Finally, the State is correct in characterizing Defendant's misunderstanding of double jeopardy. The United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." "The Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against: (1) successive prosecutions; (2) multiple charges under separate statutes; and (3) being charged multiple times under the same statute."
16. The Delaware Supreme Court specifically held that the statute criminalizing the Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony "supports the multiplication of counts . . . by both the number of weapons as well as the number of separate underlying felonies." In that case the Delaware Supreme Court found that two separate offenses resulted in two separate weapons charges and did not contravene the Double Jeopardy Clause. As such, Defendant's claim that his sentence is unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clause is without merit.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
Plea Colloquy Tr. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5-6
Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
L e w is v. State, 994 A.2d 744 (Del. 2010) (TABLE).
Plea Colloquy Tr. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5-6
Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
Def's M. for Postconviction Relief at 5.
All errors original.
Aff. of Robert M. Goff, Esq.
Def's M. for Postconviction Relief at 5.
All errors original.
Def's M. for Postconviction Relief at 4.
Aff. of Robert M. Goff, Esq.
Jamison v. State, A.2d 238 (Del. 2003).
Bible v. State, 998 A.2d 850 (Del. 2010); See also Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629 (Del. 1997).
See State v. Ayers, 2002 WL 1503449 (Del. Super. 2002 Apr. 4, 2002)(When defendant pled guilty, defendant knowingly waived the right to assert suppression claims or that his Miranda rights were infringed).
Bradshaw v. State, 806 A.2d 131, 138 (Del. 2002)
Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 286 (Del. 2006) citing Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del.2002).
Id. at 288.
Id.
--------
L e w is v. State, 994 A.2d 744 (Del. 2010) (TABLE).
Plea Colloquy Tr. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5-6
Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
Def's M. for Postconviction Relief at 5.
All errors original.
Def's M. for Postconviction Relief at 4.
Aff. of Robert M. Goff, Esq.
Jamison v. State, A.2d 238 (Del. 2003).
Bible v. State, 998 A.2d 850 (Del. 2010); See also Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629 (Del. 1997).
See State v. Ayers, 2002 WL 1503449 (Del. Super. 2002 Apr. 4, 2002)(When defendant pled guilty, defendant knowingly waived the right to assert suppression claims or that his Miranda rights were infringed).
Bradshaw v. State, 806 A.2d 131, 138 (Del. 2002)
Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 286 (Del. 2006) citing Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del.2002).
Id. at 288.
Id.
--------
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________
Richard R. Cooch, R.J.
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Investigative Services