See generally McCormick,Evidence § 6 (1954); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 769-72 (3 d ed. 1940). The question whether Abbott intentionally struck any of the Scaranos with the ax was perfectly proper; we do not see how else it could be phrased. Cf. State v. Len, 108 N.J.L. 439, 440 ( Sup. Ct. 1932). Since the objection to the earlier question was not particularized, it is appropriate to add that questions addressed to the mental operations of a defendant are thoroughly proper when such operations are an ingredient of the State's case or of a defense.

(13 Cal.Jur. 638-639.) [2, 3] It is too well settled to require extensive citation that where the state of mind of a party is in issue it is always competent for the party to testify to his own state of mind (10 Cal.Jur. 832; 8 Cal.Jur. 33) and so it has been uniformly held whenever the question has arisen that where self-defense is relied on, after prima facie proof of facts which would support a finding of reasonable cause to apprehend death or great bodily harm, the defendant is entitled to testify to his own mental reaction, and it is error not to allow him to do so. ( State v. Mark Len, 108 N.J.L. 439 [ 158 A. 749]; Commonwealth v. Woodward, 102 Mass. 155, 161-162; Duncan v. State, 84 Ind. 204, 208; State v. Sterling, (Mo.) 72 S.W.2d 70, 73; State v. Robinson, 181 N.C. 552 [ 107 S.E. 131]; People v. Biella, 374 Ill. 87 [ 28 N.E.2d 111, 112]; Starr v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 193 [30 S.W. 397, 399]; State v. Jones, 249 Mo. 80 [155 S.W. 33, 38]; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., § 329, p. 455.) In Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249 [102 A. 947], a criminal assault case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said of the defendant:

A defendant claiming the privilege of self-defense must also establish that her belief in the necessity to use force was reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Mellillo, 77 N.J.L. 505 [71 A. 671] (E. A. 1908); State v. Mark Len, 108 N.J.L. 439, 440 [ 158 A. 749] (Sup.Ct. 1932). [ Kelly, 97 N.J. at 199, 478 A.2d 364].

A defendant claiming the privilege of self-defense must also establish that her belief in the necessity to use force was reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Mellillo, 77 N.J.L. 505 [71 A. 671] (E. A. 1908); State v. Mark Len, 108 N.J.L. 439, 440 [ 158 A. 749] (Sup.Ct. 1932). [ Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 199, 478 A.2d 364].

Honesty alone, however, does not suffice. A defendant claiming the privilege of self-defense must also establish that her belief in the necessity to use force was reasonable. See, e.g., Statev. Mellillo, 77 N.J.L. 505 (E. A. 1908); State v. MarkLen, 108 N.J.L. 439, 440 (Sup.Ct. 1932). As originally proposed, the new Code of Criminal Justice would have eliminated the reasonableness requirement, allowing self-defense whenever the defendant honestly believed in the imminent need to act.

The situation here is different, and on balance we think the present case is in line with those where the error in denying a defendant the right to testify flatly as to his intent has been considered material, notwithstanding the admission of some testimony by the defendant bearing inferentially on his intent. See Haigler v. United States, 172 F.2d 986, 988-989 (10th Cir. 1949); Cain v. State, 112 Ga. App. 646, 646-647 (1965); People v. Spranger, 314 Ill. 602, 608-610 (1924); People v. Christen, 82 Ill. App.3d 192, 194-196 (1980); People v. Johnson, 108 Ill. App.2d 150, 158-160 (1969); State v. Len, 208 N.J.L. 439, 441-442 (1932); People v. Levan, 295 N.Y. 26, 33 (1945) ("We cannot extenuate the error [ruling by the judge to exclude direct question as to defendant's intent]. . . . There was no denial by the defendant, prior to the ruling, of an intent to rob.

Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, L.R. 29, C.D. 483; 55 L.J. Ch. 650 (1885), Bowen, L.J. Now that the general common-law testimonial disqualification by interest no longer obtains, wherever motive, belief or intent of a party is material to the issue, it may be proved by his own direct testimony. Mulford v. Tunis, 35 N.J.L. 256 ( Sup. Ct. 1871); State v.Mark Len, 108 N.J.L. 439 ( Sup. Ct. 1932); Crawford v.United States, 212 U.S. 183, 29 S.Ct. 260, 53 L.Ed. 465 (1909); Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77, 81 A. 974 ( Sup.Ct. Err. 1911); Jarrell v. Young, Smyth, Field Co., 105 Md. 280, 66 A. 50, 23 L.R.A., N.S., 367 ( Ct. App. 1907); Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Allen 548 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1863); Noonan v. Luther, 206 N.Y. 105, 99 N.E. 178, 41 L.R.A., N.S., 761 ( Ct. App. 1912). When the interest disqualification of a party was abolished altogether, "parties became qualified to testify to whatever other persons had been qualified to testify to, including the fact of their own intent."

" It is contended the defendant had a right to show his state of mind during the incident leading up to his wife's death and it was error for the court to have sustained the State's objection to the question. Where self-defense is interposed to an indictment for homicide or homicidal assault, the defendant is entitled to testify to the state of mind which impelled him to commit the act complained of. State v. Len, 108 N.J.L. 439 ( Sup. Ct. 1932); Wallace v.U.S., 162 U.S. 466, 40 L.Ed. 1039 (1896). Here, however, self-defense is not an issue and the question was designed to elicit not the defendant's "state of mind" but rather his opinion concerning his wife's intent.

Self-defense may not be carried beyond the bounds of necessity. State v. Jayson,supra; State v. Len, 108 N.J.L. 439; State v. Brown, 62Id. 666. Next, it is maintained that the trial judge erred in refusing to direct the Prosecutor of the Pleas to produce, for the use of the accused, a stenographic statement made by the prosecutrix respecting the altercation, believed to contain admissions at variance with her denial on cross-examination that she had applied certain abusive epithets to the accused just prior to the assault.

See generally McCormick, Evidence § 6 (1954); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 769- 72 (3d ed. 1940). The question whether Abbott intentionally struck any of the Scaranos with the ax was perfectly proper; we do not see how else it could be phrased. Cf. State v. Len, 108 N.J.L. 439, 440, 158 A. 749 (Sup.Ct. 1932)." State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 174 A.2d 881, 889 (1961).