Leja appealed all three convictions, as well as the upward sentencing departure associated with the second-degree felony murder conviction. State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459 (Minn.App. 2003). The court of appeals vacated the accomplice-after-the-fact conviction.
Id. at 428-29; see also State v. French, 402 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding that any error in admitting officer's testimony regarding defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence was harmless where officer "did not focus on, nor unduly highlight, [defendant's] silence"). In State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 463-64 (Minn. App. 2003), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004), we found that a prosecutor's cross-examination question strongly implying the defendant's postarrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This is because a person who is charged and convicted as a principal to an offense cannot also be liable as an accomplice to that offense. State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 466 (Minn.App. 2003) (discussing that, under Minnesota law, a defendant found guilty of aiding and abetting first- or second-degree murder is a principal and cannot also be guilty of aiding after the fact), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004). Accordingly, we reverse Amacher's aiding-after-the-fact conviction and remand for the district court to vacate the conviction and leave the guilty verdict intact.
Accordingly, in State v. Leja, this court determined that a statement was not hearsay when it was used "not for its truth, but to show [the defendant's] knowledge." 660 N.W.2d 459, 465 (Minn.App. 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004).
State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Minn. 1996). Crosby argues that her conviction for aiding an offender as an accomplice after the fact is legally impermissible given our holding in State v. Leja. 660 N.W.2d 459 (Minn. App. 2003), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004).
It is true that a person who has been convicted of aiding and abetting a crime under section 609.05, subdivision 1, cannot also be convicted of aiding an offender to commit that crime under section 609.495, subdivision 1(a). State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 465-66 (Minn. App. 2003) (concluding that, as a matter of law, a defendant convicted of aiding second-degree murder could not also be convicted of aiding an offender), aff'd asmodified, 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004).
( Jordan v. State (2000) 272 Ga. 395 [ 530 S.E.2d 192, 194]; State v. Hawkins (1992) 326 Md. 270 [ 604 A.2d 489, 494-500]; Staten v. State (Fla. 1988) 519 So.2d 622, 625-626; State v. Leja (Minn.Ct.App. 2003) 660 N.W.2d 459, 465-466; People v. Hartford (1987) 159 Mich.App. 295 [ 406 N.W.2d 276, 278-279]; 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, Post-Crime Aid, ยง 13.6(a), pp. 402-403, fns. 25-26.) All of those cases permit the defendant to be charged and tried as both a principal and an accessory if the pretrial evidence supports both charges, but the cases require that the jury be told that the defendant cannot be convicted of both.
State v. Swyningan, 304 Minn. 552, 555, 229 N.W.2d 29, 32 (1975). See also State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 466 (Minn.App. 2003) (holding that it is impossible as a matter of law for a principal to also be guilty of being an accomplice after the fact), rev'd on other grounds, 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004); State v. Sullivan, 77 N.J.Super. 81, 90, 185 A.2d 410, 415 (1962) (stating "[a]n accessory after the fact `cannot be charged, or punished as the principal offender.
We presume that jurors followed the district court's instructions. State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Minn. App. 2003), review granted (Minn. Jul. 15, 2003).