Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5606-13T4
11-16-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRIAN J. LAURENZA, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Haas and Currier. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 12-08-1494. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Brian Laurenza appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the police (1) violated the knock-and-announce rule; (2) unlawfully entered a fenced-in backyard of his residence; and (3) executed the arrest warrant in an unreasonable manner. Because we find the police complied with the requirements of State v. Miller, 342 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 2001) in verifying defendant lived at the address and was home at the time of the execution of the warrant, we affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record developed at the suppression hearing. Sergeant Patrick Barrett of the Jersey City Police Criminal Warrant Squad testified concerning the issuance of a warrant for defendant after his DNA was found at the scene of a burglary. Background and criminal checks were done and an address for defendant was provided through regularly used databases. Prior to going to the address, Barrett distributed photographs of defendant to his team of officers.
When the group of six officers arrived at the apartment building where defendant resided, two officers went to the fenced-in backyard in order to prevent escape and the others entered through the unlocked front door of the building. Defendant's residence was located on the first floor and the officers reported they could hear a woman's voice within the apartment.
Prior to knocking on defendant's door the officers saw a woman in the vestibule exiting the building. A photograph of defendant was shown to the woman and the officers pointed to defendant's door. The woman gave a nod and the officers interpreted the gesture as confirming that defendant resided in that apartment.
The officers also encountered a maintenance person who unlocked the gate of the backyard, allowing them to enter into the yard and make observations through a back window of defendant sitting on a bed. They contacted the officers who were inside the building with their observations and began to knock on the back windows identifying themselves as Jersey City police officers and calling out defendant's name. The officers denied attempting to enter or entering the apartment through the back window.
Inside the building, the officers knocked on the apartment door loudly, stating: "Police, open the door, police, open the door." After a period of time, defendant's wife opened the door, pointed to the back of the residence, and told police defendant was there. The officers could see defendant standing in a back bedroom. They entered the bedroom and told defendant to lay down on the ground. Officer Michael Donahue testified that he was with defendant in the bedroom. The officer stated he was standing on a pile of clothing that was on the floor and as he brushed against a white shirt it uncovered a small handgun. The officers took the gun into evidence.
After defendant's wife permitted the officers to enter the home, Barrett stated she was very helpful. She agreed to sign several consent-to-search forms and the officers gathered evidence from the apartment pursuant to her consent.
Defendant's wife also testified at the hearing providing a different version of events. She stated that she and her thirteen-year old son, as well as defendant, were located in the back bedroom. There was knocking at the back windows and at the front door, and men yelling that they were police officers, calling defendant's name. She stated that she saw a man trying to enter through the window. Defendant then told her to open the front door. She advised she only signed consent-to-search forms after the officers advised her that a failure to sign would result in her son being taken "into the State and she would be held in custody." She said she was not told she could refuse to sign the forms.
Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; third-degree theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); third-degree receipt of stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).
The trial judge issued a written decision on the suppression motion. In finding the execution of the arrest warrant to be lawful, the judge noted that the officers had discovered defendant's address through investigative work. He found the officers' testimony to be credible concerning their interactions with both the unidentified female resident of the apartment building and the superintendent; both individuals confirming defendant lived in the apartment at the time the warrant was executed. He, therefore, found that both prongs of Miller had been satisfied.
In addressing the evidence seized following the signing of the search forms, the judge determined defendant's wife was credible in her testimony as to the circumstances surrounding her signing of the consent-to-search forms. He repeated the officer's description of her as nervous and crying, and concluded she had not acted freely, as she believed there were dire consequences if she failed to comply with the officers' request. The judge determined that she had not knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search, and therefore suppressed all evidence obtained from the consent searches. As to the handgun, the judge found it had been seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine and denied its suppression.
Following the judge's decision on the suppression hearing, defendant pled guilty to the burglary and second-degree weapons charges. He was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment with three years of parole ineligibility.
On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE UNLAWFULLY ENTERED THE FENCED-IN BACKYARD OF THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE, VIOLATED THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE, AND EXECUTED THE WARRANT IN AN UNREASONABLE MANNER.
1. Because the Police Entered the Private Backyard Without Abiding by the Knock-and-Announce Precautions and Prior to Knowing that Mr. Laurenza was Actually Present in the House, Their Entry was Unconstitutional, Requiring Suppression of all of the Evidence.
2. Because the Police Failed to Announce Their Purpose Prior to Entry, The Knock-And-Announce Rule was Violated, Requiring Suppression of the Evidence.
3. Because The Police Acted Unreasonably When Executing The Arrest Warrant By Entering through A Back Window And/Or By Handcuffing Mrs. Laurenza And Pointing Guns At Her and Her Son, Suppression Is Required.
When considering a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, "[w]e conduct [our] review with substantial deference to the trial court's factual findings, which we must uphold . . . so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 228 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Those findings warrant particular deference when they are substantially influenced by the trial judge's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
"We review the record on a motion to suppress to determine whether the findings are supported by credible evidence and the legal conclusions are valid." State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super 425, 430 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J. 560, 564 (App. Div. 1990)).
In Miller, supra, we adopted a two prong test governing the execution of an arrest warrant. To lawfully execute an arrest warrant in a dwelling, the officers must have "objectively reasonable bases for believing that the person named in the warrant both resides in the dwelling and is within the dwelling at the time." Id. at 479. The judge found the address had been revealed through investigative work, including parole records. He also found the officers to be credible in their testimony regarding the confirmation that defendant resided in the apartment by the other resident of the building and the superintendent. Finally, the officers were granted access into the backyard by the superintendent where they were able to see defendant through a window.
We are satisfied by the judge's credibility determinations and the substantial credible evidence in the record that the mandate of Miller was satisfied to render the officers' entry into the residence and subsequent arrest lawful.
Defendant does not argue on appeal that the gun was not properly seized under the plain view doctrine. --------
We also reject defendant's argument that the officers did not comply with the knock-and-announce rule. Both the officers and defendant's wife testified law enforcement officers were knocking, loudly identifying themselves, and calling out defendant's name. The wife then opened the door, allowing the officers to enter and indicating where defendant was in the apartment. There was no forcible entry here. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 14 (2009) (establishing that the knock-and-announce rule renders unlawful a forcible entry to arrest or search where the officer failed first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission).
We are satisfied that the trial judge's findings of fact are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, and the matter was correctly decided. We therefore affirm the order denying defendant's suppression motion as to the seizure of the handgun.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION