Opinion
01-31-1929
STATE v. LARIMORE.
David J. Reinhardt, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State. P. Warren Green, of Wilmington, for defendant.
Proceedings by the State against Edward Larimore, Jr., for operating an automobile after revocation of operator's license. Decree in accordance with opinion.
RODNEY, J., sitting.
David J. Reinhardt, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.
P. Warren Green, of Wilmington, for defendant.
The defendant was charged with operating an automobile after his operator's license had been revoked in violation of section 6 of chapter 193, vol. 32, Laws of Delaware. That act was approved March 28, 1921. Under its provisions the Secretary of State was authorized to revoke or suspend licenses to operate automobiles where the owners of such licenses were shown by reasonable evidence not to be proper or competent persons to operate such automobiles. Section 3 provided that no operator's license should be revoked without a hearing and provided for certain notices to be given and formalities to be complied with.
Section 6 provided:
"* * * The operation of any motor vehicle by a person whose operating license is revoked or suspended, or who is not entitled to operate the same under other provisions of the law, shall be punishable on conviction. * * *"
It was agreed that the license of the defendant to operate a motor vehicle had been revoked by the Secretary of State on July 24, 1928. That revocation of license was not made pursuant to chapter 193 of volume 32 (supra), but the license was revoked following a conviction of the defendant of the offense of operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Section 239 of the Revised Code of 1915 as amended March 23, 1923, by chapter 7, vol. 33, Laws of Delaware, provided that upon the conviction of a person for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated the facts and record of such conviction should be certified to the Secretary of State "who shall forthwith revoke the license of the party so convicted for a period of one year." It was contended by the defendant that there could be no prosecution or conviction under section 6 of chapter 193, vol. 32, except in those cases where the license was revoked under the provisions of and in accordance with the notices provided by chapter 193, being the Act of 1921.
The state contended that a prosecution and conviction could be had under section 6 of chapter 193, vol. 32, for operating a motor vehicle after revocation of license where such revocation was had for driving while intoxicated under the provisions of chapter 7 of volume 33, being the Act of 1923. This was the sole question involved in the case.
RODNEY, J. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction of almost universal acceptation that statutes concerning the same subject-matter will be considered together even though the several statutes received legislative sanction at different times. One reason for the rule is that all general laws upon the same subject will be construed with reference to the whole system of which each act forms a part. Penal statutes are within the operation of the general rule. 25 R. C. L. 1066.
The Act of March 28, 1921 (chapter 193, vol. 32, Laws of Delaware), provides for revocation of licenses to operate automobiles. Section 6 is a general law providing the punishment for "the operation of any motor vehicle by a person whose operating license is revoked or suspended, or who is not entitled to operate the same under other provisions of the law."
The Act of 1923 (under which this license is revoked) makes it mandatory upon a conviction for driving while intoxicated for the trial justice to certify the facts and record to the Secretary of State who "shall forthwith revoke the license of the party so convicted." Both acts concern the forfeiture of operators' licenses for automobiles andto that extent are in pari materia. In one act provision is made for hearings upon proceedings to revoke a license, while in the other the certification of a conviction for driving while intoxicated makes it mandatory upon the Secretary of State to "forthwith" revoke the license of the person so convicted. The penalty for driving an automobile after the revocation of the license as provided by section 6 is applicable to a violation of either act.
Chancellor Kent, in Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 735, 744, says:
"All statutes, said Lord Mansfield (Doug. 30), which are in Pari Materia, are to be taken together, as if they were one law; and, in many instances, a remedy provided by one statute, will be extended to cases arising on the same subject-matter under a subsequent statute."
The case of Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226, is analogous to the present one. In that case prosecutions were had under a statute of 1856. There was no provision in that act imposing a penalty for a violation of its terms. The Act of 1856 was held in pari materia with an Act of 1827 and the violators of the Act of 1856 were held amenable to the penalties provided by the Act of 1827.