Appellant further argues, correctly, that evidence of a separate crime is inadmissible unless sufficient to take to the jury. State v. Marahrens, 114 Ariz. 304, 307, 560 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1977); State v. LaGrand, 138 Ariz. 275, 280, 674 P.2d 338, 343 (App. 1983). We disagree, however, with the argument that, because the appellant was not charged with the Gerhart Moehring burglary, such evidence did not exist.
ยถ14 We agree with the state that the attempted armed robbery was complete by the time Herrera, Ortiz, and Cordova arrived at C.H.'s home, knowing Herrera was armed with a baton and having travelled there with the intent to rob the residents. See State v. LaGrand, 138 Ariz. 275, 280 (App. 1983) (entering store with intent to rob, coupled with gun found in car, sufficient evidence of attempted armed robbery); cf. State v. May, 137 Ariz. 183, 186-87 (App. 1983) (evidence defendant went to victim's home armed with pistol and waited in victim's shed sufficient to establish attempted aggravated assault with deadly weapon).
To date, however, our courts have not determined whether that standard was superseded by the adoption of the Arizona Rules of Evidence in 1977 or, more particularly, by the interpretation of Rule 104(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence โ the federal counterpart to Arizona's Rule 104(b) โ in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). See State v. Valles, 162 Ariz. 1, 5, 780 P.2d 1049, 1053 (1989); State v. McGann, 132 Ariz. 296, 298, 645 P.2d 811, 813 (1982); State v. Woods, 121 Ariz. 187, 190, 589 P.2d 430, 433 (1979); State v. Corcoran (Treadaway), 119 Ariz. 573, 576, 583 P.2d 229, 232 (1978); State v. Marahrens, 114 Ariz. 304, 307, 560 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 112 Ariz. 592, 594, 545 P.2d 49, 51 (1976); State v. Armstrong, 176 Ariz. 470, 473-74 n. 3, 862 P.2d 230, 233-34 n. 3 (App. 1993); State v. Pereida, 170 Ariz. 450, 453, 825 P.2d 975, 978 (App. 1992); State v. LaGrand, 138 Ariz. 275, 280, 674 P.2d 338, 342 (App. 1983); State v. Keith, 24 Ariz. App. 275, 277, 537 P.2d 1333, 1335 (1975); State v. Biddlecome, 14 Ariz. App. 163, 165, 481 P.2d 533, 535 (1971); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 547, 804 P.2d 72, 80 (1990); State v. Williams, 182 Ariz. 548, 553, 898 P.2d 497, 502 (App. 1995). In Huddleston, the United States Supreme Court held that, in order to introduce otherwise-admissible prior-acts evidence under Federal Rule 104(b), the proponent need only present sufficient proof upon which a jury could reasonably conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the other party committed the prior act.
Because there was no evidence presented that appellant transported Parker within the meaning of A.R.S. ยง 13-3210, the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict. State v. LaGrand, 138 Ariz. 275, 674 P.2d 338 (App. 1983).
Nevertheless, it was found to be harmless error. Appellant also argues that the evidence was inadmissible because the proof was insufficient to take to the jury, citing State v. Mitchell, 112 Ariz. 592, 545 P.2d 49 (1976); State v. Hughes, 102 Ariz. 118, 426 P.2d 386 (1967); and State v. LaGrand, 138 Ariz. 275, 674 P.2d 338 (App. 1983). We find the evidence sufficient here.
Substantial evidence does not require, as defendant asserts, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" but rather such proof "as reasonable minds could have concluded that defendant committed the crime." State v. LaGrand, 138 Ariz. 275, 280, 674 P.2d 338, 343 (App. 1983). The record contains such evidence.