Opinion
No. 5-741 / 04-1700
Filed November 23, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom, Judge.
Joel Kramersmeier appeals from his conviction and sentence for murder in the first degree. AFFIRMED.
Patricia M. Hulting of Terrill, Martens, Hulting Stockdale, An Association of Sole Practitioners, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Frank Severino and Michael Hunter, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Joel Kramersmeier appeals from his conviction and sentence for murder in the first degree. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On the evening of September 4, 2003, Cindy Johnson died from a stab wound to the heart. A passing motorist discovered Cindy's body off the side of an on-ramp to Interstate 35 in Ankeny. Officers at the scene observed two large pools of blood on the pavement that were connected to the victim by distinct, thirty-foot long drag marks. Joel Kramersmeier was subsequently arrested while driving Cindy's vehicle. The arresting officers found Cindy's blood on both the vehicle and Kramersmeier's clothing.
Kramersmeier waived his Miranda rights and told investigators that he and Cindy are the parents of a two-year old child, and until recently had shared a residence. Kramersmeier indicated that he and Cindy had been arguing constantly over the past several months and that on the day of the stabbing, Kramersmeier had been drinking heavily. Kramersmeier also informed the investigators that he, Cindy, and their son were en route from Cindy's residence in Waukee to his mother's residence in Ankeny when Kramersmeier exited the vehicle on the on-ramp to urinate. He directed Cindy out of the vehicle, and when she complied, he (1) stabbed her in the chest, (2) waited for her to stop breathing, and then (3) dragged her body from the road. Kramersmeier told the investigators that he had procured a fillet knife from Cindy's residence earlier in the evening, but had disposed of the knife after the stabbing. No weapon was discovered.
In advance of trial, Kramersmeier filed a notice of his intent to rely on defenses of insanity, diminished capacity, and intoxication, but following a mental health examination, withdrew them before the jury trial commenced in September of 2004. Because of Kramersmeier's admissions to investigators, it soon became clear that the fighting issue was whether the homicide was committed with premeditation as required to sustain a first-degree murder conviction. See Iowa Code § 707.2 (2003). The State called a number of witnesses who detailed the growing animosity Kramersmeier held for the victim before her death. One witness testified that a week before Cindy's death, Kramersmeier disclosed that he had been arguing with Cindy and said he would "kill her." The investigators who interviewed Kramersmeier after he was arrested were also called to testify to the substance of the confession, including Kramersmeier's description of his preparation for the attack, his involvement in the stabbing, and his attempt to conceal the body.
On appeal, Kramersmeier notes his trial counsel failed to cross-examine five of these witnesses called by the State. Kramersmeier does not allege on direct appeal that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Kramersmeier also notes his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the confession in advance of trial, but does not advance any theory by which that failure could be construed as a breach of an essential duty.
Kramersmeier rested without calling any witnesses on his behalf. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Kramersmeier was sentenced to life in prison. He now appeals, alleging the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel denied him a fair trial. In particular, Kramersmeier alleges trial counsel made several prejudicial misstatements of the evidence in her closing argument. Included among these misstatements made by trial counsel was the following:
Kramersmeier also points out several other prejudicial misstatements made by trial counsel during closing argument that he now claims not only resolved several factual disputes in the State's favor, but also served to emphasize damaging evidence adduced by the State. First, in trying to prove Kramersmeier had prior animus for Cindy, the State had called one witness who testified that Kramersmeier regularly referred to Cindy as a "bitch," and another who testified he often called Cindy a "repulsive fat pig." In summing up the State's evidence, trial counsel mistakenly combined these two references, stating instead that Kramersmeier was alleged to have called Cindy a "repulsive fat bitch." Second, despite the inherent ambiguity in one witness's claim that Kramersmeier had told the witness that he wanted to "kill her," trial counsel's closing argument emphasized that "her" referenced Cindy. Lastly, Kramersmeier contends trial counsel emphasized the concealment of the body by arguing a fact not in dispute. Although the evidence made it clear that Kramersmeier had moved the body thirty feet off the roadway, trial counsel argued that Kramersmeier was too small to have dragged Cindy's body that distance.
[Kramersmeier] dragged her body so it could not be found . . . Excuse me. He did not drag her body for that reason. He dragged her body so it would not get run over and because it was disgusting.
Kramersmeier asserts this excerpt from the argument aided the State in its attempted to persuade the jury that it had met its burden to prove he killed Cindy with malice aforethought by conceding that he dragged the body in an attempt to conceal the crime. Kramersmeier therefore insists these misstatements constitute a breach of an essential duty. Kramersmeier also contends that even without the aid given to the State by way of his trial counsel's misstatements, there is insufficient evidence in this case to sustain his first-degree murder conviction.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the first-degree murder charge for correction of errors at law, and we will uphold the jury's verdict if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Evidence is substantial if a rational jury could be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each essential element of the crime charged. State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 2001). Evidence is not substantial, however, where it raises only suspicion, speculation or conjecture. Id. And while we review the entire record, not just evidence supporting guilt, we must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d at 377.
Where the ineffectiveness of counsel is alleged as the basis for the denial of a fair trial, we perform de novo review of the entire record in order to assess both the reasonableness of counsel's conduct and any prejudice suffered thereby. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel need not be raised on direct appeal to preserve them for post-conviction proceedings. Iowa Code § 814.7 (2005). If such a claim is raised on direct appeal, and the record is adequate to permit us to assess trial counsel's effectiveness, or the record is sufficient to determine whether prejudice resulted from counsel's alleged unprofessional error, we may decide the ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal. State v. Allen, 348 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1984). In order to prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Kramersmeier must demonstrate that but for counsel's failure to perform an essential duty, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different. State v. Miller, 590 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Iowa 1999).
III. Discussion.
We first address Kramersmeier's sufficiency of the evidence claim. Iowa Code section 707.2 requires the State to prove Kramersmeier, with malice aforethought, "willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation" killed Cindy Johnson. Our supreme court has held that the "use of a deadly weapon supports an inference of malice, and when accompanied by an opportunity to deliberate, also supports an inference of deliberation and premeditation." State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2001). Premeditation and specific intent to kill may also be shown by:
(1) evidence of planning activity of the defendant which was directed toward the killing; (2) evidence of motive which might be inferred from prior relationships between defendant and the victim; and (3) evidence regarding the nature of the killing.
State v. Khouri, 503 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1993). As was detailed above, Kramersmeier admitted to investigators that he had (1) taken a fillet knife from his victim's residence, (2) lured her out of her vehicle, (3) plunged the knife into her chest, (4) waited for her to stop breathing, and then (5) pulled the body thirty feet off the roadside.
We are convinced the record presents ample evidence from which the State could demonstrate that Kramersmeier possessed the specific intent to kill, and that his conduct in furtherance of that intent was premeditated. Not only did Kramersmeier admit using a deadly weapon to commit the killing, he clearly had an opportunity to deliberate on the killing throughout the drive from Waukee to Ankeny while he was in possession of the deadly weapon. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d at 25. In addition, Kramersmeier's theft of the knife itself constitutes evidence of planning, as does his remark to one of the witnesses suggesting the formation of a specific intent to kill at least a week before the act was committed. Khouri, 503 N.W.2d at 395. A rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from this and other evidence in the record that Kramersmeier's killing of Cindy Johnson was premeditated. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d at 741. We therefore reject Kramersmeier's sufficiency of the evidence claim.
Overwhelming record evidence exists from which a rational jury could find Kramersmeier guilty of first-degree murder in this case. There simply is no plausible basis upon which we could conclude that but for isolated misstatements of the evidence made by trial counsel during closing argument, Kramersmeier would not have been convicted. Miller, 590 N.W.2d at 725. Our previous discussion of what constitutes adequate proof of premeditation clearly demonstrates that even if Kramersmeier did not attempt to conceal the body, his prior conduct in luring the victim out of the vehicle and stabbing her with a deadly weapon were alone sufficient to sustain the charge of first-degree murder. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d at 25. Thus we conclude any alleged breach of an essential duty attributed to trial counsel's closing argument did not affect the outcome of the trial. Finding no prejudice, we reject Kramersmeier's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and affirm the conviction and sentence.