Opinion
No. 04-02-0199-CR.
Delivered and Filed: January 29, 2003.
Appeal from the 216th Judicial District Court, Kendall County Texas, Trial Court No. 3942, Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Paul W. GREEN, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
The State appeals an order granting appellee, Craig Allen Kothe's, motion to suppress. Tex.Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5)(Vernon 2002). Kothe was indicted for possession of a controlled substance in the amount of less than one gram. Following arraignment on this charge, the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing on Kothe's motion to suppress evidence including drug paraphernalia found in Kothe's vehicle and heroin found on Kothe's girlfriend, Jennifer Brantley. Kothe's motion was granted, and the trial court entered an order suppressing the evidence. The State of Texas appeals this order, bringing two issues before this court. First, the State argues the trial court erred in granting Kothe's motion to suppress, because the search which uncovered the incriminating evidence was valid. Second, the State contends the trial court erred in granting Kothe's motion to suppress, because Kothe did not have standing to challenge the search of Brantley.
Background
On July 24, 2001, Kendall County Deputy Van Forslund received a radio dispatch advising him that a vehicle was "driving erratically" on the interstate. Deputy Forslund responded to the dispatch and located the vehicle, driven by Craig Allen Kothe. Kothe's girlfriend, Jennifer Brantley, was also in the vehicle. Before Forslund was able to stop the vehicle, Kothe exited the highway, stopping at a rest area where the officer pulled up behind him.
Deputy Forslund first sent a radio dispatch, calling in the license plate of Kothe's car. He then approached the vehicle, obtained Kothe drivers' license and proof of insurance, and ran a "routine computer check." As the computer check was running, Forslund conducted a field sobriety check and determined that Kothe was not intoxicated. At this time, a second officer arrived and conferred with Forslund regarding the incident. Forslund then made a second dispatch, this time to determine whether Kothe had any outstanding warrants. The results of the inquiry were negative. Forslund testified that once he had determined Kothe was not intoxicated and had no outstanding warrants he was prepared to let him leave. Before the officer was able to release Kothe, however, he received a teletype from the Fredericksburg Police Department.
The teletype described the vehicle Kothe was driving and Kothe, himself, reporting that the vehicle contained a blue bank bag which held antique coins taken from a home safe. The teletype requested that the coins be held but Kothe released and the Fredericksburg Police Department notified. Deputy Forslund again approached the vehicle, this time to question Kothe regarding the coins. Kothe admitted to having the coins earlier but explained that he had changed them into paper currency. Forslund requested permission to search the vehicle for the blue bank bag and coins, and Kothe agreed. Following Kothe's verbal assent, the officer obtained a signed written consent to search the vehicle for the blue bank bag.
Deputy Forslund began his search in the front seat of the car. The center console was open, and the officer looked inside, discovering items which appeared to be drug paraphernalia. Forslund stopped the search and questioned Brantley regarding the items found in the console. Brantley advised the officer that she had heroin on her person and that Kothe had instructed her to hide the drugs. Brantley was then searched, and the officers discovered two balloons of heroin in her clothing.
Deputy Forslund found a Coca-Cola can which was cut in half. The can had a scoured bottom, and ahypodermic needle was lying across the opening.
Kothe and Brantley were then arrested for possession of a controlled substance and possession of narcotics paraphernalia. Both Kothe and his vehicle were taken to the Kendall County Law Enforcement Center where law enforcement officers conducted an inventory search of Kothe's vehicle and obtained a written statement from Kothe, exculpating Brantley.
Before trial, Kothe moved to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the stop, claiming the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial court agreed and granted Kothe's motion to suppress as to all items seized from "the defendant's person, his vehicle, or persons connected with defendant at the scene of (his) arrest or detention. . . ." The State now appeals the suppression order.
Valid Search
In its first issue, the State contends the trial court erred in granting Kothe's motion to suppress, because the search in question was valid and no evidence was obtained in violation of either the Texas or the United States Constitutions. Motions to suppress are subject to a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we afford deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts and rulings on mixed questions of law and fact. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Morfin v. State, 34 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). However, we decide de novo whether the trial court erred in misapplying the law to the facts. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Morfin, 34 S.W.3d at 666.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure. Traffic stops are considered seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, traffic stops are considered more similar to investigative detentions than formal arrests. Valadez, 267 F.3d at 397. Therefore, we analyze the legality of traffic stops for Fourth Amendment purposes under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). The Terry standard has two prongs: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the search and seizure was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398.
Because Kothe never disputed the legality of the initial stop, the State's argument on appeal focuses on the second prong of Terry, the scope of the stop. The courts of both the United States and the State of Texas have continually held that any "investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Moore v. State, 55 S.W.3d 652, 658 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.). An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245; Moore, 55 S.W.3d at 658. Once the reason for the stop has been satisfied, the stop may not be used as a "fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., concurring); Davis, 947 S.W.2d 243. In other words, once an officer's suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional, articulable, reasonable suspicion. Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398. Consequently, a detention that is not temporary and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference, is unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth Amendment. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243.
The State argues that, even after Forslund had determined Kothe was not intoxicated, the officer had the reasonable suspicion, in the form of the Fredericksburg teletype, necessary to detain Kothe. Kothe counters that the teletype arrived several minutes after Forslund had made his determination regarding Kothe's sobriety, and, because of this time lapse, the continued detention violated Kothe's Fourth Amendment rights.
Although the authority cited above suggests that Deputy Forslund's investigative detention could last no longer than the time it took him to determine whether Kothe was intoxicated, the Court in Davis noted that, in a traffic stop situation, it is not unreasonable for an officer to check for outstanding warrants. 947 S.W.2d at 245 n. 6; Smith v. State, 840 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd). The cases cited by the State in Valadez also support the assertion that an officer may continue a detention pending the results of computer checks. See United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 198 (5th. Cir. 1999); Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 435. The Court in Shabazz also iterated the importance of the law enforcement interest served by running a computer check on the license of an individual stopped for a traffic violation. 993 F.2d at 437. Based on the reasonable suspicion which led to the initial stop, Forslund was entitled to run the computer check on Kothe's license for purposes of both identification and determination of outstanding warrants. The time it took Forslund to run the check was minimal and imposed no significant Fourth Amendment hardship upon Kothe.
Because it was not unreasonable for Forslund to run the computer checks on Kothe, the period of detention was not beyond the scope of the initial purpose for the stop. The record indicates the results of the computer check were received almost simultaneously with the Fredericksburg teletype, which provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to further detain and question Kothe. It was during this second block of time, after the officer received the teletype, that he obtained Kothe's consent, both oral and written, to search the vehicle.
Because Kothe's detention was reasonably related in scope to the initial purpose for the stop and because Kothe's consent validated any further detention, the search which uncovered the incriminating evidence was valid. We sustain the State's first issue and reverse the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress.
Kothe also contends the search was invalid because it exceeded the scope of consent. The consent obtainedfrom Kothe by Deputy Forslund was to "search the vehicle for the blue bag containing the silver coins." The drug paraphernalia was in plain sight, located in the open console. It was this paraphernalia which led to the questioning and search of Brantley. Therefore, Forslund's search did not exceed the scope of Kothe's consent.
Because of our holding it is not necessary to address the State's second issue. We accordingly reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.