Opinion
A23-0227
08-08-2023
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Eric Anthony Klaysmat, Appellant.
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DU-CR-18-2766
Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Lucinda E. Jesson, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. On July 19, 2018, St. Louis County Sheriff's Deputies stopped appellant Eric Anthony Klaysmat's vehicle for speeding and ultimately arrested him on suspicion of driving while impaired. Deputies obtained a warrant for a sample of Klaysmat's blood for chemical testing, which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.132.
2. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Klaysmat on August 24, 2018, with two gross-misdemeanor driving-while-impaired (DWI) offenses for (1) driving while under the influence of alcohol, Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(1) (2016), and (2) driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(5) (2016).
3. Following a trial, a jury found Klaysmat guilty of both DWI offenses. The district court sentenced Klaysmat on November 14, 2022, entering judgments of conviction for both counts of DWI and imposing concurrent executed sentences of 365 days with credit for time served. This appeal follows.
4. Klaysmat argues that the district court erred in entering judgments of conviction for both DWI offenses because the charges arose from a single course of conduct and the offenses were charged under different subsections of the same criminal statute. The state, in lieu of a brief, filed correspondence indicating that it agrees with Klaysmat and joins in his request to have the matter remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate one of the DWI convictions.
5. Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1 (2022), provides that "[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both." This prohibition has been interpreted to also preclude "multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident." State v. Jackson, 363 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1985). Whether a conviction violates section 609.04, subdivision 1, is a legal question we review de novo. State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn. 2012).
6. This court has previously held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both driving while under the influence of alcohol and driving with an alcohol concentration at or above the established limit where the charges arise from a single behavioral incident. State v. Clark, 486 N.W.2d 166, 170-71 (Minn.App. 1992). There, this court noted that the appellant was convicted under "different subsections of the same statute" and that the charges "applied to one behavioral incident." Id. at 171. Relying on Jackson, we concluded that "[o]ne of the convictions must be vacated." Id. at 170-71. More recently, this court applied Clark to another defendant who was similarly convicted of both driving while impaired and driving with an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. State v. Coleman, 944 N.W.2d 469, 487 (Minn.App. 2020), aff'd on other grounds, 957 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 2021). This court reached the same result as in Clark, concluding that because the offenses were based on the same behavioral incident, only one conviction was permissible under section 609.04, subdivision 1. Id.
7. Klaysmat argues that his case is analogous. We agree. Klaysmat was charged with two separate DWI offenses following a single traffic stop for speeding, and there is no dispute among the parties or in the record that these charges did not arise from a single behavioral incident. Because the DWI offenses at issue are defined in separate subparts of the same subdivision of section 169A.20, the district court was not permitted to enter judgments of conviction for both crimes pursuant to section 609.04, subdivision 1.
8. The appropriate remedy for this error is to reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate one of the DWI convictions but leave the jury's finding of guilt for that offense intact. Coleman, 944 N.W.2d at 487.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court judgment is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate one of Klaysmat's DWI convictions and corresponding sentence, leaving intact the jury's guilty verdict for that offense.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.