Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1704-11T4
02-19-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GEORGE KING, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Arthur J. Owens, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Andrew C. Carey, Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Joie Piderit, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Parrillo and Guadagno.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 03-04-0561.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Arthur J. Owens, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Andrew C. Carey, Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Joie Piderit, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant George King appeals from an order of the Law Division denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
We reiterate the background and facts as found in our prior decision granting leave to appeal to both parties:
Defendant George King was charged with the murder of Meifang Rush at the Woodbridge Mall, which occurred on January 8, 2003. Rush was apparently abducted near her car and strangled to death. The police had no suspects in their murder investigation until March 2003.
On March 13, 2003, at about 11:00 p.m., defendant was arrested and brought to the Newark police station for questioning on the homicide of Edna Ryan. Detective Michael DeMaio of the Newark Police Department and Investigator Nicole Berrian of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office began questioning defendant at about 3:15 a.m. and, within an hour, defendant had confessed to Ryan's murder [for which he subsequently pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and, according to the judgment of conviction, received a twenty-five year prison term].
Almost immediately after the Ryan statement was taken, defendant stated, "I might as well tell you about Woodbridge." When Detective DeMaio asked what he meant, defendant referred to the murder of a girl at a mall in Woodbridge, prompting the Newark police to contact the Woodbridge Police Department.
Detective Edward Galinis of the Woodbridge Police Department and Investigator Kevin Morton of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office arrived at the Newark Police Department at about 6:30 a.m. They conducted a pre-interview of defendant,
advised him of his Miranda rights, and took a formal taped statement of defendant beginning at about 9:00 a.m., in which he confessed to the murder of Rush at the Woodbridge Mall.
[State v. King, 387 N.J. Super. 522, 528-29 (App. Div. 2006).]
Thereafter, defendant claimed his confession to the Rush homicide was false. To that end, he retained a forensic psychiatrist who concluded, inter alia, that defendant had certain personality disorders and that those disorders were consistent with defendant's claim of false confession.
Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his confession and the State moved to exclude the defense psychiatrist's testimony. The judge denied the suppression motion and allowed the expert testimony with some restrictions.
Both the State and defendant sought leave to appeal, which we granted and ultimately held that:
(1) evidence of defendant's personality disorders and their relation to and consistency with defendant's confession would be relevant in murder trial to jury's assessment of confession;
(2) psychiatrist was qualified as an expert to testify about defendant's personality disorders and their relation to and consistency with defendant's confession;
(3) defendant's personality disorders and psychological makeup constituted subject matter that would be beyond the ken of the average juror;
(4) psychiatrist's testimony on defendant's personality disorders and their relation to and consistency with defendant's confession was sufficiently reliable under [the] Frye test to be admissible in murder trial;
(5) trial court acted within its discretion in excluding from murder trial any testimony by psychiatrist about statements or information provided by interrogating officers, investigators, and prosecutor regarding false confessions to other crimes that defendant claimed to have made during interrogation; and
(6) trial court abused its discretion in imposing a blanket prohibition of any testimony at murder trial by psychiatrist as to any statements made by defendant to him during clinical interviews pertaining to interrogation.
[King, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 539-41, 546, 549-50.
Thereafter, in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count one of a five-count indictment charging him with the Rush murder. He was sentenced to a thirty-eight year term of imprisonment subject to the eighty-five percent parole bar. Defendant did not appeal his judgment of conviction.
Instead, defendant filed a timely PCR petition alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his confession on the grounds the police withheld his medication until he confessed and for failing to pursue an insanity defense. Following argument, the PCR judge denied defendant's petition and request for an evidentiary hearing, reasoning:
That as it concerns the allegation that [defendant] was probably insane at the time he committed this offense and was not operating under the requisite mental requirement when he was confessing, and based upon the evidence that I have before me, I do not believe . . . the defense's failure to pursue such an avenue is an indication of ineffective assistance of counsel.
. . . .
And I make this finding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing for the following reasons:
One. That there has been no prima facie showing that there was any true indication that [defendant] was insane either at the time he was confessing or at any time subsequent to that confession, for the following reasons:
[Defendant] was evaluated twice by his own psychiatrist. He was also evaluated by the [S]tate's psychiatrist.
[Defendant] has a very long history of mental problems and at no time was there any evidence presented to anyone that he had ever been declared to be insane at any time. He was declared to have various personality disorders, but never had anyone declared him
to be insane, on the verge of insanity, potentially insane . . . in any way, shape or form.
As a matter of fact, in the documentation that I have, in reading a portion of Dr. Harris['s] evaluation -- and Dr. Harris was [defendant's] psychiatrist -- Dr. Harris stated that the defendant, in his opinion, at the time of the interrogation, he was not symptomatic. That he felt the defendant was asymptomatic with regard to his personality disorders.
. . . .
The confession itself was taped and [defendant] did not, at that point in time during the taping of the confession, indicate in any way that he felt that he want -- asked for his medication.
As I indicated earlier, the wife of [defendant] . . . was contacted at some point and told the officers that . . . he should have been on medication, but, as has already been indicated, [defendant] had been off that medication for months prior to having committed the offenses before the bar.
. . . .
During the course of the confession, [defendant] was asked if he needed anything, if he wanted anything. He was provided with whatever he needed or asked for at the time. And it doesn't appear that at that time he asked for any medication. And, again, as I said, this was during the confession period.
. . . .
And I, again, restate the fact that [defendant] had been evaluated at least three times by a psychiatrist. I do not
believe that, if [defendant] were truly insane at any given point from the time he confessed until the time he entered the plea, that not -- neither of these psychiatrists would have brought it to the attention of the respective persons that hired them.
As I indicated, his own doctor indicated that, in his opinion, [defendant] was not symptomatic. Therefore, to now, in the calm and cold light of day, say that the defense attorney failed to properly pursue a viable defense, that being that [defendant] was insane at the time he gave this confession, I think is just as the case law has indicated, it is highly speculative. . . .
. . . .
[Defendant] is arguing that he should have been pursuing a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, and I think I've covered that with regard to the fact that he was evaluated by several psychiatrists, both for him and against him.
And there was never any indication from any of them that there was any suspect that [defendant] was: one, had his medication withheld from him purposely; or, two, was suffering from any mental disease or defect that would allow him or would not allow him to control himself to the point that he did not know what he was doing was wrong or, if he did know, he couldn't control that.
On appeal, defendant reiterates the arguments raised below:
I. THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT FAILED TO VIEW THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL.
A. Trial Counsel Failed to Pursue an Insanity or Diminished Capacity Defense.
B. Trial Counsel Failed to Move to Suppress his Confession on the Grounds that the Interrogators Withheld Medication Until Defendant Confessed.
It is axiomatic that in order for defendant to obtain relief based on ineffective assistance grounds, he is obliged to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's performance was deficient, but also that but for counsel's deficiency, "he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369-70, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 209-10 (1985); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456-57 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S. Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). We are persuaded that the alleged deficiencies here clearly fail to meet either the performance or prejudice prongs of the Strickland test. We therefore affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Pullen in her oral opinion of April 29, 2011.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).