And the defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is privileged to remain silent. An inference that springs from thin air lessens the prosecution's burden while chilling the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 10 n. 5, 988 P.2d 949. The majority position thus has the effect of defeating the presumption of innocence, shifting the burden of proof to defendant, and requiring defendant to forfeit his right to silence, essentially creating strict liability offenses.

"We review for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the evidence established a prima facie case," and thus, warrants submission to the jury. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Further, "'[w]e will reverse a jury verdict only when . . . we find that "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.

The State argues that Williams is factually indistinguishable from the instant case, and that if Williams justifies upholding a conviction in this case then it is, a fortiori, sufficient to support the magistrates' decisions that bound Clark and Smith over for trial. The court of appeals has asserted that Williams stands for the proposition that "a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery," State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 13, 988 P.2d 949, and, in light of that interpretation, Smith and Clark argue that we should take this opportunity to overturn Williams. We decline the invitation to reconsider Williams.

The evidence the State presented that Defendant presented a forged check to the bank is sufficient to infer knowledge of the forgery. See State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 13, 988 P.2d 949 ("Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery."). Additionally, the State presented evidence through Detective Gruber's testimony that the Defendant could give no information about the person from whom she received the check, had no records of what she claimed was a business transaction, and could not corroborate her story about having an upholstery business.

¶ 17 To prove the "purpose to defraud," the State must show that an individual acted with the "knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud."State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,¶ 7, 988 P.2d 949. "Fraud" has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as an intentional misrepresentation offered for the purpose of inducing reliance upon it to gain some advantage. State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977).

To support this contention, Andreason points out that he altered nothing on the Second Copy, thus leaving its date, December 26, 1978, plainly visible on its first page. The State cites State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 988 P.2d 949, for the proposition that "Defendant's presentation of the second set of plans in effect represented to Hicks that the plans had been `reviewed and re-stamped' by an architect," i.e., that intent may be inferred by the mere utterance of the Second Copy. In Kihlstrom, the State proved that the defendant cashed a forged check, but presented no actual evidence that the defendant knew the check was a forgery.

"Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,¶ 13, 988 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). See State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985).

The State's failure to present evidence to satisfy this necessary element of the offense would have entitled Smith to a dismissal on that count. See, e.g., State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 ("If the prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence to support its case, the trial court should dismiss."). Section 76-10-504 provides

Where the trial court rejects a defendant's claim that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence regarding elements of a charge, an appellate court will affirm the trial court's decision "if `the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] some evidence exists from which a reasonable [fact finder] could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, ¶ 6, 988 P.2d 452 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989) (alterations in original)); see also State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949. We have reviewed the record in the present case and conclude that the prosecution met its burden of bringing forth prima facie evidence regarding the elements of the charge.

When an appeal focuses on a denial of a motion for directed verdict made at the close of the State's case-in-chief, "this court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief," and the evidence presented after the close of State's case-in-chief is irrelevant. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949. However, when we review the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury verdict, we look at all of the evidence presented at trial.