However, because Watkins is challenging only the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, it is the definition employed by the trial court in making that ruling that is at issue, not the ultimate jury instruction, which was assented to only after the motion to dismiss was denied. Cf. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949 (stating that where the "[defendant's appeal focuses on the denial of the motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief," the appellate court's "review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief"). ¶ 13 The definition found in the Cohabitant Abuse Act is significantly broader than the common definition of the word "cohabitant," see generally Keene, 2005 UT App 37, ¶ 10, 107 P.3d 693 ("In construing the plain language of a statute, words which are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily usage."

The State's failure to present evidence to satisfy this necessary element of the offense would have entitled Smith to a dismissal on that count. See, e.g., State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 ("If the prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence to support its case, the trial court should dismiss."). Section 76-10-504 provides

"We review for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the evidence established a prima facie case," and thus, warrants submission to the jury. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Further, "'[w]e will reverse a jury verdict only when . . . we find that "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.

The State argues that Williams is factually indistinguishable from the instant case, and that if Williams justifies upholding a conviction in this case then it is, a fortiori, sufficient to support the magistrates' decisions that bound Clark and Smith over for trial. The court of appeals has asserted that Williams stands for the proposition that "a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery," State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 13, 988 P.2d 949, and, in light of that interpretation, Smith and Clark argue that we should take this opportunity to overturn Williams. We decline the invitation to reconsider Williams.

Id. (quoting State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P. 1023, 1029 (1911)). But see State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949 (stating, in reviewing a denied motion to dismiss, that “this court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief”). ¶ 45 In any event, in the present case, McCallie himself has placed the entire record before us.

” Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction “if, ‘upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, ... some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949 (omission in original) (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)); see also State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ¶ 11, 994 P.2d 177 (explaining that Utah appellate courts “review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict”). ¶ 14 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts “may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict.”

See State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶¶ 17-18; Schroyer, 2002 UT 26 at ¶ 12, 44 P.3d 730; State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ¶ 15, 26 P.3d 223. "Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 10, 988 P.2d 949. "[S]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted).

¶ 17 To prove the "purpose to defraud," the State must show that an individual acted with the "knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud."State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,¶ 7, 988 P.2d 949. "Fraud" has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as an intentional misrepresentation offered for the purpose of inducing reliance upon it to gain some advantage. State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977).

See Tavares, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 475, 31 N.E.3d 1167 (sufficient evidence where counterfeit bills "were patently fake in appearance"). Accord State v. Gantt, 504 S.W.2d 295, 298, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (sufficient evidence where, inter alia, purported maker's first name was misspelled); Mooney v. State, 888 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (sufficient evidence where "alteration was apparent"); State v. Kihlstrom, 988 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah App. 1999) (sufficient evidence would exist where "the signature does not match the name printed on the check"). To be sure, it is possible that a person could fail to notice that the signature on a check did not match the name on the check, even where the signature is as clear and legible as in this case.

In my opinion, there is simply no underlying evidence here to support the conclusion that Carrera knew he was not entitled to possess the social security card. ¶ 9 The City contends that the evidence was sufficient based on this court's decision in State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 988 P.2d 949. There, the state presented evidence that the defendant had cashed a forged check on the account of a company, but failed to present any actual evidence of the defendant's knowledge that the check was forged. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.