"We review for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the evidence established a prima facie case," and thus, warrants submission to the jury. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Further, "'[w]e will reverse a jury verdict only when . . . we find that "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.

¶ 17 To prove the "purpose to defraud," the State must show that an individual acted with the "knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud."State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,¶ 7, 988 P.2d 949. "Fraud" has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as an intentional misrepresentation offered for the purpose of inducing reliance upon it to gain some advantage. State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977).

See Tavares, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 475, 31 N.E.3d 1167 (sufficient evidence where counterfeit bills "were patently fake in appearance"). Accord State v. Gantt, 504 S.W.2d 295, 298, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (sufficient evidence where, inter alia, purported maker's first name was misspelled); Mooney v. State, 888 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (sufficient evidence where "alteration was apparent"); State v. Kihlstrom, 988 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah App. 1999) (sufficient evidence would exist where "the signature does not match the name printed on the check"). To be sure, it is possible that a person could fail to notice that the signature on a check did not match the name on the check, even where the signature is as clear and legible as in this case.

To support this contention, Andreason points out that he altered nothing on the Second Copy, thus leaving its date, December 26, 1978, plainly visible on its first page. The State cites State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 988 P.2d 949, for the proposition that "Defendant's presentation of the second set of plans in effect represented to Hicks that the plans had been `reviewed and re-stamped' by an architect," i.e., that intent may be inferred by the mere utterance of the Second Copy. In Kihlstrom, the State proved that the defendant cashed a forged check, but presented no actual evidence that the defendant knew the check was a forgery.