” “Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances.” State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 10, 988 P.2d 949 (citing Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996) ; State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789, 792 (Utah 1991) (holding a jury could infer intent from overall circumstances of murder); State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980) (allowing a jury instruction stating that “[a] person's state of mind is not always susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances”)).¶ 30 The State presented no direct evidence of Bingham's state of mind when he engaged in the course of conduct, and the trial court made no express findings with respect to Bingham's mental state.

The parties agree that we should only review the evidence up to the time that the trial court denied the directed verdict motion. See State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949 (noting that when reviewing a denied motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, "this court's review ... is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief"). But seeState v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶¶ 42, 44, 369 P.3d 103 (suggesting that the Utah Supreme Court adopted the "waiver rule some years ago" in State v. Stockton, 6 Utah 2d 212, 310 P.2d 398 (1957) ). Under the waiver rule, " ‘if the defendant elects to introduce evidence following the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, appellate review of the defendant's conviction encompasses all of the evidence presented to the jury, irrespective of the sufficiency of the evidence presented during the state's case-in-chief.

However, because Watkins is challenging only the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, it is the definition employed by the trial court in making that ruling that is at issue, not the ultimate jury instruction, which was assented to only after the motion to dismiss was denied. Cf. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949 (stating that where the "[defendant's appeal focuses on the denial of the motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief," the appellate court's "review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief"). ¶ 13 The definition found in the Cohabitant Abuse Act is significantly broader than the common definition of the word "cohabitant," see generally Keene, 2005 UT App 37, ¶ 10, 107 P.3d 693 ("In construing the plain language of a statute, words which are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily usage."

When an appeal focuses on a denial of a motion for directed verdict made at the close of the State's case-in-chief, "this court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief," and the evidence presented after the close of State's case-in-chief is irrelevant. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949. However, when we review the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury verdict, we look at all of the evidence presented at trial.

"Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,¶ 13, 988 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). See State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985).

The State's failure to present evidence to satisfy this necessary element of the offense would have entitled Smith to a dismissal on that count. See, e.g., State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 ("If the prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence to support its case, the trial court should dismiss."). Section 76-10-504 provides

"We review for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the evidence established a prima facie case," and thus, warrants submission to the jury. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 8, 988 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Further, "'[w]e will reverse a jury verdict only when . . . we find that "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.

The State argues that Williams is factually indistinguishable from the instant case, and that if Williams justifies upholding a conviction in this case then it is, a fortiori, sufficient to support the magistrates' decisions that bound Clark and Smith over for trial. The court of appeals has asserted that Williams stands for the proposition that "a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery," State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 13, 988 P.2d 949, and, in light of that interpretation, Smith and Clark argue that we should take this opportunity to overturn Williams. We decline the invitation to reconsider Williams.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence demonstrating that Father caused Younger Child’s severe injuries. The parties have not addressed whether we should only review the evidence up to the time that the juvenile court denied Father’s motion for involuntary dismissal, i.e., at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, or whether we should review the entire record before us. See State v. Kihlstrom , 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949 (observing, where the defendant’s appeal focused on the denial of a motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, that the court’s "review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief"). But see State v. McCallie , 2016 UT App 4, ¶¶ 42, 44, 369 P.3d 103 (suggesting that the Utah Supreme Court adopted the waiver rule in State v. Stockton , 6 Utah 2d 212, 310 P.2d 398 (1957), and observing that under the waiver rule, "if the defendant elects to introduce evidence following the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, appellate review of the defendant’s conviction encompasses all of the evidence presented to the jury, irrespective of the sufficiency of evidence presented during the state’s case-in-chief" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ), cert. granted , 384 P.3d 567 (Utah 2016).

For clarity, we cite the rule that was in effect at the time Father made his motion. The parties have not addressed whether we should only review the evidence up to the time that the juvenile court denied Father's motion for involuntary dismissal, i.e., at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, or whether we should review the entire record before us. See State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 949 (observing, where the defendant's appeal focused on the denial of a motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief, that the court's "review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief"). But see State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶¶ 42, 44, 369 P.3d 103 (suggesting that the Utah Supreme Court adopted the waiver rule in State v. Stockton, 310 P.2d 398 (Utah 1957), and observing that under the waiver rule, "if the defendant elects to introduce evidence following the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, appellate review of the defendant's conviction encompasses all of the evidence presented to the jury, irrespective of the sufficiency of evidence presented during the state's case-in-chief" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. granted, 384 P.3d 567 (Utah 2016).