State v. Kepiro

11 Citing cases

  1. State v. Avila

    102 Wn. App. 882 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 26 times
    Holding trial court's failure to provide an opportunity to address the court was harmless error because the juvenile's mother spoke on his behalf, his sentence was well below the statutory maximum and had likely already been served

    The State asserts it need not prove Mr. Avila intended to carry out the threat or intended to communicate the threat directly or indirectly to Mr. Kimes, merely that the threat was made. To support its argument, the State relies on State v. Edwards, 84 Wn. App. 5, 924 P.2d 397 (1996); State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 810 P.2d 19 (1991); and State v. Hansen, 122 Wn.2d 712, 862 P.2d 117 (1993). Edwards discussed RCW 9.61.160, a statute making it unlawful "for any person to threaten to bomb" buildings or other places where people assemble.

  2. City of Seattle v. Ivan

    71 Wn. App. 145 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 21 times
    In Ivan, Division One determined Seattle's coercion ordinance, with a threat definition virtually identical to the definition here, was non-public "because of the private nature of the proscribed behavior; the statute contemplates private communications between individuals."

    Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 63 L.Ed. 470, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919). But see State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 122, 810 P.2d 19 (1991) wherein the court broadly stated that "[c]ommunications which qualify as threats are outside the realm of protected speech", (citing State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988)). Kepiro addressed a challenge to a state statute prohibiting the intimidation of a judge; and a "threat" as defined by the relevant portion of RCW 9A.72.160 was defined as communicating the intent to "cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened . . ."

  3. State v. Stephenson

    89 Wn. App. 794 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that the intimidation statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad

    RCW 9A.76.180(3)(a) describes "true" threats that are outside the scope of protected speech. State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 125, 810 P.2d 19 (1991). RCW 9A.76.180(3)(a) describes "true" threats that are outside the scope of protected speech.

  4. State v. Edwards

    84 Wn. App. 5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 31 times
    Noting that "[t]he ordinary meaning of β€˜threaten’ clearly includes ... future threats"

    [6] Nor does the first part of RCW 9.61.160 require actual intent to injure. In State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 810 P.2d 19 (1991), the court analyzed an analogous statute, RCW 9A.72.160, which criminalizes intimidation of judges. Kepiro argued that the statute contained an implied element of intent to harm or reasonably cause alarm.

  5. In re Steven S.

    25 Cal.App.4th 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that threats and fighting words are "remove[d] . . . from the scope of the First Amendment"

    The only intent requirement is that the offender intentionally or knowingly made a communication that a reasonable person would construe as a threat. ( Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d at p. 1265, fn. 3; State v. Kepiro (1991) 61 Wn. App. 116, 124-126 [ 810 P.2d 19, 24].) The court held that the statement in that case β€” "`If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.'" β€” was political hyperbole rather than a true threat, given its context and expressly conditional nature.

  6. State v. Hansen

    67 Wn. App. 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 3 times
    Defining the verb "direct"

    We note at the outset that the State's position is untenable. First, the State incorrectly claims support for its position in our recent decision in State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 810 P.2d 19 (1991). In Kepiro, the only other published opinion interpreting RCW 9A.72.160, we held that the State need not prove that the defendant actually intended to cause the threatened harm.

  7. State v. Vanwinkle

    3 Wn. App. 2d 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018)

    State v. Locke, 175 Wn.App. 779, 789, 307 P.3d 771 (2013) (quoting State v. Allen, 176 Wn.2d 611, 626, 294 P.3d 679 (2013)). See also State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn.App. 116, 125, 810 P.2d 19 (1991) ("[I]t is implicit in the definition of 'threat' in RCW 9A.04.110(25)(a) that only true or serious threats are covered."). State v. Kohonen, 192 Wn.App. 567, 575, 370 P.3d 16 (2016) (citing State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 54, 84 P.3d 1215 (2004)).

  8. State v. King

    135 Wn. App. 662 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 16 times

    ΒΆ16 In some contexts, however, any "`apparently serious threat may cause the mischief or evil toward which the statute was in part directed.'" State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 123, 810 P.2d 19 (1991) (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969)). Laws prohibiting threats of violence focus on fear and "`the disruption that fear engenders,'" as well as the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.

  9. State v. Batson

    124 Wn. App. 1016 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)

    The defendant need not actually intend to carry out the threat. State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 121, 810 P.2d 19 (1991). Mr. Batson contends that the State failed to prove any specific ruling by Judge Culp, past or future, that Mr. Batson was supposedly trying to influence by his threats to blow up the courthouse, the judge, and the witnesses.

  10. State v. Side

    105 Wn. App. 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 4 times
    Analyzing psychologist-patient communications, the court held that " patient who is warned that communications may not be kept confidential has no reasonable expectation of confidentiality and any privilege is waived."

    Id. Nor need the defendant actually intend to cause the bodily harm. State v. Kepiro, 61 Wn. App. 116, 121, 810 P.2d 19 (1991). "All that is required is that the defendant direct a threat to a judge in which he [or she] communicates the intent to do so."