Opinion
Case No. 20000981-CA.
Filed March 28, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable Guy R. Burningham.
Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant first argues the trial court erred under State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), when it admitted the toxicology test results.
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
"However, in order for new scientific evidence to be admissible, a threshold reliability test must be met. This court established that test nearly a decade ago in [Rimmasch]." Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61,¶ 13, 987 P.2d 22. In Rimmasch, the supreme court held that "expert testimony `based upon novel scientific principles or techniques . . . [was subject to] additional tests of admissibility,' including that the novel technique be `inherently reliable.'" State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42,¶ 16, 5 P.3d 642 (quoting Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396) (alteration in original). "However, the Rimmasch test was not intended to apply to all expert testimony. Rather, Rimmasch is implicated only when the expert testimony is `based on newly discovered principles.'" Id. (quotingRimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396).
In the instant case, Rimmasch does not apply because there are no novel scientific principles or techniques involved. Defendant conceded that the gas chromatography technique is not a novel technique. Rather, Defendant contends that the analysis of the test did not comport with proper procedures. "Rimmasch simply requires that the scientific principles underlying the expert's testimony be inherently reliable, not that the expert's actual testimony be inherently reliable." Id. Therefore, to be admissible under rule 702, the testimony from the qualified expert need only be helpful to the trier of fact. See id. at ¶ 17; Utah R. Evid. 702. Because the trial court heard extensive testimony on this issue and made adequate findings in support of the test's admission, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant was operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1)(a) (1999).
"`When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal jury trial . . . "we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury."'" State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185,¶ 16, 4 P.3d 100 (quoting State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (citations omitted)). "`Under this standard, we will reverse a conviction only when the evidence . . . "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted."'" Id. (quoting Fisher, 972 P.2d at 97 (citations omitted) (alteration in original)).
Defendant contends that the only evidence presented regarding negligence, aside from his inebriation, was the fact that the truck was facing upwards. However, Defendant omits other evidence that was presented at trial, such as the testimony of the accident reconstruction expert and Defendant's statements made at the scene. Accordingly, we hold there was ample evidence regarding negligence on which the jury could reasonably rely to support its verdict.
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.