” In defendant's view, the trial court could not properly count an infraction DUII conviction under formerORS 487.540 as a predicate offense to support the lifetime revocation of his driving privileges. The state responds that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Kellar, 349 Or. 626, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011), and the history of ORS 809.235, defendant's conviction under the prior version of the DUII statute qualifies as a predicate offense for purposes of a lifetime revocation under ORS 809.235. We agree with the state.

But the legislature did not, and, as a result, defendant's plain text argument has some force. Nevertheless, State v. Kellar, 349 Or. 626, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011), and State v. Andre, 142 Or.App. 285, 920 P.2d 1145,rev. den.,324 Or. 229, 925 P.2d 908 (1996), persuade us that the legislature's reference to convictions under ORS 163.145 does not preclude its application to convictions under formerORS 163.091.

"In 2003, the legislature amended ORS 809.235 to require permanent revocation of a person's driver's license ‘if the person is convicted of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants under ORS 813.010 for a third time.’ " State v. Kellar , 349 Or. 626, 632, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011). That portion of ORS 809.235 was originally introduced as House Bill (HB) 2885 (2003).

ORS 801.555 was enacted and added to the Vehicle Code in 1983 as part of a "comprehensive revision of the [V]ehicle [C]ode." State v. Kellar , 349 Or. 626, 630, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011). As part of that comprehensive revision, legislature explained that, " ‘in revising the code, it is not the purpose or intent of the Oregon Legislative Assembly to change the law.’ "

In considering whether the provisions of ORS 809.235(1)(b) encompassed convictions under the predecessor to ORS 813.010, the Supreme Court has, in passing, distinguished between ORS 809.235(1)(b)(A) and subparagraphs (B) and (C), observing that the latter described qualifying offenses that "might not be criminal in Oregon." State v. Kellar , 349 Or. 626, 633, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011). However, the meaning of ORS 809.235(1)(b)(B) was not at issue or further discussed in Kellar . Thus, while it is true that the 2007 amendments would likely encompass such things as a conviction on a DUII per se theory in a state that had a .05 percent statutory BAC limit—that is, conduct that would not, as such, "be criminal in Oregon"—Kellar does not aid our inquiry as to whether a statute such as RCW 46.61.5249 fits within the newer provisions.

; State v. Kellar, 349 Or. 626, 636 (2011) (“Defendant's interpretation results in a redundancy, something that we seek to avoid in interpreting statutes.”))

Oregon courts, however, must attempt to avoid redundancy when interpreting a statute. State v. Kellar, 349 Or. 626, 636, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011). ORS § 86.735(1), therefore, requires the recording of assignments of both legal and equitable title, which is different from the law in Minnesota according to Jackson.

Said another way, when construing a statute to determine the intent of the legislature, this court will generally attempt to avoid a statutory construction that creates redundancy in the way that the statute is read. See Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 354 Or. 676, 692, 318 P.3d 735 (2014) ([Redundancy, of course, is a consequence that this court must avoid if possible."); State v. Kellar, 349 Or. 626, 636, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011) ("Defendant's interpretation results in a redundancy, something that we seek to avoid in interpreting statutes."). To interpret the statutory exemption as SAIF proposes takes meaning away from the legislature's intentional use of both "leasehold interest" and "furnish."

See Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor and Industries , 354 Or. 676, 692, 318 P.3d 735 (2014) ([R]edundancy, of course, is a consequence that this court must avoid if possible."); State v. Kellar , 349 Or. 626, 636, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011) ("Defendant's interpretation results in a redundancy, something that we seek to avoid in interpreting statutes."). To interpret the statutory exemption as SAIF proposes takes meaning away from the legislature's intentional use of both "leasehold interest" and "furnish."

Second, TriMet's construction of the phrase "may not meet" in ORS 192.630(2) as meaning the same thing as "may not hold a meeting" creates a redundancy, which is "something that we seek to avoid in interpreting statutes." State v. Kellar , 349 Or 626, 636, 247 P.3d 1232 (2011). Read with the substitution that TriMet proposes, the prohibition in ORS 192.630(2) applies only when there is: (1) a meeting; (2) of a "quorum of a governing body"; that (3) is "for the purpose of deciding on or deliberating toward a decision on any matter.