The supreme court has emphasized that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution "ensure that an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy will not be subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions." State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai'i 124, 129, 925 P.2d 294, 299 (1996) (quoting State v. Meyer, 78 Hawai'i 308, 311-12, 893 P.2d 159, 162-63 (1995)). Therefore, evidence obtained by private individuals may be properly admitted.
Specifically, "the purpose of ... article I, section 7 is to protect individuals against intrusions by the government." State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai‘i 124, 129, 925 P.2d 294, 299 (1996) (emphasis in original). Thus the Hawai‘i constitution is not limited to protection against police misconduct but "ensure[s] that an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy will not be subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions.... The basic purpose ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials."
This court has determined that "'[u]nlike the exclusionary rule on the federal level, Hawai'i's exclusionary rule serves not only to deter illegal police conduct, but to protect the privacy rights of our citizens.'" State v. Kahoonei 83 Hawai'i 124, 131, 925 P.2d 294, 301 (1996) (quoting Lopez, 78 Hawai'i at 445, 896 P.2d at 901); see also State v. Dixon, 83 Hawai'i 13, 23, 924 P.2d 181, 191 (1996) (stating that "article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides broader protection than the [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution because it also protects against unreasonable invasions of privacy"); State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113, 123, 913 P.2d 39, 49 (1996) (stating that "article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution" provides a "more extensive right of privacy . . . than that of the United States Constitution"); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 662, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985) ("In our view, article I, § 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution recognizes an expectation of privacy beyond the parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights."); Hanson I, 97 Hawai'i at 82, 34 P.3d at 12 ("The Hawai'i Supreme Court has concluded that a person's expectation of privacy under article 1, § 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution is greater than that under the [F]o
State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai'i 124, 127, 925 P.2d 294, 297 (1996) (quoting Boynton, 58 Haw. at 536, 574 P.2d at 1334)).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution "ensure that an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy will not be subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions." State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai'i 124, 129, 925 P.2d 294, 299 (1996) (quoting State v. Meyer, 78 Hawai'i 308, 311-12, 893 P.2d 159, 162-63 (1995)). Thus, any evidence obtained by private individuals, acting wholly on their own initiative, is not protected by the fourth amendment or article I, section 7, and is admissible in a criminal trial.
It is well settled that the purpose of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i State Constitution is "to protect individuals against intrusions by the government." State v. Kahoonei, 83 Haw. 124, 129, 925 P.2d 294, 299 (1996) (emphasis in original). Evidence obtained by a private individual acting wholly on his or her own initiative is therefore properly admissible in a criminal trial.
Defense counsel initially argued the texts should be suppressed because the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai‘i Constitution ensure an "individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy will not be subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions." Citing State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai‘i 124, 925 P.2d 294 (1996), James argued that, under the totality of the circumstances, CW was acting as a government agent at the time she texted James. James characterized GW’s texts as "pretext calls."
Defense counsel initially argued the texts should be suppressed because the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai‘i Constitution ensure an "individual's legitimate expectations of privacy will not be subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions." Citing State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai‘i 124, 925 P.2d 294 (1996), James argued that, under the totality of the circumstances, CW was acting as a government agent at the time she texted James. James characterized CW's texts as "pretext calls."
In his application, Locquiao argues that the ICA's opinion gravely erred in its analysis of the circuit court's finding that Kim was not acting as an arm of the government when he detained and searched Locquiao at Kalihi Cue on January 19, 1999. Relying on this Court's decisions in State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai'i 124, 925 P.2d 294 (1996), and State v. Boynton, 58 Haw. 530, 574 P.2d 1330 (1978), Locquiao contends that the ICA erred in failing to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test and the factors enumerated in Boynton to the present matter, instead focusing solely on the express terms of Kim's plea agreement with the HPD and the DEA as the basis for its holding. Locquiao asserts that, under the totality of the circumstances, Kim was an agent of the government and, therefore, was subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution, see supra note 6.
The purpose of the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is "to protect individuals against intrusions by the government." Lawson, 103 Hawai‘i at 19, 78 P.3d at 1167 (quoting State v. Kahoonei, 83 Hawai‘i 124, 129, 925 P.2d 294, 299 (1996) ). Evidence obtained by a private individual acting wholly on their own initiative is properly admissible in a criminal trial.