State v. Johnson

29 Citing cases

  1. State v. Coltherst

    263 Conn. 478 (Conn. 2003)   Cited 50 times
    In Coltherst, we determined that, in Harrell and Johnson, we had not focused on the defendant's subjective state of mind in concluding that a defendant could not be charged under § 53a-54b unless he had been convicted of intentional murder.

    Therefore, we concluded in Harrell that the defendant's conviction for arson murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54d could not serve as a predicate murder for purposes of the capital felony statute. Id., 839; see also State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 713-14, 699 A.2d 57 (1997) (conviction for felony murder cannot be predicate for capital felony conviction). Public Acts 1973, No. 73-137, § 2(a), provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes suicide by force, duress or deception. . . ."

  2. State v. Peeler

    271 Conn. 338 (Conn. 2004)   Cited 161 times
    Concluding that the State established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the disclosure and use of the defendant's mental health records would not "have had a tendency to influence the judgment of the jury" (quoting State v. Rolon , 257 Conn. 156, 777 A.2d 604, 617 (2001) )

    The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant of a capital felony based on conspiratorial liability under Pinkerton v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 640. Specifically, the defendant argues that the instruction was erroneous because: (1) this court's decisions in State v. Harrell, 238 Conn. 828, 681 A.2d 944 (1996), and State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 699 A.2d 57 (1997), preclude a trial court from instructing a jury that it may use the doctrine of Pinkerton liability to find a defendant guilty of a capital felony under § 53a-54b; (2) allowing the use of the Pinkerton doctrine to prove a capital felony would produce an absurd, bizarre and unworkable result; and (3) this court never has adopted the expansive notion of Pinkerton liability applied by the trial court and should not do so in the present case. We disagree with each of the defendant's arguments.

  3. State v. Small

    242 Conn. 93 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 52 times
    Rejecting constitutional challenge to charge containing explanation that reasonable doubt "is more than a guess or a surmise"

    Convicted of the crimes of capital felony, felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in connection with the shooting deaths of two individuals in a confrontation over the theft of narcotics, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant's capital felony conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing on the felony murder counts; as set forth in this court's decision in State v. Johnson ( 241 Conn. 702), a capital felony conviction may be predicated only on a conviction of intentional murder and not, as here, on a conviction of felony murder. ( One justice dissenting)

  4. State v. Amado

    50 Conn. App. 607 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 8 times

    Held: 1. In light of the Supreme Court's determination in State v. Johnson ( 241 Conn. 702) that felony murders cannot constitute the predicate for a capital felony conviction, this court vacated its earlier determination affirming the defendant's conviction of capital felony. 2.

  5. State v. Castillo

    329 Conn. 311 (Conn. 2018)   Cited 17 times
    Rejecting defendant's contention that presence of three officers in his living room weighed in favor of concluding that he was in custody

    t, "[i]n terms of whether a reasonable person would feel that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest and, therefore, that he was ‘in custody,’ the circumstances surrounding the defendant's interview in the present case appear no more coercive or intimidating an atmosphere than was present in other cases in which our Supreme Court determined that a suspect questioned in a residence prior to an arrest was not ‘in custody’ and, thus, not entitled to Miranda [warnings]. See, e.g., State v. Kirby , 280 Conn. 361, 369–70, 392–94, 396, 908 A.2d 506 (2006) (defendant [was] not ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes although five police officers arrived at his home at 4:30 a.m. to question him about kidnapping and assault because defendant invited officers into home, defendant knew why police were there, encounter lasted less than fifteen minutes, officers' guns stayed holstered, and defendant [was] not handcuffed until after he admitted to kidnapping); State v. Johnson , 241 Conn. 702, 714–21, 699 A.2d 57 (1997) (defendant [was] not ‘in custody’ although confronted by two detectives and uniformed police officer in driveway of father's house prior to consenting to be questioned in kitchen)." State v. Castillo , supra, 165 Conn. App. at 720, 140 A.3d 301.

  6. State v. Johnson

    253 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2000)   Cited 94 times
    Holding that, "in accepting the defendant's guilty plea, the trial court implicitly found him [to be] competent"

    On appeal, we vacated Duane Johnson's conviction on the capital felony count but affirmed his conviction on all of the remaining counts. See State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 706, 699 A.2d 57 (1997). At the hearing, the state offered Duane's statement, and over the defendant's objection, the court admitted the statement only as to Duane.

  7. State v. Amado

    697 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 348 (AC 15176), is granted. The case is remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702 (1997). McDONALD, J., dissenting.

  8. State v. Benzinger

    2002 Ct. Sup. 9509 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    Additionally, "the defendant has the burden of proving custodial interrogation . . . before the state must prove adequate warnings of the rights that inhere in the privilege against self-incrimination were given to the defendant and that the defendant's waiver of his rights was constitutionally valid." State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 718 (1997). Our Supreme Court has concluded that a "interrogation" includes any words or actions on the part of law enforcement personnel that they should know are reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response.State v. Burak, 201 Conn. 517, 531 (1986); State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 225 (1987).

  9. Amado v. Lee

    Case No. 3:09cv450 (JBA) (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2014)

    The petitioner argued that two felony murders could not form the basis for capital felony, the judge's instructions on self-defense relating to the intentional murder counts were erroneous and the judge's improperly concluded that self-defense cannot be a defense to felony murder. (See Resp't's Mem., App. F.) On July 16, 1997, the Connecticut Supreme Court granted the petition for certification to appeal the Appellate Court's decision and remanded the case to the Appellate Court in light of the decision in State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 699 A.2d 57 (1997) (rejecting state's claim that convictions for felony murder can serve as predicates for capital felony conviction). See State v. Amado, 242 Conn. 906, 697 A.2d 368 (1997).

  10. State v. Mangual

    311 Conn. 182 (Conn. 2014)   Cited 45 times
    Recognizing that, based on reasoning from Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 43940, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, not every seizure constitutes custody for purposes of Miranda, Miranda custody analysis involves initial inquiry into whether reasonable person would have thought he was free to leave, akin to Terry seizure analysis, but, if person is seized, custody analysis also involves additional inquiry of whether reasonable person would have understood his freedom of action to have been curtailed to degree associated with formal arrest [quoting United States v. Newton, supra, 369 F.3d 672]

    Although this court has not been called on to decide whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a search warrant at a suspect's home rendered the atmosphere police-dominated for purposes of Miranda, the Appellate Court has addressed that issue; see State v. Read, 132 Conn.App. 17, 20–23, 29 A.3d 919, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 916, 33 A.3d 740 (2011); and we previously have considered whether a suspect was in custody when he invited the police into his home and willingly agreed to speak to them. See State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 394–96, 908 A.2d 506 (2006); see also State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 719–20, 699 A.2d 57 (1997) (defendant voluntarily met with police in his father's residence). A review of these and related cases from this state, as well as federal and sister state cases involving the interrogation of a suspect during a police search of his residence, reveals the following nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in determining whether a suspect was in custody for purposes of Miranda: (1) the nature, extent and duration of the questioning; (2) whether the suspect was handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained; (3) whether officers explained that the suspect was free to leave or not under arrest; (4) who initiated the encounter; (5) the location of the interview; (6) the length of the detention; (7) the number of officers in the immediate vicinity of the questioning; (8) whether the officers were armed; (9) whether the officers displayed their weapons or used force of any other kind before or during questioning; and (10) the degree to which the suspect was isolated from friends, family