State v. Johnson

48 Citing cases

  1. State v. Goodman

    415 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 2010)   Cited 218 times
    Holding evidence of gang membership was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) and Cofield to prove motive

    The judge also allowed introduction of Goodman's letter to Jones, once redacted to eliminate parts of the letter he found unduly prejudicial. Citing State v. Buhl, 269 N.J.Super. 344, 635 A.2d 562 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468, 640 A.2d 850 (1994), and State v. Johnson, 216 N.J.Super. 588, 524 A.2d 826 (App.Div. 1987), the judge found that the letter was relevant to consciousness of guilt and determined that the prejudicial effect could be addressed by a limiting instruction. He gave the following limiting instruction to the jury.

  2. Goodman v. Nogan

    Civil Action No. 16-4591 (JMV) (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Citing State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344, 635 A.2d 562 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468, 640 A.2d 850 (1994), and State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588, 524 A.2d 826 (App. Div. 1987), the judge found that the letter was relevant to consciousness of guilt and determined that the prejudicial effect could be addressed by a limiting instruction.He gave the following limiting instruction to the jury.

  3. State v. W.B.

    DOCKET NO. A-5868-17T4 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2020)

    At the conclusion of the case, the jury should again be instructed on this point.[330 N.J. Super. 545, 559 (2000) (first citing State v. Gallicchio, 44 N.J. 540 (1965); and then citing State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588, 608-09 (App. Div. 1987)) (internal citations omitted).]

  4. Velazquez v. City of Camden

    447 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 2016)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that testimony that defendant police officer was not to be prosecuted was violative of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence

    But defendants' forceful defense of the trial court's ruling prohibiting any reference to Ramos' mental health records is a “straw man” argument, because plaintiff has never sought to use the records to challenge Ramos' subjective motivation in firing on him. Instead, plaintiff sought to use the records to challenge Ramos' perceptions and his ability to make observations, a classic use of extrinsic evidence to impugn a witness's credibility under N.J.R.E. 607. SeeState v. Johnson , 216 N.J.Super. 588, 603, 524 A. 2d 826 (App.Div.1987) (“any deficiency of the senses which would lessen the ability to perceive facts testified to by the witness is an attack on the credibility of the witness”), certif. denied , 107 N.J. 647, 527 A. 2d 467 (1987).SeeKaye v. Rosefielde , 432 N.J.Super. 421, 478, n. 30, 75 A. 3d 1168 (App.Div.2013) (explaining that “ the technique of setting up an argument that does not exist and then refuting that misrepresented argument is called the ‘straw man’ fallacy”) (quoting Canesi v. Wilson , 158 N.J. 490, 518, 730 A. 2d 805 (1999) (O'Hern, J., concurring)), rev'd on other grounds , 223 N.J. 218, 238, 121 A. 3d 862 (2015).

  5. State v. Benthall

    865 A.2d 693 (N.J. 2005)   Cited 4 times
    Emphasizing a prior inconsistent statement is only admissible under N.J.R.E. 607 after the trial court finds "the party seeking to neutralize had no prior knowledge that the witness would testify contrary to the prior statement"

    We impose strictly the requirement of surprise because, in this context, "the prior statement was not written, recorded or given under oath." State v. Johnson, 216 N.J.Super. 588, 608, 524 A.2d 826 (App.Div. 1987). If neutralization is administered loosely, then under the banner of impeachment prior contradictory evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(1) is placed before the jury by a witness's own proponent.See generally, Caccavale, supra, 58 N.J.Super. at 573, 157 A.2d 21, and see also N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) (adopted after Caccavale). The Rule expanded the means for witness impeachment to include use of a prior sworn statement, or those that are sound recorded or written and signed by the witness under circumstances supporting the statement's reliability.

  6. State v. Long

    119 N.J. 439 (N.J. 1990)   Cited 165 times
    Holding that 971 day delay did not violate petitioner's right to a speedy trial since the delay was attributable to the defendant, the pre-trial time was productively used, and it was necessary for defendant to prepare a list of mitigating factors.

    This issue involves another discretionary ruling. Flight of an accused is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and therefore of guilt. State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588, 612, 524 A.2d 826 (App.Div. 1987) (quoting United States v.Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970)). Mere departure, however, does not imply guilt.

  7. Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.

    226 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1988)   Cited 15 times
    Finding that the absence of a limiting instruction was harmless since it was compensated for by opposing counsel's presentation of the case

    There can be no question that the OSHA citations were hearsay. Evid.R. 63; State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588, 600 (App.Div. 1987), and were improperly admitted under Evid.R. 63(15), which provides:. . . [A] statement is admissible if in the form of (a) a written statement of an act done, or an act, condition or event observed by a public official if it was within the scope of his duty either to perform the act reported or to observe the act, condition or event reported and to make the written statement, or (b) statistical findings made by a public official whose duty it was to investigate the facts concerning the act, condition or event and to make statistical findings.

  8. Suarez-Perez v. Royce

    Civ. 21-15948 (RK) (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2024)

    “We have stated that evidence of threats to witnesses was “not subject to the restriction of [former] Evid. R. 55.” State v.. Johnson, 216 N.J.Super. 588, 611 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 647 (1987). However, such evidence is more properly viewed as “admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt under N.J.R.E. 404(b).”

  9. Garry v. Warren

    Civil No. 13-3907 (ES) (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    Certainly, not every departure from this requirement mandates reversal. State v. Johnson, 216 N.J.Super. 588, 614 (App.Div.1987). Prosecutorial misconduct is not a basis for reversal unless the conduct was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.

  10. State v. Ingram

    196 N.J. 23 (N.J. 2008)   Cited 185 times
    Holding that trial court abused discretion in allowing State to argue that defendant's absence from trial constituted consciousness-of-guilt evidence

    It is clear that "[f]light of an accused is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and therefore of guilt." State v. Long, 119 N.J., 499,575 A.2d 435 (1990) (citing State v. Johnson,216 N.J.Super. 588, 612, 524 A.2d 826 (App.Div. 1987)). That said, "[m]ere departure, however, does not imply guilt" as "[f]light requires departure from a crime scene under circumstances that imply consciousness of guilt."