Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1701-13T4
04-22-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. J.L., Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Abby P. Schwartz, Designated Counsel, on the brief). James P. McClain, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Courtney M. Cittadini, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fasciale and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 06-11-2572. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Abby P. Schwartz, Designated Counsel, on the brief). James P. McClain, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Courtney M. Cittadini, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a February 26, 2013 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). He contends that his plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.
In 2006, defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a (counts one and two), as well as first-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b (count three). In September 2007, defendant appeared before the Honorable Bernard Edward DeLury, Jr., to plead guilty to count one in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss counts two and three as well as to recommend that defendant be sentenced in the range of second-degree offenses and be sentenced to five years in prison with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In February 2008, Judge DeLury sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement, and imposed mandatory fines, penalties, and Megan's Law restrictions. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
In March 2012, defendant filed his petition for PCR, asserting that he received "[i]neffective assistance of counsel because [his] lawyer did not explain civil commitment to [him] and [defendant] didn't understand what it meant" due to his developmental disability. Following a January 2013 hearing on defendant's petition for PCR, Judge DeLury issued a written opinion and order on February 26, 2013, finding that defendant had not established a prima facie case and that no evidentiary hearing was necessary, and denying the petition for PCR.
On appeal, defendant raises the following point:
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE PETITIONER'S COGNITIVE ABILITIES, GIVEN THAT HE HAS AN I.Q. OF 79, PUTTING HIM IN THE RANGE OF BORDERLINE MENTALLY RETARDED, WAS A DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, THERE IS NO WAY TO EVALUATE WHAT COUNSEL KNEW ABOUT PETITIONER'S ABILITIES AND WHAT PETITIONER WAS CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING ALL THE NON-CUSTODIAL ASPECTS OF HIS SENTE[N]CE. PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL, THE EFFEC[]TIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND DUE PROCESS.
We have considered this argument in light of the record and applicable legal standards, conclude it is "without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion," Rule 2:11-3(e)(2), and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge DeLury's thorough written opinion. We add the following brief remarks.
Judge DeLury reviewed the petition and concluded that defendant failed to meet the two-part Strickland/Fritz test, which provides that a criminal petitioner seeking relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel must establish (1) deficient performance of counsel such that a defendant was denied the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel; and (2) prejudice to the petitioner resulting from counsel's deficient performance, such that the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial and reliable result. This standard applies to assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel associated with guilty pleas, and a petitioner seeking relief after entering a guilty plea must show a reasonable probability that, but for errors by counsel, he or she would have decided not to plead guilty and instead have gone to trial. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350-51 (2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1454, 185 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2013).
Here, we agree with Judge DeLury's conclusions that defendant did not show deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland/Fritz. The trial court accepted a knowing and voluntary guilty plea from defendant, and defendant was advised of the conditions of his plea. The record demonstrates that a thorough factual basis was provided in support of defendant's guilty plea. Defendant admitted that he could not read; however, the transcript of the plea proceeding demonstrates that the court discussed the ramifications of the plea with defendant, who testified that he understood what was going on in the courtroom. Both defendant and his counsel acknowledged that counsel had read the plea form to defendant and discussed it thoroughly with him. Moreover, it was clear that the court was aware of defendant's cognitive limitations and carefully questioned him as to his understanding of the proceedings, the entry of the plea and the consequences thereof, including the possibility of civil commitment.
Moreover, we agree that a plenary hearing was not warranted. "[T]rial courts ordinarily should grant evidentiary hearings to resolve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims if a defendant has presented a prima facie claim in support of post-conviction relief." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). A prima facie claim is made if the petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the Strickland/Fritz test. Id. at 463. Here, Judge DeLury correctly determined that no such prima facie case was established, as there was no reasonable likelihood of showing deficient performance or prejudice.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).