Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0226-14T2
03-23-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. CHEO JENNINGS, Defendant-Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant/cross-respondent (Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for respondent/cross-appellant (John Douard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Alvarez and Carroll. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 13-10-0584. Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant/cross-respondent (Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for respondent/cross-appellant (John Douard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Cheo Jennings was indicted by the Somerset County grand jury and charged with first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2), and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d. Defendant moved to suppress an oral statement he gave to Franklin Township Police Officer Robert Young at the scene of the alleged robbery, and a recorded statement he later provided to Franklin Township Detective Kevin Fitzharris at police headquarters.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Law Division judge granted defendant's motion to suppress the statement made to Young, concluding that defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation at the scene without first having been advised of his Miranda rights. The court denied defendant's motion to suppress the recorded statement made at police headquarters. We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal that portion of the order granting the motion to suppress, and defendant's cross-motion for leave to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress the recorded statement. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the suppression of defendant's statement to Young, and affirm the denial of the motion to suppress defendant's recorded statement.
I.
The sole witnesses at the Miranda hearing were Fitzharris and Young. On August 30, 2013, at about 2:10 p.m., Fitzharris was riding in a police vehicle with another officer when he received a report of an incident that occurred at the International Meat Market in Franklin Township. On the scene first, Fitzharris observed defendant on a bicycle attempting to ride away. Defendant's shirt was covered with blood. Uncertain as to what had occurred, Fitzharris and the other officer detained defendant. Fitzharris did not ask defendant any questions. Rather, he informed defendant: "Just relax. We have got to figure out what is going on here."
Young then arrived, and "began [a] preliminary investigation." According to Young, this entailed speaking with the store owner, two witnesses to the event, and then defendant. Young testified that his purpose in speaking with defendant "was to ascertain his side of the story as far as what happened at the incident."
When asked by the prosecutor on direct examination to detail his exchange with defendant, Young gave the following account:
A. I asked [defendant] what happened to which [defendant] said . . . "the store owner [] came at me for no reason."
Q. Okay. And did you go further than that?
A. Yeah. I asked what he was doing there at the store. He said he was trying to buy some food and check out but nobody would help him.
He said he decided to walk out of the store when [the store owner] followed him, at which point [defendant] advised the fight ensued, which was broken up by other witnesses.
. . . .
Q. And did you ask [defendant] any questions about a knife?
A. I did.
Q. And what was his response?
A. He said that the knife was planted on him.
Young testified that this conversation with defendant took place on the sidewalk in front of the store, and lasted "[n]o[] longer than five minutes at most." Defendant was not handcuffed during the questioning. Young described defendant as coherent, and he exhibited no indicia of intoxication. Based on the "totality" of the circumstances, including defendant's statement, and the accounts provided by the store owner and two witnesses who implicated defendant in the incident, Young then placed defendant under arrest. Young further explained that "[w]hen there are multiple parties involved [you] speak with all of them before making a decision to arrest." Medical personnel arrived at the scene and treated defendant for his injuries. Defendant declined further medical treatment.
Fitzharris read defendant his Miranda rights at police headquarters. At 6 p.m., defendant signed the standard form waiving those rights. Defendant then gave a recorded statement to the detective, offering his version of the events. Defendant admitted that he left the store without paying for some meat, but only did so to alert his wife that he was in the store. Defendant stated it was his intent to return to the store to pay for the items, but the store owner and witnesses did not give him a chance to do so. Instead, according to defendant, "[t]hey kept beating me, they jumped on me and kept hitting me." Defendant conceded he had a knife but told Fitzharris that he was just using it to keep the men away from him.
After defendant had substantially concluded his version of the incident, the following exchange occurred:
[Defendant] You believing them?
[Fitzharris] And then you kept coming at him[?]
[Defendant] There ain't nothing to talk about you believing that. All I did was went outside and told my wife I'm in the store.
[Fitzharris] Okay if that's the way you feel, listen, that's the way you feel then this is gonna end right now, at least I got your side of the story okay.
[Defendant] Only thing I did was let my wife know I was in the store. She did not go to the store. All of a sudden here they come.Following some brief additional questioning during which defendant completed his version of events and was informed of the procedures regarding his initial court appearance, the recorded interview concluded. Like Young, Fitzharris testified that defendant acted and spoke coherently and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
After considering the oral arguments of defense counsel and the prosecutor, the judge found that defendant's statement to Young violated Miranda and should be suppressed. The judge acknowledged that during an investigatory stop a "suspect is not in custody for Miranda purposes." Here, however, the court determined that defendant was detained and not free to leave during Young's questioning. It concluded that "[h]e was in fact, under the totality of the circumstances, subjected to custodial interrogation the object of which was to elicit information from [] defendant."
Defendant argued that his recorded statement should also be suppressed. He contended that his apparent attempt to stop his questioning, and his physical condition during the interrogation, rendered the waiver of his Miranda rights involuntary. The court disagreed, based on the "credible testimony" of Fitzharris and its own review of the recorded statement. The judge found that defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights and then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them and agreed to speak to the police.
The court also found that defendant had not attempted to invoke his Miranda rights during Fitzharris's questioning. The judge reasoned:
In this case the [recorded] statement . . . made by [] defendant is not a statement that he wishes to remain silent or which shows that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. He's just threatening the officer, well, if that's the way you feel, then ain't nothing to talk about. You believe in that.These appeals followed.
That's not in the judgment of this court an invocation and, therefore, does not require re-administration of Miranda rights because, as I have said, it is just a continuation of the conversation continued by [defendant] after Fitzharris says, all right, we'll just stop right now. And, apparently, that's not the way [defendant] feels because in contrast to an indication that he meant to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege, he continue[d] to tell Fitzharris the story.
II.
Our analysis of the parties' arguments is guided by fundamental principles of law that apply to custodial interrogation of suspects. Every person has a privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V; N.J.R.E. 503. A person can, however, make a knowing and voluntary waiver of the privilege. "Inherent in every Fifth Amendment analysis is the question of whether the statement was voluntary, and, independently, whether the law enforcement officers taking it complied with Miranda." State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 605 (2011).
When the State intends to introduce a defendant's confession at trial, it "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . [the] confession was voluntary and was not made because the defendant's will was overborne," State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462 (2005), "and, if custodial, that the defendant was advised of his rights and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived them." W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 602 n.3.
When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress a statement, we generally defer to the factual findings of the trial court when they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. See State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 409 (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007 )), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 831, 130 S. Ct. 65, 175 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2009); see also W.B., supra, 205 N.J. at 603 n.4 ("As the finding of compliance with Miranda and voluntariness turned on factual and credibility determinations, we need only find sufficient credible evidence in the record to sustain the trial judge's findings and conclusions."). When a defendant's statement is videotaped, however, and "the trial court's factual findings are based only on its viewing of a recorded interrogation that is equally available to the appellate court[,] . . . deference to the trial court's interpretation is not required." State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 566 (2012). We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusions that flow from established facts. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
A.
We first address the State's appeal, in which it argues that the court erred in concluding that defendant was in custody when Young questioned him. The State contends that defendant's statements were in response to general on-the-scene questioning, for which Young did not need to administer Miranda warnings and secure defendant's waiver before proceeding.
In State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601 (2007), the Court described the circumstances under which Miranda warnings are required:
In general, Miranda warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation [may] be admitted in evidence. In Miranda, the Court defined "custodial interrogation" as questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The determination whether a suspect is in custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned . . . . [T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.
[Id. at 615-16 (first and third alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).]
"The rights set forth in Miranda are not implicated when the detention and questioning is part of an investigatory procedure rather than a custodial interrogation, or where the restriction on a defendant's freedom is not of such significance as to compel the conclusion that his liberty is restrained." State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 216 (1998). "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process" does not require Miranda warnings. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725. The United States Supreme Court, as well as our courts, have distinguished between detaining a citizen in the course of an investigatory stop, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968), and placing a citizen in custody so as to trigger Miranda requirements. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3147-52, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 331-36 (1984); see also State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 2005).
In Berkemer, the Court noted that features of an ordinary traffic stop generally do not implicate the concerns that underlie adoption of the Miranda warning. Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S. Ct. at 3149-50, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 334-35. The traffic stop is ordinarily brief. "[Q]uestioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek." Id. at 437-38, 104 S. Ct. at 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 333. Also, in a typical traffic stop, the motorist does not "feel[] completely at the mercy of the police." Ibid. "[T]he atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself . . . ." Id. at 438-39, 104 S. Ct. at 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 334.
Berkemer's characterization of police investigative detentions as non-custodial is not limited to motor vehicle stops. "[P]olice may conduct general on-the-scene questioning of a suspect, as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, without giving Miranda warnings." State v. Toro, 229 N.J. Super. 215, 220 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 216 (1989).
Thus, for example, in State v. Brown, 352 N.J. Super. 338, 354-56 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002), the defendant, who was suspected of carrying drugs, was stopped at Newark Airport from getting into a taxi by DEA agents who asked her to accompany them to the airline ticket office where she was questioned. We held that because the entire encounter only took five minutes, and the questioning was conducted in a public place in a non-coercive environment, Miranda warnings were not required. Ibid. Similarly, in State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. 62, 67-68 (App. Div. 1988), the defendant was detained for thirty minutes at the scene of a fire investigation while police asked why he was there and then investigated his story. We concluded that "[a]s [the] defendant's restraint constituted a permissible investigatory detention rather than rendering him in custody, the absence of Miranda warnings did not preclude the evidentiary use of [the] defendant's responses to the officer's questions." Ibid.; see also Smith, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 431-36 (analogizing the restraint inherent in a domestic violence dispute to that involved in a traffic stop).
In the present case, the police were called to investigate an incident that occurred at the International Meat Market. Upon arriving, they observed defendant bleeding and about to leave on his bicycle. Since they did not know what had occurred, Fitzharris detained defendant. Rather than question defendant, Fitzharris told him to "[j]ust relax" while the police "figure out what is going on here." Upon Young's arrival, he spoke not only with defendant but also the store manager and the two witnesses in an effort to investigate what had occurred. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Young conducted his questioning of defendant in a manner different from the other witnesses. The questioning occurred in the middle of the afternoon shortly following the police response to the store. It took place in a public area, outside the store, and lasted no more than five minutes, during which defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained.
In viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding Young's on-the-scene questioning, we cannot conclude that defendant was subject to "'the inherent psychological pressure on a suspect in custody.'" Brown, supra, 352 N.J. Super. at 351 (quoting State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 102 (1997)). As a result, Young did not have to administer Miranda warnings before he questioned defendant. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court's order that suppressed defendant's statement to Young.
B.
We next address defendant's cross-appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress the recorded statement he provided to Fitzharris at police headquarters. Defendant argues that because he was "clearly bloody and likely in need of medical care," he was not in a position to provide a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Defendant further argues that he attempted to stop the interrogation, but Fitzharris improperly failed to re-administer Miranda warnings.
We find no support in the record for defendant's argument that the injuries he sustained in the incident rendered his recorded statement involuntary. To the contrary, defendant was afforded medical treatment at the scene and then refused any further treatment. Both Young and Fitzharris testified that defendant acted and spoke coherently. The judge viewed the video recording of defendant's statement at police headquarters and came to the same conclusion.
Defendant contends that his statement to Fitzharris, "There ain't nothing to talk about you believing that," constituted an invocation of his Miranda right to cease further questioning. It is well established that "once a suspect in custody invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation 'must cease,' and 'the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.'" State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395, 402 (2012) (quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at 1627-28, 16 L. Ed. 2d 723). "[A] suspect who has invoked his or her right to counsel 'is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.'" Id. at 403 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981)).
To determine whether a suspect has invoked his or her right to counsel, we consider the "totality of the circumstances," focusing on "the reasonable interpretation of defendant's words and behaviors." Diaz-Bridges, supra, 2 08 N.J. at 564. The invocation of the right to counsel "'need not be articulate, clear, or explicit . . . any indication of a desire for counsel, however ambiguous, will trigger entitlement to counsel.'" State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 622 (2011) (quoting State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 253 (1993). However, "[w]hen a suspect's words are ambiguous," police are permitted "to follow up by asking questions that are designed to clarify the meaning of those words." Id. at 623.
Applying these principles to the "totality of circumstances" surrounding defendant's recorded statement, we discern no basis to disturb the trial judge's decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant's remark "[t]here ain't nothing to talk about you believing that" was not an assertion of a right, ambiguous or otherwise. Rather, it was immediately followed by a continuation of defendant's version that he went outside to tell his wife he was in the store. When Fitzharris responded "Okay if . . . that's the way you feel then this is gonna end right now," instead of ceasing the discussion, defendant continued to explain what had occurred. Accordingly, the court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his recorded statement to Fitzharris.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).