Opinion
CDCR-17-30221
04-12-2018
STATE OF MAINE v. MARYLEE JASINSKI Defendant
Attorney: MICHAEL WHIPPLE, HALLETT WHIPPLE WEYRENS. State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON.
Attorney: MICHAEL WHIPPLE, HALLETT WHIPPLE WEYRENS.
State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON.
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Jed J. French Maine District Court Judge.
Defendant is charged with operating under the influence and failing to submit to a test at the request of a law enforcement officer. Pending before the court is Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed December 12, 2017.
The court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress on February 8, 2018. Defendant Mary lee Jasinski appeared, represented by Attorney Michael D. Whipple. The State appeared, represented by Assistant District Attorney William Barry. The court heard testimony from Deputy Dyar of the Cumberland County Sheriffs Department and admitted into evidence a video recording of Defendant at the Bridgton Police Department after arrest.
Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the court finds the following:
On July 3, 2017, Deputy Dyar- was on patrol in Naples, Maine, traveling on Route 302. Dyar observed Defendant's vehicle leading a line of at least two additional vehicles, traveling at around 30 miles per hour (mph) in a 50 mph zone. Dyar observed the lead vehicle cross the center divider line, then move back and cross the fog line. Based on these observations, Dyar activated his lights and sirens, and pulled over Defendant's vehicle on suspicion that the driver might be impaired.
Following the stop, after identifying Defendant and smelling the odor of intoxicating beverages, Dyar administered standard field sobriety tests to Defendant, Defendant admitted to having consumed alcoholic beverages, and Dyar observed signs of intoxication during the field sobriety tests. Dyar arrested Defendant and transported her to the Bridgton Police Department to administer a breath analysis test.
At the Police Department, a conversation ensued between Dyar and Defendant regarding the breath test. Ultimately, though Defendant said she was willing to submit to a test, the breathalyzer machine was unable to accept her breath sample. Dyar informed Defendant that she is marked as a refusal for the test and transported her to the Cumberland County Jail, Defendant was handcuffed during the entire incident and restrained with a waist belt.
Defendant seeks suppression of statements made while in custody and suppression of her refusal to take the breath analysis test. Defendant also challenges the vehicle stop, arguing that there was a lack of reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop. Defendant's arguments are addressed below.
1. Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion
The Law Court has held that a constitutional traffic stop must involve "objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." State v. Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶ 7, 143 A.3d 124. The "officer's assessment of the existence of specific and articulable facts sufficient to warrant the stop must be objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances." State v. Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶ 11, 995 A.2d 238 (internal citation omitted). The "only requirement" the Law Court has "imposed on the reasonable articulable suspicion standard is that the officer's suspicion be more than mere speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch, " State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 11, 960 A.2d 321. See also State v. King, 2009 ME 14, ¶ 6, 965 A.2d 52 ("an officer may undertake field sobriety testing, 'like any other investigatory stop, if at the time the officer has an articulable suspicion, objectively reasonable in light of all the circumstances, that the object of the search has committed or is about to commit a crime.'") (quoting State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 919, 920 (Me. 1995)).
The Law Court has held that "a vehicle's brief, one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence and, in the absence of oncoming or passing traffic, without erratic operation or other unusual circumstances, does not justify an intrusive stop by a police officer." State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978, 979 (Me. 1987). However, in State v. Buxton, 687 A.2d 227, 228 (Me. 1987), the Court found that reasonable suspicion existed based on the defendant's "abnormal driving", specifically, the defendant was driving "substantially below the maximum speed limit, and both of his passenger side tires were on the gravel for approximately one hundred and fifty feet, " The Court cited State v. Brown, 675 A, 2d 504, 505 (Me. 1996) (reasonable, articulable suspicion existed to stop the defendant based on the early morning hour, the vehicle's crossing of the center line and "striking" of the fog line, and the vehicle's traveling speed of 15 mph below the speed limit) and State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16, 19 (Me. 1994) (reasonable, articulable suspicion existed to stop the defendant based on the vehicle's speed of 15 mph under the speed limit, the early morning hour, and "repeated drifting" over the fog line) for support.
Based on the evidence presented, this court finds that reasonable, articulable suspicion existed for Deputy Dyar to stop Defendant. Deputy Dyar testified that he observed Defendant's vehicle traveling approximately 10 to 15 mph under the speed limit, after 12 a.m., with other vehicles traveling behind Defendant, Deputy Dyar also observed Defendant's vehicle cross the center line and the fog line. The facts in this case are akin to those in Buxton, Brown, and Cusack above. Therefore, this court finds that based on the early hour, the slow speed of Defendant's vehicle with a vehicle traveling behind her, and the vehicle's crossing of the center and fog lines, Defendant's "abnormal driving" gives rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was operating the vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating substance, 2. Miranda Rights
With respect to Defendant's Miranda-based challenge, "[i]n order for the statements made prior to a Miranda warning to be admissible, the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements were made while the person was not in custody, or was not subject to interrogation." State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 23, 829 A.2d 247 (emphasis in original). The appropriate analysis for this determination is set forth in State v, Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23, 928 A.2d 746, in which the Law Court explained:
A person not subject to formal arrest may be "in custody" if "a reasonable person standing in the shoes of [the defendant would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave" or if there was a "restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." State v. Holloway, 2000 ME 172, PI4, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (citation and quotation marks omitted). This test is an objective one, and we have stated that in analyzing whether a defendant is in custody, a court may consider the following factors:
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;
(2) the party who initiated the contact;
(3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant);
(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it);
(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
(8) the number of law enforcement officers present;
(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and
(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.(citing State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222). See also State v. Williams, 2011 ME 36, 15 A.3d 753 (applying above-listed factors in totality in determining that defendant was not in custody at the time of police interrogation).
For the purposes of Miranda, "custodial interrogation" includes "both express questioning, and also words or actions that. . . [have] the force of a question on the accused . . . reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990).
Applying the factors set forth by the Law Court for assessing whether Defendant was "in custody" at the time of statements made, the court finds as follows:
There is no question that Defendant was in custody. Defendant was handcuffed, at times with her hands restrained by a waist belt, at the Bridgton Police Department, with two officers present. A reasonable person in Defendant's place would clearly not feel at liberty to leave the station.
However, there is no evidence of an interrogation of Defendant. At the station, Deputy Dyar's conversation with Defendant was in regards to the restroom and the administration of the breath analysis test. There were no questions or actions "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Therefore, although Defendant was in custody, there was no custodial interrogation of Defendant, and suppression of statements is not warranted.
3. Coercion of Defendant into Refusal
In her final argument, Defendant argues essentially that she was coerced into refusing the breath analysis test by threat of jail. This argument holds no merit. Defendant argues that Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287 (1st Cir. 1995) supports this proposition. In Roberts, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and vacated a mandatory jail sentence of a Defendant who was convicted and sentenced for refusal to take a blood alcohol test under an implied consent law. Id. at 1296. The Court found that the defendant's right to due process was violated when the officer inaccurately informed him of the consequences of a refusal by failing to inform him of the mandatory jail time. Id., at 1292, The facts in Roberts are unlike those in this case; here, Defendant argues that had she not been threatened with incarceration, Defendant may have been more inclined to take the breath analysis test This is unlike the scenario in Roberts because no information was withheld from Defendant that would have made Defendant more inclined to submit to the test.
Defendant additionally relies on State v. Murphy, No. CR-05-612, 2006 Me. Super, LEXIS 38 (Feb. 26, 2006). In Murphy, the defendant submitted to a blood alcohol test after the officer fold her that if she refused the test, she would go to jail overnight, but if she submitted, she would be released to go home, Id. at *l-2. The Superior Court (Mills, J.) found that "[b]ut for the threat of immediate incarceration, she would have signed the implied consent form and refused to take a test, " Id. The officer's statement "affected the defendant's ability to choose and added the immediate consequence of incarceration for a refusal that has not been mandated by the Legislature." Id. at *3-4. Murphy is also inapposite to this ease; even if Deputy Dyar made coercive statements to convince Defendant to submit to tire breath analysis test, she still refused the test. There is no evidence that any such statements coerced Defendant into submitting to the test, and there was no information withheld from Defendant that affected her choice to refuse.
Finally, this court finds that Deputy Dyar's statements to Defendant were not coercive statements and were not an ultimatum to force Defendant between choosing the test or jail, The court is persuaded, after watching the video of Deputy Dyar and Defendant at the Bridgton Police Department, that Deputy Dyar's statement along the lines of, "This is the only option you have. The other option is jail" is in reference to the restroom alone, in response to the inaudible comment on the video by Defendant, presumably about the restroom. Deputy Dyar's other comments about talcing Defendant to jail were after she failed to take the breath tests properly, thus after she was considered a refusal. There is no evidence that Deputy Dyar's statements coerced Defendant into refusing the test.
Accordingly, because the evidence adduced at hearing establishes the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion, no Miranda violation, and no coercion of Defendant's refusal, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.