Opinion
I.D. No. 9910021436.
Submitted: September 5, 2000.
Decided: September 21, 2000.
Peggy Hageman, David Favata and Megan K. D'Iorio, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, 820 N. French Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for the State of Delaware.
Joseph M. Bernstein, 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1130, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Sean Jamison.
Thomas A. Pedersen, 727-B N. Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant, Sean Jamison.
OPINION
Sean Jamison ("Jamison") moves to suppress several statements made subsequent to his arrest in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on October 27, 1999. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are. denied in part and granted in part.
FACTS
On October 14, 1999, a home invasion and robbery occurred at 304 Cedar Street in Wilmington, Delaware. During the incident, Baltazar Torres was killed with a firearm later identified from the casings and bullets left at the crime scene as a nine millimeter Taurus (the "Cedar Street homicide"). In addition to Mr. Torres, three other individuals were also in the residence and received bullet wounds. After being interviewed, the victims described three to four individuals breaking into the residence, robbing them of cash, phones and jewelry, and then after requesting additional money and cocaine, began to shoot. As a result of the investigative work performed by the Wilmington Police Department ("WPD") and led by Detective Raymond Wyatt, Jamison was developed as the primary suspect. This eventually led to sufficient facts for Detective Wyatt to obtain a warrant for Jamison's arrest on October 24, 1999, charging him with Murder in the First Degree, Robbery, Burglary, Assault, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and Conspiracy.
There was a total of eleven charges.
Approximately a week after the Cedar Street homicide on October 21, 1999, a similar homicide using the same weapon occurred, killing victim, Devon Gross (the "Gross homicide"). Kevin Slade ("Slade"), an associate of Jamison, was developed as the primary suspect in this homicide. Detective Michael Lawson of the WPD was the chief investigating officer in that matter.
This homicide occurred in the 1100 block of West 7th Street in Wilmington. The ballistic report indicated that the same nine millimeter Taurus that was involved in the "Gross homicide" was also involved in the "Cedar Street homicide."
Subsequent investigation revealed that Jamison's girlfriend, Sonia Nicole Bowman ("Niki") resided at 427 East Maple Street in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania. On October 26, 1999, officers of the WPD contacted her and learned that Jamison and Slade had stayed at her home. She told them that she had seen Jamison and Slade with handguns and a large nylon case. After several hours of searching her property on October 26, 1999 with the use of a metal detector, the officers were only able to locate the nylon bag, containing an AR15 assault weapon. The bag had been hidden behind the house under an old carpet covered with leaves. The nine millimeter Taurus was never located.
On October 27, 1999, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Detective Lawson was contacted by the Philadelphia FBI Fugitive Task Eorce indicating that they had received information, which they believed would lead to the arrest of Jamison and Slade later that day. At approximately 2:45 p.m., Jamison and Slade were arrested in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania by the Philadelphia Police Department ("PPD") and the FBI Fugitive Task Force. Based upon the Delaware warrant, Jamison was charged with the offense of Flight to Avoid Prosecution. Upon arrest, Jamison was transported from the arrest site of 51st and Woodland Avenue in Philadelphia by patrol officers and arrived at the Homicide Fugitive Division at approximately 3:30 p.m. Detective Dennis Dusak of the PPD was assigned to assist the WPD and process Jamison as a fugitive. Detective Dusak testified that after obtaining basic arrest information, an arrestee would normally be brought to the Police Detention Unit, also known as the "PDU," to be processed. But, because the WPD was interested in talking to Jamison, he was placed in an interview room at the Homicide Division until the WPD arrived.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 27, 1999, Detective Lawson of the WPD received a call that Jamison and Slade had been arrested. Because it was his day off, he received the call at home and went to the WPD prior to traveling to Philadelphia. At the station, he had to familiarize himself with the Cedar Street homicide because Detective Wyatt was out of the State. In addition, Detective Lawson gathered other officers, Detective John Ciritella, Detective James Diana, and Lieutenant Sean Finerty, to assist him in Philadelphia, as well as Deputy Attorney Generals, Susan Purcell and Natalie Woloshin. The group arrived in Philadelphia between 7:00-7:30 p.m.
Philadelphia detectives testified during the hearing that the WPD arrived at approximately 4:30 p.m. The Court believes that based on Detective Lawson's version of the events, that time is incorrect.
Meanwhile, after arriving at the police station, Jamison was advised that he was arrested for Flight to Avoid Prosecution, and pedigree information was obtained. Philadelphia detectives did not interview him nor did they mirandize him at this time. Jamison was told that the WPD officers were on their way to interview him, and he was cooperative and agreed to talk to them. While it is unclear exactly when Jamison was advised of the extradition process, he declined to waive extradition.
In dispute, Jamison testified that Detective Dusak did not offer him the opportunity to waive extradition and that if it had been offered to him, he would have taken it.
After briefly conferring with the Philadelphia detectives, the WPD started the interviewing process at approximately 7:30 p.m. Since Detective Lawson was more familiar with the Gross homicide, as the chief investigating officer, he decided to first interview Slade. That interview lasted between 45 minutes to an hour with no information provided as to the location of the gun or jewelry that was taken during the Cedar Street incident.
At approximately 8:30 p.m., Detective Lawson, along with Detective Diana, began interviewing Jamison. At the beginning of the interview, Jamison was advised of his Miranda rights and indicated a willingness to speak to them. The interview was taped until Jamison requested that the recorder be turned off. Detective Diana transcribed the substance of the remaining portion of the interview in handwritten notes. In general, Jamison consistently maintained that he did not shoot Baltazar Torres but that he was present when the shooting occurred. Jamison implicated Slade, Devon Gross, and Darius Boyd in the Cedar Street homicide and robbery. During the unrecorded portion of the interview, Jamison indicated that the gun used in the Cedar Street homicide was located in the yard behind Niki's house in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania. The interview continued until approximately 1:15 a.m. on October 28, 1999.
Devon Gross was the victim in the Gross homicide.
While Jamison was being interviewed, Wilmington officers again attempted to locate the handgun at the Kennett Square location based on Jamison's disclosures. Jamison even drew a map of the location at some point during the interview. But, all efforts to locate the nine millimeter Taurus were unsuccessful. After Detective Lawson told him that the officers still could not locate the gun, Jamison agreed to accompany the police to the Kennett Square location to pin point where it was buried. After discussing it with Lieutenant Finerty and the PPD, Detective Lawson stated that although Jamison was willing, there was a collective decision not to take him to Kennett Square that evening. They reasoned that it was too risky to expose a prisoner to a wooded lot at such a late hour.
Jamison disputes this and stated that the police drew the map.
At this point, it appears that a discussion occurred between the two police departments, and perhaps in the presence of two Deputy Attorney Generals, where Detective Dusak explained that the normal procedure would be for Jamison to be turned over to the PDU for processing. But, as Detective Dusak further explained, if they followed the normal process, it would likely be two to three days before Jamison would again be available to them. In essence, the PDU is the unit responsible for the formal processing of all arrestees in Philadelphia. Jamison would be fingerprinted, interviewed by pretrial services, and would appear by video before a magistrate in order to establish bail, at which time a public defender would be available. Normal processing of an arrestee, once they are turned over to PDU, would be 18 to 36 hours, and if the arrestee was not released on bail, he would be transported to a local correctional facility. In Jamison's case, he would then await an extradition hearing in three to ten days.
Since the Wilmington detectives wanted to have Jamison available the next morning, the Philadelphia detectives agreed to keep him overnight in the interview room located in the Homicide Division. As such, Jamison was fed and slept on several chairs pushed together.
The next day at approximately 11:00 a.m, Wilmington detectives again arrived at the Philadelphia Roundhouse. While there is some confusion as to who rode together in the patrol cars, Jamison rode with the Philadelphia detectives to the Kennett Square location, stopping on the way for lunch at Wendy's. After searching unsuccessfully for two to three hours behind Niki's home, in the area where Jamison believed the gun was located, the search was terminated.
At this point, the Philadelphia detectives returned Jamison to their headquarters. On the way back, Jamison directed the detectives to the jewelry store where some of the robbery proceeds had been pawned. They arrived at the Roundhouse at approximately 5:45 p.m., and Jamison was turned over to the PDU, 27 hours after his initial arrest. On October 29, 1999, he was arraigned in Philadelphia Municipal Court at 2:00 p.m. via closed-circuit television.
On October 29, 1999, officers of the WPD, together with a cadet class from the Police Academy, returned to Kennett Square to again search for the gun. The nine millimeter Taurus was subsequently recovered after removing some shrubbery and raking the top layer of grass.
On November 18, 1999, Detective Wyatt was advised that Jamison had waived extradition. Detective Wyatt picked him up around 11:00 a.m. from Philadelphia and returned to Wilmington, Delaware around 12:15 p.m. Jamison was brought to the detective division at the WPD and was processed on the arrest warrant. Prior to starting the paperwork for the booking process, Detective Wyatt asked if he would be willing to speak with him since the detective was not present in Philadelphia. Jamison refused and stated that he had already incriminated himself enough in Philadelphia. As such, Detective Wyatt began the paperwork and did not question him. During the processing, Detective Wyatt came into the interview room where Jamison was located and asked him to verify information on the arrest/fingerprint card. The arrest card had pedigree information and also listed the eleven charges. When Jamison asked about the number of charges, Detective Wyatt explained the nature of the charges, including Jamison's liability under conspiracy and accomplice liability theories. In response, Jamison stated that he wanted to tell his side of the story. The detective left the room and activated the videotape equipment. Upon his return, Jamison was given his Miranda rights, and the videotaped statement began at 2:20 p.m. and ended at 3:35 p.m. Jamison made incriminating statements similar to those made in Philadelphia. After the statement and the booking process were completed, he was turned over to a booking officer and transported to court.
On November 9, 1999, Jamison waived extradition. There was no explanation for the delay in returning him to Delaware.
In contrast, Jamison testified that after he invoked his right to remain silent, Detective Wyatt continued to ask him several times whether he had changed his mind. Jamison further stated that after he voiced a concern about the number of charges, Detective Wyatt said that he could perhaps help him dispose of some charges if he would tell him what happened. As such, Jamison stated that Detective Wyatt's statements made him change his mind, and because he did not shoot anyone, he wanted to relay his side of the story.
CONTENTIONS
Jamison moves, on the grounds of several constitutional violations, to have the following suppressed: (1) all the statements made by Jamison to Detective Lawson and Detective Diana on October 27, 1999 in Philadelphia, (2) all statements made by Jamison on October 28, 1999, (3) all physical evidence seized or recovered by police, which constituted "fruits" of the above statements, and (4) all statements made by Jamison on November 18, 1999 to Detective Wyatt. Due to the various violations alleged, the Court will address each argument chronologically.
The October 27, 1999 and October 28, 1999 Statements
Jamison argues that all his statements made on October 27th and 28th should be suppressed based, first, on the failure to promptly present him before a magistrate without unreasonable delay and secondly, on the failure to honor his invocation of his right to remain silent. The Court will first address the "prompt presentment" argument.
A. Prompt Presentment
Jamison argues that he was not promptly presented under Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(a) and 11 Del. C. § 1909. On October 27, 1999, Jamison was arrested at 2:45 p.m. in Philadelphia, and the processing procedure began on October 28, 1999 at 6:00 p.m., 27 hours later. He was not arraigned in Philadelphia Municipal Court until October 29, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. via closed-circuit television, which was 47 hours after arrest. First, Jamison argues that once the decision was made not to present him because the WPD was traveling to Philadelphia to talk to him, the rule was violated. In the alternative, Jamison argues that once the interview ended in the early morning hours of October 28, 1999, he should have been processed in the PDU and presented to a magistrate. Because Jamison was not promptly presented, he argues that the statements and fruits developed therefrom should be suppressed.
First, the choice of law must be addressed. Where the admissibility of a Jamison's incriminating statement to Delaware authorities is challenged in a Delaware prosecution, Delaware law will govern, regardless of whether the statement was taken outside Delaware. The governing standard of the arresting officer's duty is found in Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(a), which provides in part:
State v. Siple, Del. Super., Cr.A. Nos. IN94-12-1641 to IN94-12-1672, Cooch, J. (July 19, 1996) (Mem. Op.) at 22.
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint . . . shall take the arrested person without unreasonable delay before the nearest available committing magistrate of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed . . ."
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 5(a).
Section 11 Del. C. § 1909 of Title 11 similarly states:
If not otherwise released, every person arrested shall be brought before a magistrate without unreasonable delay, and in any event the person shall, if possible, be so brought within 24 hours of arrest, Sundays and holidays excluded, unless a resident judge of the county where the person is detained or of the county where the crime was committed for good cause shown orders that the person be held for a further period of not exceeding 48 hours.
Rule 5 implements the statute and reflects the intent of the Court and legislature to provide a reasonably speedy initial appearance before a neutral and detached magistrate. Rule 5(a) and 11 Del. C. § 1909 will govern when one is arrested on Delaware charges and requires that one be brought before a Delaware judge without unreasonable delay, measured from the time the Delaware authorities gain custody of the arrestee. If this Court determines that there was unreasonable delay in taking an arrested person before a judicial officer, and the detention was unlawful, then, under settled Delaware law, evidence obtained during such period is inadmissible at trial.
See Warren v. State, Del. Supr., 385 A.2d 137, 141 (1978), overruled on different grounds, Roberts v. State, Del. Supr., 494 A.2d 156 (1985).
Siple at 53.
Warren, 385 A.2d at 141 ( citing Vorhauer v. State, Del. Supr., 212 A.2d 886, 892 (1965)). This exclusionary rule is also known as the McNabb-Mallory rule, which was derived from McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The latter case involved the Federal Criminal Rule 5(a). which requires that the arrested person be taken before a committing Magistrate without `unnecessary' delay instead of unreasonable' delay referred to in our Rule.
But the application of Rule 5(a) and 11 Del. C. § 1909 is not as simple or clear when the arrest occurs in another jurisdiction. The remedies associated with violations of these rules lose their effect if they are not directed to the conduct of the law enforcement agents of the jurisdiction where the prosecution takes place. Exclusion of evidence by a Delaware court for unlawful conduct by authorities from another jurisdiction, who presumably neither are aware of Delaware's rules nor have an interest in the Delaware prosecution, would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule, i.e. to deter unlawful police conduct. The Delaware exclusionary rule will not operate to exclude evidence obtained in another jurisdiction as a result of misconduct by authorities of another jurisdiction. As such, assuming that there was misconduct, normally, the Philadelphia police's failure to properly present Jamison under Rule 5 would have no effect on the prosecution in Delaware.
Siple at 57.
Id.
Id at 58.
However, this does not end the inquiry. Rule 5 would come into play if the Delaware authorities gained actual or constructive custody of Jamison while in the other jurisdiction. Since there is no dispute that Jamison was in the actual custody of the PPD, the Court must address whether the actions of the WPD on this evening placed Jamison in their constructive custody.
See Siple at 53-63.
In federal cases, constructive custody has been found in similar situations where there was a working arrangement between federal and state authorities to elicit information from an accused before taking him before a magistrate. For example, in United States v. Barlow, the defendant was arrested by Detroit police on a state charge of grand larceny, and the FBI contacted the Detroit police in connection with their investigation of a theft involving the defendant. The FBI and the Detroit police agreed to exchange information with respect to their independent investigations. As such, while in custody of the Detroit police, the FBI interviewed the defendant, and his presentment was delayed. The Sixth Circuit held that even if the federal authorities did not have actual custody, they could have constructive custody where the federal and the state authorities have a "working arrangement to elicit information from an accused before taking him before a magistrate." The Court further explained that the "collaborative effort must be specifically designed to circumvent the requirements of Rule 5(a), that is, designed to produce evidence which would not be admissible if the defendant were in federal custody the entire time." "A mere suspicion of improper cooperation is not enough to make out a Rule 5(a) violation." The Court then held that no collaborative arrangement existed because both the state police and the FBI conducted legitimate independent investigations.
Siple at 60 (citing United States v Barlow, 6th Cir., 693 F.2d 954 (1982)).
6th Cir., 693 F.2d 954 (1982).
Barlow, 693 F.2d at 957.
The test for determining whether a working arrangement exists so as to charge federal authorities with constructive custody was set forth in Barnett v. United States, 5th Cir., 384 F.2d 848 (1967): The necessary inquiry is whether the cooperation between state and federal officials had as its purpose a mere interchange of information and resources between two legitimate investigations, one state and the other federal, or to permit in-custody investigation and interrogation by federal officials without compliance with [Federal] Rule 5(a). The purpose must be determined objectively from all surrounding circumstances. A high degree of cooperation by state officials in making the subjects available for interrogation by federal officers is not conclusive. Nor is it controlling that the individuals were taken into state custody because of information furnished state officials by federal officers stimulated the state investigation. However, the existence of a legitimate state investigation for a suspected state offense is essential to a valid purpose, and it is important "vhether or not state officials will proceed with further action on the state charge independent of the outcome of the federal investigation. Id. at 858.
Barlow, 693 F.2d at 958.
Id. at 959.
Id. In addition, the Sixth Circuit stated that a valid Miranda waiver also waives the prompt judicial warning of one's constitutional rights. Id. But, this Court is not willing to adopt such a broad interpretation of Miranda so that it would justify any failure to reasonably present a defendant in accordance with the Rules of this Court and the legislative intent in this area. The Court believes that the rationale for a prompt presentment goes beyond the mere advisement of rights.
In State v. Siple, this Court found that the above analysis from Barlow was applicable to a case where one state arrested a defendant on charges in that state, then a second state took custody and arrested the defendant on charges in the second state. In Siple, the defendant was arrested in Ocean City, Maryland due to the sexual assault of a woman in her Ocean City home. Because there was a suspected link between the Ocean City incident and a series of unsolved rapes in New Castle County, Delaware, the Delaware police were contacted. The officers from Maryland and Delaware agreed to cooperate with the exchange of information relating to the offenses, which they believed were related. The Delaware officers interviewed the defendant, and his presentment was delayed. The Court found that:
Del. Super., Cr.A. Nos. IN94-12-1641 to IN94-12-1672, Cooch, J. (July 19, 1996) (Mem. Op.).
Delaware and Maryland authorities were not acting in concert with each other so that Delaware authorities will be charged with having constructive custody of Defendant at any earlier time. Both Delaware and Maryland police were working on independent investigations involving Defendant. Bach suspected Defendant of crimes within its own jurisdiction and charged Defendant with crimes in their respective states. The exchange of information and cooperation between police agencies is a legitimate and laudable pursuit. Providing other police agencies the opportunity to interview a defendant does not convert the relationship to one of acting in concert. Thus, Delaware authorities were under no duty to present Defendant to a Delaware judge and therefore cannot be charged with improperly delaying.
Siple at 63-64.
The Court believes that the factual circumstances surrounding Jamison's detention makes this matter distinguishable from Siple. In the present case, the only reason that the Philadelphia authorities arrested Jamison was based on an outstanding arrest warrant in Delaware. There was no separate, independent investigation based on another crime in Pennsylvania. The only reason that Jamison was not processed shortly after his arrest was the desire of the WPD to interview Jamison. Once the interview concluded, 10 hours after his arrest, it was the actions and requests of the WPD that further delayed the normal processing procedure. In this case, the PPD had no independent interest in Jamison and they were simply cooperating and accommodating the interests of the Delaware authorities. If the WPD had indicated that they were done with Jamison at the conclusion of the interview, the Court has no doubt that Jamison would have immediately been turned over to the PDU. It would be fundamentally unfair for the Delaware authorities to now hide behind and blame the delay on their Philadelphia counterparts. Whatever actions were taken that evening can only reasonably be attributable to the conduct of the Delaware authorities. As such, the Court finds that the interaction between the Philadelphia and Wilmington authorities that evening resulted in Delaware's constructive custody of Jamison.
Now, the next question is whether there was an unreasonable delay in the presentment. The Court finds that Jamison was appropriately interviewed on October 27, 1999 into the earlier morning hours of October 28, 1999 and finds no error in the Philadelphia authorities contacting the Delaware authorities and holding Jamison in the Homicide Division until the Wilmington detectives arrived to interview him. But, at the conclusion of the interview at 1:30 a.m., the Court finds that it was unreasonable to delay further processing and the ultimate presentment of Jamison. While the Court understands and appreciates the difficult circumstances presented to the officers that evening, it simply does not justify the holding of Jamison for an additional 16 hours before turning him over to the PDU. The Court finds it is reasonable for the Delaware authorities, who are tacitly controlling the situation, to be accountable for the requirements under Rule 5 at this point in the detention.
Furthermore, the Court does not believe that the public's safety was at issue. The State argued that the authorities delayed Jamison's presentment and kept him in the Homicide Division overnight so that the police could search for a firearm, which would have otherwise been a public safety issue. Under the unique facts of this case, the Court does not believe that the police would have been remiss in processing Jamison and not immediately searching for the firearm. On October 26, 1999, a thorough search of the firearm had been conducted at Nicole Bowman's property in Kennett Square prior to Jamison's arrest to no avail. This search lasted several hours and even a metal detector was used. This was followed by another unsuccessful search on the evening of October 27th, pursuant to the directions and a map drawn by Jamison. The firearm was buried in a secluded backyard, and this was not a situation where a gun was potentially assessable in a very open, public place. As such, the Court finds no merit in the State's public safety argument and finds that it does not provide reasonable justification to delay Jamison's presentment.
As such, the delay in presenting Jamison from 1:30 a.m. on October 28, 1999 until 2:00 p.m. on October 29, 1999, a span of 36 hours, for the sole purpose of finding the gun and further interviewing Jamison, was unreasonable. As a result, Jamison's motion is GRANTED in part, and the evidence developed after the conclusion of the interview on October 28, 1999 at 1:30 a.m. until Jamison was turned over to the PDU is excluded.
In addition, according to Vorhauer v. State, Del. Supr., 212 A.2d 886 (1965), a detention in excess of 24 hours without the proceedings prescribed by Rule 5 is unreasonable. Id. at 893. See also Warren v. State, Del. Supr., 385 A.2d 137 (1978).
Due to this ruling, the State has indicated that it may argue that the evidence is admissible under the theory of inevitable discovery. Since there is no motion before the Court at this time, that issue will not be addressed in this opinion. If the State intends to make an argument of this nature, it should promptly file an appropriate motion in advance of trial.
B. Invocation of Right to Silence
Jamison next argues that he invoked his right to remain silent during his statement with Detective Lawson on October 27, 1999, and as such, the questioning should have ceased. Because it did not, Jamison argues that all the statements thereafter should be suppressed.After Jamison's rights were read and during the recorded interview on October 27, 1999, an exchange occurred between Detective Lawson and Jamison regarding a conversation that Jamison had with Kevin Harris ("Jazz"), Jamison's friend, and Amanda Chambers, Jamison's girlfriend. During the investigation, Jazz told the WPD that Jamison showed him a newspaper article and stated that he made the paper in regards to the homicide at Cedar Street. Ms. Chambers told the WPD that Jamison gave her a necklace, which had been taken from the victim, Baltazar Torres, and also provided the police with information regarding the homicide. When Detective Lawson asked Jamison about the story that he told Jazz and Amanda, Jamison replied that he "told "em some dumb shit" and that the whole story was "bull shit." Thereafter, the following exchanged took place:
Q523: Then what bull shit story did you tell Amanda and Jazz, tell me?
A523: (CU)(CU) (talking too low).
Q524: Huh?
A524: I'd rather not say.
Q525: You'd rather not . . .
A525: I . . .
Q526: Say?
A526: Rath-I'd ra-I'd rather not say right now you know what I mean. See "cause for real-for real-for real you know what I'm sayin' I feel like- feel like know what I'm sayin' I do-I already-I-I already know I was in the hole-I already know I was in the hole you know what I'm sayin' but I'm diggin' my shit-I'm diggin' my shit even deeper you know what I'm sayin' I'm makin' it sound like I did it you know what I mean and I-I'd rather-I'd rather just be quiet.
Q527: Is that what you told them?
A527: I'd rather just be quiet.
Q528: Did you told Jazz and Amanda that you did it?
State's Exhibit 5 at 63-64.
It is in this exchange that Jamison argues he invoked his right to silence. As such, the issue is whether those statements constituted an invocation of that right.
Before the police can conduct a custodial interrogation of a suspect, the individual must be advised of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as outlined in Miranda. Once Miranda warnings have been given and an individual indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease and the police may not initiate continued interrogation on the crimes at issue but must scrupulously honor such invocation. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Dodson v. State, the right to remain silent is a constitutional right that is subject to similar protection afforded the right to counsel. As such, like the right to counsel, the cessation of police questioning arises only when a suspect has clearly asserted his right to silence. In addition, the determination of whether a suspect clearly asserted his right calls for an objective inquiry, i.e. whether a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an invocation of silence. The objective standard for evaluating a purported invocation of the right serves the purpose of providing "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to law enforcement officers for determining when questioning must be cut off. When an individual is unclear in their invocation, the police may continue to ask questions, but only for the limited purpose of clarifying the individual's intent. Under the Delaware constitution, the police are required to clarify the statement before continuing with the interrogation. Any statement made after a suspect clearly exercises his right to remain silent must be suppressed as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
There is no dispute that Jamison was in custody and subject to interrogation.
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 473-74.
Dodson v. State, Del. Supr., 513 A.2d 761, 763 (1986).
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
Del. Supr., 513 A.2d 761 (1986).
Id. at 763.
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988).
State v. Culp, Del. Super., Cr. A. Nos. IK98-08-0027, IK98-08-0028, Ridgely, J. (Aug. 2, 1999) (ORDER). This Court found that the clarification approach, which was originally set forth in Crawford v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 571, 577 (1990) for the purposes of an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, also applied in the context of an ambiguous or equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. In Steckel v. State, Del. Supr., 711 A.2d 5 (1998), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the "clarification approach" as described in Crawford, supra.
State v. Deangelo, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. 9903023368, Cooch, J. (March 21, 2000) (Mem.Op.) at 5 ( citing Crawford, 580 A.2d at 577). See also Siple at 27; State v. Demby, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN94-12-1518, Cooch, J. (Nov. 28, 1995) (Mem. Op.) at 17-20.
DeShields v. State, Del. Supr., 534 A.2d 630, 651-52 (1987).
Taken alone, Jamison's statements, "I'd rather not say" and "I'd rather just be quiet," appear to indicate an unwillingness to talk. But, put in the context of the conversation between Jamison and Detective Lawson, it would be a fairer interpretation to view them as an unwillingness by Jamison to divulge the comments he had made to friends, which were the subject of Detective Lawson's questioning. If the statement at A524 "I'd rather not say" is read in its context, it is obvious that Jamison did not want to talk about the comments he made to Amanda and Jazz. Objectively reviewing the statement, there is no indication that Jamison was responding to anything other than the story in question at the time. The Court finds that Jamison was not indicating that he no longer wished to speak to the detective, only that he wished not to speak about those particular comments.
In Brank v. State, an analogous case, the Court examined whether the individual invoked her right to counsel. In Brank, the suspect, Brank, who had been drinking alcohol, was taken to the hospital to receive treatment for her injuries after she was involved in a car accident. Brank refused treatment and stated that she did not want treatment without the approval of her lawyer. She argued that she invoked her right to counsel, and as such, the incriminating statements made thereafter were inadmissible. The Court found that the purpose of Brank's requests for counsel were made in connection with the blood test and medical treatment and she did not want to submit to either without her lawyer being present. The Court concluded that because Brank's requests for counsel were unambiguously limited to these purposes, they were not an invocation of the right to counsel.
Del. Supr., 528 A.2d 1185 (1987).
Id. at 1188.
Like Brank, the Court finds that Jamison did not invoke his right to remain silent and instead indicated an unwillingness to speak in a limited purpose. The statements in the October 27, 1999 statement "I'd rather not say" and "I'd rather just be quiet" were not a "clear" invocation of Jamison's Fifth Amendment right viewed in context of the interview. The Court also finds that taken in context, no ambiguity existed that would require Detective Lawson to clarify Jamison's intent. It is clear that Jamison's unwillingness to speak was limited to that particular story.
The Court also finds that Jamison's reliance on State v. Culp is misplaced. In Culp, the Court found that Culp invoked her right to remain silent during interrogation. In that case, a detective said "if you want to talk about it being an accident then you have to let us know that it's okay to talk to you." When Culp clearly responded, "Well, I don't want to talk," the Court found that the detectives should have scrupulously honored her wishes and ceased all questioning. But, Culp is distinguishable from the instant case. Here, Jamison stated "I'd rather not say" in response to a question about comments he allegedly made to other people. In Culp, the suspect indicated her unwillingness to talk based on the detective's question clarifying whether it was alright to speak with her about the incident. Again, the context of the statement is what is determinative in this case.
Del. Super., Cr. A. Nos. IK98-08-0027, IK98-08-0028, Ridgely. J. (Aug. 2, 1999) (ORDER).
Id. at 2.
Id.
As such, the Court finds that Jamison did not invoke his right to remain silent, and his motion as it relates to this argument is DENIED.
The November 18, 1999 Arrest in Delaware
Next, Jamison argues that statements and evidence should be suppressed after the Delaware authorities took actual custody of him on November 18, 1999. Jamison's argument is two-fold. First, Jamison argues that, similar to Philadelphia, he was not promptly presented in Delaware under Rule 5. Second, Jamison claims that incriminating statements should be suppressed when Detective Wyatt initiated conversation after Jamison invoked his right to remain silent.
A. Prompt Presentment
Jamison argues that similar to the situation in Philadelphia, he was not promptly presented in front of a magistrate in Delaware as required in Rule 5 and 11 Del. C. § 1999. When Jamison was transported from Philadelphia to Wilmington on November 18, 1999 after he waived extradition, he was subject to Rule 5 and 11 Del. C. § 1909. Jamison arrived in Wilmington at approximately 12:15 p.m. after Detective Wyatt picked him up in Philadelphia around 11:00 a.m. Detective Wyatt began the booking process and ultimately questioned him on video. Jamison argues that there was unreasonable delay in presenting him because the detective sought to obtain a statement from him first. As such, the Court must decide whether the delay from 12:15 p.m. until sometime in the late afternoon or early evening constituted an unreasonable delay under Rule 5.
The Court will not repeat the law as previously outlined above.
While Section 1909 refers to a 24-hour period in establishing that a person should be brought before a magistrate without unreasonable delay, this Court has observed that "[t]he reference to a 24-hour period is to an exception, not a norm, and it is not an outer limit within which a detention period is presumptively permissible." As such, under certain circumstances, a delay of less than 24 hours may also be unreasonable. But, there are no clear-cut standards for reasonableness, so each case must be judged on its own facts and among the factors to be considered are the length of the delay and the atmosphere surrounding the detention.
Wright v. State, Del. Supr., 633 A.2d 329, 334 (1993) ( quoting Warren. 385 A.2d at 142).
State v. Coyle, Del. Super., 567 A.2d 870, 875 (1989).
Webster v. State, Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 298, 301 (1965).
Wright, 633 A.2d at 334.
The Court finds that there was not an unreasonable delay based on the totality of the circumstances on November 18, 1999. The delay in presenting Jamison was approximately 5 hours. The Court does not find that the one hour statement on video plus the time for processing constituted an unreasonable delay. In addition, Detective Wyatt provided a reasonable explanation and justification for the processing delay. Because several officers had been involved in the case since Jamison's arrest, the warrant was not in its normal location, and there was a delay associated with finding the document and gathering information. Furthermore, this finding is consistent with other cases, which have addressed this issue. The Court does not find that there was an unreasonable delay under these circumstances, and as it relates to this issue, the motion is DENIED.
Hopkins v. State, Del. Supr., 501 A.2d 774 (1985) (eight hour delay was not unreasonable despite the chief investigating officer questioning the defendant); Weekley v. State, Del. Supr., 222 A.2d 781 (1966) (no unreasonable delay where three defendants made statements which lasted 4 hours).
B. Invocation of Right to Silence
Lastly, Jamison argues that on November 18, 1999, Detective Wyatt reinitiated conversations with him after he invoked his right to silence, and as such, the statements made subsequent to his invocation should be suppressed.
The law, as laid out above, is applicable to this issue but the question raised is somewhat different. During the October 27, 1999 recorded statement, the question of Jamison's right to remain silent was whether Jamison clearly invoked it. Now, in the November 18, 1999 statement, there is no dispute that Jamison invoked his right to remain silent. The question is after he invoked it, who initiated the subsequent conversation? The answer to this question will dictate whether subsequent incriminating statements are admissible.
When Jamison arrived at the WPD on November 18, 1999 at 12:15 p.m., Detective Wyatt asked him if he would give a statement. There is no dispute that Jamison refused. As such, Detective Wyatt ceased questioning and began the booking process. Jamison was placed in an interviewing room while the detective completed the booking paperwork. A few hours later,Detective Wyatt gave Jamison an arrest and fingerprint card to verify pedigree information. On the arrest card, Jamison's eleven charges were listed. When Jamison saw the number of charges, he became concerned and asked Detective Wyatt about them. Detective Wyatt explained the nature of the charges and the reasoning behind the decisions to include each of them. In particular, he explained conspiracy and accomplice liability. After the explanation, Jamison stated that he wanted to "tell his side of the story." At this point, the detective explained that he needed to read him his rights before he could speak. At 2:30 p.m., Detective Wyatt began the video tape of Jamison's statement. He was again mirandized on the videotape, and Jamison waived his rights. The question for the Court is whether Jamison initiated conversation or whether Detective Wyatt's statements or actions elicited conversation from Jamison.
The Court is convinced that the several hours delay in the booking process was not an attempt to improperly obtain a statement from Jamison. As previously explained, Detective Wyatt had difficulty locating the arrest warrant.
In Michigan v. Mosley, the United States Supreme Court attempted to define under what circumstances questioning can resume once an accused invokes his right to remain silent. The Court held that the admissibility of statements obtained after an individual in custody decided to remain silent under Miranda depends on whether his "right to cut off questioning" was "scrupulously honored." The Court in Mosely found that the defendant's right had not been violated because the police immediately ceased the interrogation once he invoked his right, resumed questioning only after a significant period of time had passed and fresh warnings had been given, and restricted the second interrogation to a completely different crime.
423 U.S. 96 (1975).
Id. at 104.
Id. at 106-07.
In Smith v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court, although addressing an invocation of a right to counsel, outlined the two prong test originally set in Edwards v. Arizona regarding the admissibility of subsequent statements. The Court found that a suspect's responses to further questioning may only be admitted upon a finding that the suspect initiated further discussions with the police and knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.
469 U.S. 91 (1984).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Smith, 469 U.S. at 95.
In Wainwright v. State, the defendant was arrested in Maryland for murder and possession of a firearm, waived extradition, and was taken to the police barracks to explain "why he was brought back to Delaware and what he was being charged with." The detective gave the defendant his Miranda rights, and the defendant asked for an attorney. As such, the detective ceased questioning. But before taking him to the processing room, he advised the defendant that he was being charged with murder because his co-defendant had given a complete statement describing the defendant's involvement. About an hour later, the defendant stated that he did not kill the victim. At that point, the detective asked him if he was retracting his request for counsel and the defendant responded in the affirmative. In deciding the issue, the Delaware Supreme Court looked to the United States Supreme Court case of Rhode Island v. Innis, where the Court held that:
Del. Supr., 504 A.2d 1096 (1986).
Id. at 1098.
446 U.S. 291 (1980).
"interrogation' under Miranda need not amount to actual questioning and may instead be the "functional equivalent' of such questioning. The Court defined the latter to include "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'
Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1102 ( quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 302).
The Delaware Supreme Court found that although the defendant had a generalized knowledge of the charges against him, it was appropriate for the detective to complete the formalities of the booking process, including advising the defendant of the charges before taking him to the nearest available Justice of the Peace for his initial appearance as required by 11 Del. C. § 1909 and Rule S. But, the Court further held that in going beyond the formalities of the booking process to describe the State's evidence, the detective engaged in an unnecessary tactic that was reasonably calculated to elicit a reaction from the defendant. "Any attempt to "spark' the accused's initiative to make a statement in the absence of counsel through presentation of evidence will contaminate the waiver." As such, the Court barred the incriminating statements that followed into evidence.
Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1103.
Using the guidelines in Wainwright, the Court finds that Detective Wyatt properly approached Jamison with the arrest card in order to complete the booking process even after Jamison invoked his right to remain silent. The Court further finds that simply handing Jamison an arrest card to verify information was not intended to spark Jamison's initiative to make a statement and waive his prior invocation. As in Wainwright, the Court finds no error in allowing the detective to complete the formalities of the booking process. Moreover, the charges listed on the arrest card were the same ones that had existed when the detective applied and received an arrest warrant on October 24, 1999. Jamison was extradited on these same charges, and they presumably were not a surprise to him. Therefore, this is not a situation where an officer attempted to elicit a reaction from a defendant by adding charges or exaggerating his predicament. There is simply no evidence to suggest that Detective Wyatt showed Jamison the arrest card in an attempt to obtain a statement from him.
Furthermore, after noticing the charges listed, it was Jamison who questioned the detective about the charges. Detective Wyatt's explanation was merely a response to Jamison's questions. And, after explaining the charges at the request of Jamison, it was Jamison who requested to tell his side of the story, a reaction neither requested or solicited by Detective Wyatt.
In State v. Coyle, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that once the defendant invokes his right to counsel or to remain silent, interrogation cannot resume unless the defendant initiates the communication, exchange or conversation with the police. The Court also noted that non-interrogational conversation could amount to interrogation for purposes of Miranda. "A practice that the police know is reasonably likely to invoke an incriminating response from a suspect is interrogation." In Coyle, the conversations in question took place at the hospital while the two officers and the defendant were waiting for the phlebotomist to take a blood test of the defendant. The officers compared investigative techniques but in the context of this investigation. The Court held that there was no indication that their discussion was one which they should have known would prompt the defendant to want to say something incriminating. As such, the Court concluded that the defendant's request to say something further was an initiation of a conversation with the police.
Del. Super., 567 A.2d 870 (1989).
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 879.
Id.
This is the exact situation presented to Detective Wyatt, and he reacted properly. Furthermore, prior to making a statement, Detective Wyatt satisfied the second prong of the Edwards test by mirandizing Jamison on video and obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver.
As such, the Court finds that Jamison initiated the subsequent conversation with the police, the initiation was not sparked or improperly prompted by the officer, and after being advised of his rights, he knowingly and intelligently waived his prior invocation. As a result, the motion to suppress the November 18, 1999 statement is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth below, Jamison's motion to suppress is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as consistent with the findings above.
_______________________________ Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.