Recognizing that a plea of insanity triggers a broad inquiry into the defendant's entire life, courts have admitted evidence of prior misconduct because of its significance in showing the mental condition of the defendant, when such evidence would ordinarily be excluded. See Thomason v. State, 46 Ala. App. 10, 237 So.2d 121 (1970); Burgunder v. Arizona, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940); People v. Vanda, 111 Ill. App.3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609 (1982); Fulmer v. State, 249 Ind. 261, 230 N.E.2d 307 (1967); Wilson v. State, supra; State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La. 1981); People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 116, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1962); State v. Johnson, 69 Wash.2d 264, 418 P.2d 238 (1966); 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed. 1972) 222. "Whenever insanity is asserted as a defense and is supported by any credible evidence, `it is of critical importance that the defendant's entire relevant symptomology be brought before the jury . . . .' `[W]hen insanity is in issue, any and all conduct of the person is admissible in evidence.
The relevancy of proffered evidence depends on whether it tends to prove or disprove a material fact at issue. State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La. 1981); State v. Constantine, 364 So.2d 1011 (La. 1978). A trial judge's determination regarding the relevancy of evidence will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.
In order to determine if there has been a speedy trial violation, the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). State v. James , 394 So.2d 1197 (La. 1981) ; State v. Reaves , 376 So.2d 136 (La. 1979). Under the Barker test, to determine whether or not there has been a speedy trial violation, the court considers: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.
These factors include: (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, (4) and prejudice to the defendant. Id. ; State v. James , 394 So.2d 1197 (La. 1981) ; State v. Jordan, supra . Here, a review of the record does not indicate a violation of McGill's right to a speedy trial.
These factors include: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; (4) and prejudice to the defendant. State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La.1981); State v. Bradham, supra. Applying the four factors mentioned above, review of the record does not indicate a violation of Wills' right to a speedy trial.
These factors include: (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, (4) and prejudice to the defendant. Id.;State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La.1981); State v. Jordan, supra;State v. Johnston, 480 So.2d 823 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985). Applying the four factors mentioned above, review of the record does not indicate a violation of Bradham's right to a speedy trial.
Id.; State v. James, 394 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1981); State v. Jordan, supra; State v. Johnston, 480 So. 2d 823 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). Applying the four factors mentioned above, review of the record does not indicate a violation of Bradham's right to a speedy trial.
The four factors to be considered under the test are: 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) prejudice to the defendant, such as the possible impairment of the presentation of the accused's defense. Barker v. Wingo, supra; State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La. 1981). A motion to quash is the proper procedural vehicle for challenging an untimely commencement of trial.
The four factors to be considered are: 1) length of delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and 4) prejudice to the defendant, such as the possible impairment of the presentation of the accused's defense. Barker v. Wingo, supra; State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La. 1981); State v. Johnston, supra. For noncapital felony cases, the state must commence trial within two years from the date of institution of prosecution.
Whether this right has been violated is determined by a four-part test: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his or her right, and prejudice to the defendant.Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197, 1200 (La. 1981). [Boldface added for emphasis.]