Opinion
NO. 03-14-00350-CR
03-24-2016
The State of Texas, Appellant v. Adalberto Jaimes, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 427TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-DC-13-200318, HONORABLE JIM CORONADO, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
After his arrest for the felony offense of driving while intoxicated, appellee Adalberto Jaimes's blood was drawn without a warrant pursuant to section 724.012(b) of the Texas Transportation Code. The trial court granted Jaimes's motion to suppress evidence relating to the results of the blood draw, which the State asserts was an abuse of discretion. We will affirm the trial court's order.
See Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2).
BACKGROUND
Austin Police Department officers Shane Kirk and Cory Knop testified that they responded to a report of a vehicle being driven away from a residence by a possibly intoxicated man in a green shirt. The officers testified that they followed a car matching the reported description to the reported residence and saw a man matching the description get out from the driver's side of the car. They testified that Jaimes, the driver, had indicators of intoxication such as an odor of alcohol on his breath, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and balance difficulties. Based on their observations and his refusal to perform field sobriety tests, the officers arrested Jaimes.
Kirk testified that Jaimes's two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated subjected Jaimes to a mandatory blood draw despite his refusal to supply a sample. See Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b)(3). Kirk testified that obtaining a warrant would have taken about twenty minutes, but that he did not obtain one because the statutes did not require him to do so:
Q. And there was—when this arrest occurred, there was no reason at all why you couldn't get a search warrant, other than you were not required to do so?
A. That's correct.
. . . .
Q. I mean, there was nothing unusual about this arrest, that there was no magistrate, there was no paperwork available that you could fill out, or any impediment to you getting a search warrant; is that correct?
A. Correct.
. . . .
Q. Okay. But, here, the only reason that you did not get a search warrant is because, by state law, because it was discouraged, you were not required to do so?
A. That's correct.
The trial court granted Jaimes's motion to suppress, opining "that no effort was made to obtain or even consider the possibility of obtaining a search warrant, and so, absent implied consent, the State has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence an exception to the warrant requirement." The State appealed.
ANALYSIS
The State asserted that the blood-draw evidence was admissible because (1) the blood draw was mandated by Texas Transportation Code section 724.012(b), which Jaimes has not shown is unconstitutional, and (2) Jaimes was deemed to have consented to the taking of a specimen under Texas Transportation Code section 724.011(a). The State argues further that the state and federal exclusionary rules do not require the blood-draw evidence to be suppressed even if it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion and will overturn the trial court's ruling only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We defer almost totally to a trial court's determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness, but review de novo pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations. Id. at 922-23. Villarreal defeats the State's Fourth Amendment arguments.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search of a person can proceed under a search warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement and must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 795-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Because Jaimes's blood undisputedly was drawn without a warrant, the State had the burden to prove the reasonableness of the seizure. State v. Robinson, 334 S.W.3d 776, 778-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
The State conceded in a supplemental brief that its arguments that police compliance with the Texas Transportation Code sections 724.011 and 724.012 made the warrantless blood draw reasonable were "directly contradict[ed]" by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Villarreal. See 475 S.W.3d at 798. That court held "that a nonconsensual search of a DWI suspect's blood conducted pursuant to the mandatory-blood-draw and implied-consent provisions in the Transportation Code, when undertaken in the absence of a warrant or any applicable exception to the warrant requirement, violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 815; see also Roop v. State, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1541, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 17, 2016, no pet. h.). The court also held that a defendant's express refusal to consent to a blood draw withdrew any statutory implied consent under the Fourth Amendment. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 799-800. Here, the arresting officer testified that he proceeded with the warrantless blood draw despite Jaimes's express refusal to consent to the blood draw because the Transportation Code permitted him to do so. He testified that there was no reason other than the existence of the statutes not to get a warrant. The State does not assert the exigence exception. Based on Villarreal, we overrule the State's first and second points of error. See id. at 815.
The exceptions to the exclusionary rules do not apply here.
The State contends in its third and fourth points that the blood-draw evidence should not have been suppressed because of various exceptions to the federal and state exclusionary rules. In its fourth point, the State claims that the evidence should not have been suppressed under the Texas exclusionary rule because the officers did not violate the law as it existed at the time Jaimes's blood was drawn, but was instead drawn in compliance with Texas law. In its third point, the State asserts that the evidence should not have been suppressed under the federal exclusionary rule because the officers in good-faith relied on the Transportation Code provisions discussed above, as well as on cases holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a person's bloodstream constituted an "exigent circumstance" sufficient to justify dispensing with the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
See, e.g., Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Laird, 38 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); Weaver v. State, 721 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd).
The Texas exclusionary rule provides that "[n]o evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(a) (emphases added). The only exception to this rule listed by the Legislature is that evidence can be suppressed if "the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause." Id. art. 38.23(b) (emphasis added). There is no exception to the Texas exclusionary rule based on an officer's compliance with the then-understood law or his good-faith reliance on anything other than a warrant. Because there was no warrant in this case, the exception to article 38.23 does not apply. See State v. Ayala, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2166, at *12 n.27 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing the evidence pursuant to the Texas exclusionary rule.
The applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained from a warrantless, mandatory blood draw is an issue currently pending before the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Cole v. State, 454 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted). For now, we apply only the expressly legislated exception to the Texas exclusionary rule. See Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Although the court-created federal exclusionary rule allows exceptions based on an officer's good-faith reliance on the law as it existed when the officer acted, it does not preempt the Texas exclusionary rule's broader protections for defendants. See Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also State v. Tercero, 467 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in suppressing the evidence under the Texas exclusionary rule, we need not address whether the evidence should have been suppressed pursuant to the federal exclusionary rule. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We overrule the State's fourth point and dismiss its third point.
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011); See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 360 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). --------
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress.
/s/_________
Jeff Rose, Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Bourland Affirmed Filed: March 24, 2016 Do Not Publish