State v. Jacobson

10 Citing cases

  1. City of Tucson v. Grezaffi

    200 Ariz. 130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that "[l]egislation designed to promote the public welfare . . . often places burdens on some persons more than others [b]ut the deprivation of the most beneficial use of property and diminution in value are not sufficient in and of themselves to constitute a taking"

    See also State v. McLamb, 188 Ariz. 1, 4, 932 P.2d 266, 269 (App. 1996); State v. Bolan, 187 Ariz. 159, 160, 927 P.2d 819, 820 (App. 1996). ¶ 4 Thus, we do not address Grezaffi's various contentions that Code § 11-19 is invalid as applied to her because she allegedly was operating a "private club" rather than a public restaurant when the City cited her; that the evidence presented at the City Court hearing was insufficient to support the magistrate's ruling, see State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 67, 588 P.2d 358, 360 (App. 1978), overruled on other grounds, Levitz v. State, 126 Ariz. 203, 613 P.2d 1259 (1980); or that the City's ordinances that govern appointment and retention of city magistrates are invalid and deprived her of "a fair hearing from an impartial tribunal." And, although Grezaffi contends the ordinance violates a laundry list of various provisions in the United States and Arizona Constitutions, we address only those arguments that she at least minimally supports with "reasons" and authoritative "citations," as Rule 13(a)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., 17B A. R.S., requires.

  2. State v. McLamb

    188 Ariz. 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 30 times
    Describing defendant's conviction for the violation of code provision "proscribing the unauthorized wearing of the official insignia of the Phoenix Police Department"

    As a charter city, Phoenix may exercise "all the powers authorized by its charter, providing those powers are not inconsistent with the Arizona Constitution or the general laws of this state." State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 68, 588 P.2d 358, 361 (App. 1978); see A.R.S. § 9-284. The defendant argues that Code section 23-21 is preempted by A.R.S. section 13-2406, thus invalidating the ordinance.

  3. In re Maricopa County

    173 Ariz. 177 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 27 times
    Holding a doctor's testimony was sufficient to determine that the patient was incapable of understanding treatment alternatives when the doctor testified that the patient's "command hallucinations" influenced his decision-making capacity

    In re Slabaugh, 16 Ohio App.3d 255, 475 N.E.2d 497, 499 (1984). See also State v. Tocco, 156 Ariz. 110, 113-14, 750 P.2d 868, 871-72 (App. 1988) ("Only where a statute proscribes no comprehensible course of conduct at all is it unconstitutional as applied to any set of facts."); State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 70, 588 P.2d 358, 363 (App. 1978) ("essential test of vagueness is whether the legislative enactment may be understood by persons of common intelligence"). Alleged overbreadth primarily concerns substantive due process because it questions whether the statutory standards "provide a constitutionally adequate basis for detention." LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 142.

  4. State v. Mercurio

    153 Ariz. 336 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    Finding that “[w]here there is no direct conflict between state statutes and the exercise of power authorized by a city's charter, our inquiry is whether the state legislation has ... completely occupied the field”

    A charter city may exercise all powers authorized by its charter, except where such exercise is inconsistent with our state constitution or the general laws of this state. State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978). Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether chapter 8, § 5 of the Phoenix City charter is "inconsistent" with article VI, § 31 of the Arizona Constitution, which provides in relevant part:

  5. State v. Holland

    153 Ariz. 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 6 times
    In State v. Holland, 153 Ariz. 536, 738 P.2d 1143 (App. 1987), a criminal misdemeanor case tried in city court and appealed to superior court, this court noted that an attack on the trial court's interpretation or application of a statute is beyond the scope of this court's review.

    State v. Spitz, 15 Ariz. App. 120, 486 P.2d 800 (1971). Beyond the scope of our review are such matters as the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978); an attack on the lower court's interpretation or application of a statute, State v. Renteria, 126 Ariz. 591, 617 P.2d 543 (App. 1979); State v. Owens, 114 Ariz. 565, 562 P.2d 738 (App. 1977); a challenge to the superior court's dismissal of an appeal from city court, State v. McNeill, 146 Ariz. 568, 707 P.2d 972 (App. 1985); a challenge to the propriety of a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace, State v. Fagerberg, 17 Ariz. App. 63, 495 P.2d 503 (1972); and issues concerning evidentiary or factual disputes, Sanders v. Moore, 117 Ariz. 527, 573 P.2d 927 (App. 1977). In summary, a criminal misdemeanor case that is tried in city court may be appealed to the superior court. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 16; A.R.S. § 22-371 to 374.

  6. Levitz v. State

    126 Ariz. 203 (Ariz. 1980)   Cited 17 times

    Appellant, however, seeks to distinguish the regulation of signs, which antedate zoning regulations as such, contending that such regulations are not zoning but a local matter dealing with a purely local problem — signs. In support of its position the City points out that Division One of the Court of Appeals in State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978) has held that the power to regulate signs is not tied to the zoning power, and a city may regulate signs under its charter power. The City notes that its ordinances regulating signs were in existence long before the State enacted any zoning legislation.

  7. Hamilton v. City of Mesa

    185 Ariz. 420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    We start by noting that municipal corporations have no inherent police power, and that their powers are delegated to them by the constitution or laws of the state. State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 68, 588 P.2d 358, 361 (App. 1978), overruled on other grounds Levitz v. State, 126 Ariz. 203, 613 P.2d 1259 (1980). A city may adopt a city charter as its organic law.

  8. City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley

    163 Ariz. 608 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 14 times

    " State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 70, 588 P.2d 358, 363 (App. 1978) overruled on other grounds, 126 Ariz. 203, 613 P.2d 1259 (1980). The tax at issue here is essentially a tax on business activities, or more precisely, upon the privilege of engaging in business.

  9. Prendergast v. City of Tempe

    143 Ariz. 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 23 times
    Finding fee award based on A.R.S. § 12-341.01, where it was first requested after the grant of summary judgment, was sufficiently timely and that opposing party had sufficient notice that fees were being sought

    A charter city may exercise all powers authorized by its charter, except where such an exercise is inconsistent with out state constitution or the general laws of this state. State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978); A.R.S. § 9-284(B) (Supp. 1983).

  10. State ex rel. Baumert v. Municipal Court of Phoenix

    602 P.2d 827 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 4 times
    Invalidating city ordinance criminalizing indecent exposure based on a definition that differed from state statutory definition of indecent exposure

    Respondents argue that the crime of indecent exposure has been preempted by the state statute, and that the city may not legislate in the area. The test for preemption has been set out in numerous Arizona cases. Clayton v. State (on rehearing), 38 Ariz. 466, 300 P. 1010 (1931), Flagstaff Vending Co. v. City of Flagstaff, supra, Phoenix Respirator and Ambulance Service, Inc. v. McWilliams, supra, State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978). Preemption by the state would prevent any ordinance by the city making indecent exposure a crime, since under the doctrine of preemption the state would have appropriated the area.