See also State v. McLamb, 188 Ariz. 1, 4, 932 P.2d 266, 269 (App. 1996); State v. Bolan, 187 Ariz. 159, 160, 927 P.2d 819, 820 (App. 1996). ¶ 4 Thus, we do not address Grezaffi's various contentions that Code § 11-19 is invalid as applied to her because she allegedly was operating a "private club" rather than a public restaurant when the City cited her; that the evidence presented at the City Court hearing was insufficient to support the magistrate's ruling, see State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 67, 588 P.2d 358, 360 (App. 1978), overruled on other grounds, Levitz v. State, 126 Ariz. 203, 613 P.2d 1259 (1980); or that the City's ordinances that govern appointment and retention of city magistrates are invalid and deprived her of "a fair hearing from an impartial tribunal." And, although Grezaffi contends the ordinance violates a laundry list of various provisions in the United States and Arizona Constitutions, we address only those arguments that she at least minimally supports with "reasons" and authoritative "citations," as Rule 13(a)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., 17B A. R.S., requires.
As a charter city, Phoenix may exercise "all the powers authorized by its charter, providing those powers are not inconsistent with the Arizona Constitution or the general laws of this state." State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 68, 588 P.2d 358, 361 (App. 1978); see A.R.S. § 9-284. The defendant argues that Code section 23-21 is preempted by A.R.S. section 13-2406, thus invalidating the ordinance.
In re Slabaugh, 16 Ohio App.3d 255, 475 N.E.2d 497, 499 (1984). See also State v. Tocco, 156 Ariz. 110, 113-14, 750 P.2d 868, 871-72 (App. 1988) ("Only where a statute proscribes no comprehensible course of conduct at all is it unconstitutional as applied to any set of facts."); State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 70, 588 P.2d 358, 363 (App. 1978) ("essential test of vagueness is whether the legislative enactment may be understood by persons of common intelligence"). Alleged overbreadth primarily concerns substantive due process because it questions whether the statutory standards "provide a constitutionally adequate basis for detention." LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 142.
A charter city may exercise all powers authorized by its charter, except where such exercise is inconsistent with our state constitution or the general laws of this state. State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978). Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether chapter 8, § 5 of the Phoenix City charter is "inconsistent" with article VI, § 31 of the Arizona Constitution, which provides in relevant part:
State v. Spitz, 15 Ariz. App. 120, 486 P.2d 800 (1971). Beyond the scope of our review are such matters as the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978); an attack on the lower court's interpretation or application of a statute, State v. Renteria, 126 Ariz. 591, 617 P.2d 543 (App. 1979); State v. Owens, 114 Ariz. 565, 562 P.2d 738 (App. 1977); a challenge to the superior court's dismissal of an appeal from city court, State v. McNeill, 146 Ariz. 568, 707 P.2d 972 (App. 1985); a challenge to the propriety of a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace, State v. Fagerberg, 17 Ariz. App. 63, 495 P.2d 503 (1972); and issues concerning evidentiary or factual disputes, Sanders v. Moore, 117 Ariz. 527, 573 P.2d 927 (App. 1977). In summary, a criminal misdemeanor case that is tried in city court may be appealed to the superior court. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 16; A.R.S. § 22-371 to 374.
Appellant, however, seeks to distinguish the regulation of signs, which antedate zoning regulations as such, contending that such regulations are not zoning but a local matter dealing with a purely local problem — signs. In support of its position the City points out that Division One of the Court of Appeals in State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978) has held that the power to regulate signs is not tied to the zoning power, and a city may regulate signs under its charter power. The City notes that its ordinances regulating signs were in existence long before the State enacted any zoning legislation.
We start by noting that municipal corporations have no inherent police power, and that their powers are delegated to them by the constitution or laws of the state. State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 68, 588 P.2d 358, 361 (App. 1978), overruled on other grounds Levitz v. State, 126 Ariz. 203, 613 P.2d 1259 (1980). A city may adopt a city charter as its organic law.
" State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 70, 588 P.2d 358, 363 (App. 1978) overruled on other grounds, 126 Ariz. 203, 613 P.2d 1259 (1980). The tax at issue here is essentially a tax on business activities, or more precisely, upon the privilege of engaging in business.
A charter city may exercise all powers authorized by its charter, except where such an exercise is inconsistent with out state constitution or the general laws of this state. State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978); A.R.S. § 9-284(B) (Supp. 1983).
Respondents argue that the crime of indecent exposure has been preempted by the state statute, and that the city may not legislate in the area. The test for preemption has been set out in numerous Arizona cases. Clayton v. State (on rehearing), 38 Ariz. 466, 300 P. 1010 (1931), Flagstaff Vending Co. v. City of Flagstaff, supra, Phoenix Respirator and Ambulance Service, Inc. v. McWilliams, supra, State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App. 1978). Preemption by the state would prevent any ordinance by the city making indecent exposure a crime, since under the doctrine of preemption the state would have appropriated the area.