Summary
In Huth, the Court noted that the statute was not intended to inhibit all police officers, except those primarily on traffic duty, from arresting a person violating traffic or motor vehicle laws.
Summary of this case from U.S. v. McCasterOpinion
No. 85-1965
Decided June 18, 1986.
Traffic laws — "On duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing * * * [motor vehicle or traffic] laws," construed — R.C. 4549.14 and Evid. R. 601(C).
O.Jur 3d Criminal Law §§ 1290, 2203.
The phrase "on duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing * * * [motor vehicle or traffic] laws" in R.C. 4549.14 and similar language in Evid. R. 601(C) refer to the officer's main purpose for his whole period of duty and not to his duty during the apprehension and arrest of the suspect. ( Columbus v. Stump, 41 Ohio App.2d 81 [70 O.O.2d 86], approved.)
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County.
On July 11, 1984, Summit County sheriff's deputy Jeral T. Mann was working at his assigned duty as a full-time security guard at the Akron-Canton Airport. Mann was attired in his deputy uniform. He was driving a brown and white Chevrolet Suburban airport security vehicle that was equipped with a siren, spotlight and police lights. The vehicle was not marked in the "distinctive manner or color" required for motor vehicles used by traffic officers. R.C. 4549.13; Ohio Adm. Code 311-3-01.
Because the airport property is not entirely contiguous, Mann occasionally traveled upon public roads in Summit County as he patrolled the airport property. While doing so at approximately 10:00 p.m. on July 11, Mann observed an automobile driven by appellant, Pamela Huth, fail to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of Mayfair and Mt. Pleasant Roads. Mann pursued Huth for some distance before he was able to stop her and arrest her. She was charged with running a stop sign, R.C. 4511.43(A), and willfully fleeing from a police officer, R.C. 4511.02(B).
Before trial, Huth filed motions to dismiss the charges and to have Mann declared incompetent to testify pursuant to R.C. 4549.14 and Evid. R. 601(C). The trial court overruled these motions. Huth then entered a plea of no contest to the charge of running a stop sign, and the court dismissed the charge of willfully fleeing from a police officer. Huth was found guilty and fined twenty dollars plus court costs.
The Court of Appeals for Summit County upheld the ruling on Mann's competency to testify and affirmed the conviction. Finding its judgment to be in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals for Butler County in Middletown v. O'Connor (June 11, 1984), No. CA 83-10-111, unreported, on the issue of competency, the court of appeals certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
Thomas R. Boley, chief prosecutor, for appellee.
Herbert, Treadon, Benson Frieg and John H. Frieg, for appellant.
This case requires a construction of R.C. 4549.14 and Evid. R. 601(C). R.C. 4549.14 provides:
"Any officer arresting, or participating or assisting in the arrest of, a person charged with violating the motor vehicle or traffic laws of this state, provided the offense is punishable as a misdemeanor, such officer being on duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing such laws, is incompetent to testify as a witness in any prosecution against such arrested person if such officer at the time of the arrest was using a motor vehicle not marked in accordance with section 4549.13 of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.)
Evid. R. 601(C), reiterating the foregoing statute, provides:
"Every person is competent to be a witness except:
"* * *
"(C) An officer, while on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing traffic laws, arresting or assisting in the arrest of a person charged with a traffic violation punishable as a misdemeanor where the officer at the time of the arrest was not using a properly marked motor vehicle as defined by statute or was not wearing a legally distinctive uniform as defined by statute." (Emphasis added.)
Because Mann's vehicle was not marked in accordance with R.C. 4549.13 and Ohio Adm. Code 311-3-01, his competency to testify against Huth hinges upon whether he was "on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing traffic laws." Evid. R. 601(C).
R.C. 4549.14 was enacted to provide uniformity in traffic control and to curb the "speed traps" that were often operated by municipal and township peace officers in unmarked cars. See Dayton v. Adams (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 89, 90 [38 O.O.2d 223]. The statute was certainly not intended to inhibit all police officers, except those primarily on traffic duty, from arresting a person violating traffic or motor vehicle laws.
We read the phrase "on duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing * * * [motor vehicle or traffic] laws" in R.C. 4549.14 and similar language in Evid. R. 601(C) to refer to the officer's main purpose for his whole period of duty and not to his duty during the apprehension and arrest of the suspect. Columbus v. Stump (1974), 41 Ohio App.2d 81, 85 [70 O.O.2d 86], approved.
Mann's primary duty was airport security, not traffic law enforcement, at the time he observed Huth violating a traffic law. His decision to pursue and arrest her did not change the "main purpose" of his law enforcement duty as referred to in R.C. 4549.14 and Evid. R. 601(C). Therefore, we hold that Mann was competent to testify.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES and C. BROWN, JJ., concur.
HOLMES and C. BROWN, JJ., concur separately.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.
I must concur in the judgment here, but do so reluctantly because the phraseology of the statute would so require. However, the result is not a reasonable one, in my view, in that I believe that the public policy inherent in the Traffic Code should logically provide that all vehicles involved in apprehension of those involved in violations should be marked in a distinctive manner or color. It would seem that there is no more reasonable basis for a vehicle being used full-time in traffic enforcement to be appropriately marked as a police vehicle than one being utilized basically for security purposes, but also occasionally used, as here, for apprehending traffic violators.
C. BROWN, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.