Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 12-0774
01-30-2014
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. MURPHY WILLIAM HUNTER, Appellant.
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Joseph T. Maziarz Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Legal Defender's Office, Phoenix By Cynthia D. Beck Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2012-105483-001
The Honorable William L. Brotherton, Jr., Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Joseph T. Maziarz
Counsel for Appellee
Maricopa County Legal Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Cynthia D. Beck
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined. THUMMA, Judge:
¶1 Defendant Murphy William Hunter appeals his conviction for possession or use of dangerous drugs. Hunter argues the superior court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no error, Hunter's conviction and resulting sentence are affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction and resolves all reasonable inferences against Hunter. State v. Karr, 221 Ariz. 319, 320, ¶ 2, 212 P.3d 11, 12 (App. 2008).
¶2 In January 2012, law enforcement officers went to room 136 of a Phoenix motel to locate a probationer registered to that room. When they arrived, officers observed Hunter, who fit the description of the probationer, leave the general area and walk toward a nearby store. When the officers knocked on the door of room 136, no one answered. The officers then verified with the desk clerk that the person registered to the room had not checked out, obtained a room key from the clerk and entered the room. Although finding no one in the room, the officers saw men's clothing as well as methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the room.
¶3 Recalling the person they had seen leave the area, the officers sought to contact Hunter to determine whether he was the probationer they were attempting to locate. The officers found Hunter in the nearby store and spoke to him on the sales floor. Three officers in street clothes wearing vests with "POLICE" emblazoned on them were present, but only one officer spoke to Hunter. The officer informed Hunter that he fit the description of a person they were looking for and wanted to verify his identity. Hunter had no identification and provided the officer a false name and social security number. The officer was unable to verify Hunter's identification with the information he provided. When asked where he was staying, Hunter told the officers that he was staying alone in room 136 of the motel, unaware that the officers had just searched that room. Hunter claimed he paid someone in the motel parking lot ten dollars so that he could use the motel room.
¶4 When Hunter made the statements regarding the motel room, he was not under arrest, was not handcuffed and was not otherwise restrained. Hunter did not ask to leave and the officer did not tell him he could not leave. The officer, however, considered Hunter to be under investigative detention and not free to leave until the officer determined whether he was the probationer they sought. Once Hunter provided the officer his real name, the officer discovered Hunter had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant and arrested Hunter. The entire encounter took less than fifteen minutes.
¶5 As relevant here, after being charged, a jury found Hunter guilty of possession or use of dangerous drugs. The superior court sentenced Hunter to a mitigated six-year prison term. This court has jurisdiction over Hunter's timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(2013), 13-4031 (2013) and 13-4033(A) (2013).
Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
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DISCUSSION
I. Denial Of The Motion To Suppress.
¶6 Hunter asserts the superior court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the officers regarding the motel room. Hunter argues the statements should have been suppressed because the officers conducted a custodial interrogation without advising him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied the motion finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Hunter was subjected to an investigative detention but was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. This court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling on a motion to suppress, State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 265, 921 P.2d 655, 668 (1996), giving deference to the superior court's factual findings, State v. Adams, 197 Ariz. 569, 572, ¶ 16, 5 P.3d 903, 906 (App. 2000). The review is confined to the facts presented at the suppression hearing. State v. Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 631, 925 P.2d 1347, 1348 (1996). This court reviews de novo the ultimate legal question of whether a defendant's constitutional rights were violated. Id. at 632, 925 P.2d at 1349.
¶7 Miranda warnings are required "only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.'" Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). "Custody" as used in Miranda "is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion." Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). As relevant here, "custody" means either a "'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984)). Custodial questioning implicates the concerns identified in Miranda, including the "danger of coercion [that] results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation." Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990).
¶8 In determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda, the court examines all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including whether a reasonable person would have felt free to stop the questioning and leave. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322, 325. While this "freedom of movement test" identifies a necessary condition of "custody," the absence of freedom of movement is not a "talismanic power" that necessitates a finding that a person is in custody. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112. Other relevant factors include the location and duration of the questioning, statements made during the questioning, the presence or absence of physical restraints and whether the person was released at the end of questioning. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189. "[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
¶9 The determination of whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda "depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323. A police officer's subjective, undisclosed belief regarding whether a person subject to interrogation is a suspect is irrelevant to an assessment of whether that person is in custody for purposes of Miranda. Id. at 319. A police officer's "unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was 'in custody' at a particular time." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). A police officer's knowledge or beliefs may become relevant when communicated to the person being questioned "by word or deed." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325. Finally, whether an investigation has focused on the person questioned is irrelevant for purposes of Miranda, so long as that focus is not disclosed to the person questioned. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 326. "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood [that person's] situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442.
¶10 The superior court did not err in finding Hunter was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Assuming Hunter was subject to an investigative detention, such a "temporary and relatively nonthreatening" investigative detention does not constitute "custody" for purposes of Miranda. See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1190; Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113; State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192, 195, 979 P.2d 5, 8 (App. 1998). Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Hunter's situation would have understood that police officers approached him in a public area in a store and explained that they were looking for a person and wanted to verify whether he was that person. It was only after they could not verify the name Hunter provided in response to their questions that they asked him where he was staying, and did so without any hint that they had discovered any criminal activity, let alone discovered drugs in a nearby motel room. The encounter was relatively brief, Hunter's freedom of movement was not restrained to a degree normally associated with a formal arrest and the situation did not otherwise present the "danger of coercion [that] results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation" that Miranda sought to address. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297. For these reasons, Hunter was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when questioned in the store, meaning the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hunter's motion to suppress.
II. Sufficient Trial Evidence Supports Hunter's Conviction.
¶11 It is a crime to knowingly possess or use a dangerous drug. A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(1). Possess is defined as "knowingly to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property." A.R.S. § 13-105(34). Hunter argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession or use of dangerous drugs because the State presented insufficient evidence that he exercised dominion or control over the methamphetamine found in the motel room. "Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction." State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200, 928 P.2d 610, 624 (1996) (citation omitted). "To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury." State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987) (citation omitted).
¶12 "Possession may be actual or constructive." State v. Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 927, 929 (App. 2013). "Constructive possession" is the exercise of dominion or control over an object in the absence of actual physical possession. State v. Cox, 214 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 10, 155 P.3d 357, 359 (App. 2007). Constructive possession exists when the object "is found in a place under [the defendant's] dominion [or] control and under circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred that the defendant had actual knowledge of the existence of the [property]." Id. at 520, ¶ 10, 155 P.3d 357, 359 (quoting State v. Villavicencio, 108 Ariz. 518, 520, 502 P.2d 1337, 1339 (1972)). Constructive possession exists whether the defendant exercises dominion and control over the object itself or the location in which the object is found. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27, ¶ 41, 170 P.3d 266, 276 (App. 2007). "[I]t is not necessary to show that a defendant exercised exclusive possession or control over the substance itself or the place in which the illegal substance was found; control or right to control is sufficient." State v. Curtis, 114 Ariz. 527, 528, 562 P.2d 407, 408 (App. 1977). Constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. Cox, 214 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 10, 155 P.3d at 359
¶13 The evidence was sufficient to support Hunter's conviction for possession or use of dangerous drugs. Hunter told the police that he was staying alone in room 136 of the motel and that personal property in the room was his. This was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hunter exercised dominion or control over the room (including the methamphetamine) and that he had actual knowledge of the existence of the methamphetamine in plain view on the nightstand. That Hunter may not have had a key to the room at the time of his arrest supported his defense that he did not possess the methamphetamine. Such evidence, however, was not dispositive.
CONCLUSION
¶14 Finding no error, Hunter's conviction and sentence are affirmed.