Summary
affirming trial court's grant of motion to suppress when video showed traffic stop that was basis of arrest
Summary of this case from State v. CastanedanietoOpinion
No. 05-11-00833-CR
08-17-2012
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. ADRIAN ANTHONY HUMMEL, Appellee
AFFIRM;
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MB1054314B
OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Richter, and Lang Miers
Opinion By Justice O'Neill
The State of Texas appeals an order granting appellee Adrian Anthony Hummel's motion to suppress evidence. In two points of error, the State asserts the trial court erred in concluding police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Hummell for a traffic offense. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order.
Hummell was stopped in the City of Dallas for a traffic offense and was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Hummell filed a motion to suppress asserting the arresting officers had no reasonable suspicion to stop him. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State offered a videotape into evidence that it asserts showed Hummell committed a traffic offense, specifically that he crossed over a "stop line" when he stopped at a red light. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State first played the videotape for the trial court. The video shows Hummell driving down Henderson Avenue. About fifty seconds into the video, Hummell slowed as he approached a red light, stopped momentarily at the intersection, at which time the light turned green and Hummell proceeded. The officers followed Hummell for another three minutes, during which time Hummell continued traveling down Henderson stopping at another red light. About two blocks after the second red light, the officers stopped Hummell, asserting he had crossed the "stop line" before stopping at the first light.
Officer Albert Sanchez testified at the hearing. At the time of the stop, Sanchez was in training. Sanchez testified that when Hummell stopped at the first red light, he crossed a "clearly marked stop line." He also testified Hummell had stopped "in the intersection." However, the video clearly reveals Hummell was not in the intersection, and the officer later admitted on cross- examination Hummell was not in the intersection. Indeed, the officer testified the "stop line" was three or four car lengths away from the intersection. There was no sign notifying drivers they were supposed to stop at that line.
Sanchez claimed they did not stop Hummell when he committed the offense because his training officer wanted to stop him in a specific parking lot. The trial court noted the officers passed at least one vacant lot, and the video shows they passed several parking lots during the three minute drive. Sanchez could not explain why they did not stop Hummell sooner. Sanchez then testified his trainer made the decision when to stop Hummell.
After hearing the evidence the trial court found the "faint line" was not sufficiently legible, and that an ordinarily prudent driver would not have anticipated a stop line in that location. It concluded the officers had no reasonable basis to believe Hummell committed the offense of failing to stop at a stop line, and therefore no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The State appeals.
In two issues, the State contends the trial court erred in granting Hummell's motion to suppress. It contends the trial court failed to use an objective standard in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. The State further asserts the videotape admitted into evidence establishes reasonable suspicion existed.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Id. Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, particularly when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We afford the same deference to mixed questions of law and fact if resolving those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. The prevailing party is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We review de novo the application of legal principles to a specific set of facts, including the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87.
A law enforcement officer is justified in detaining a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is violating the law. Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In particular, if an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting a person has committed a traffic offense, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Whether an officer's suspicion was reasonable is evaluated based on "an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop." Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The State asserts the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant for failing to stop at a "clearly marked stop line." An operator of a vehicle facing only a steady red signal shall stop at a "clearly marked stop line." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.007(d) (West 2001). In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. Id. The trial court found, from a review of the officer's testimony, the dash camera video, a map print-out of the area, and the bird's eye view of the area, that the officers did not have a reasonable basis for believing Hummell had committed the offense. The trial court stated the faint stop line at dusk was not sufficiently legible to an ordinarily observant person. The trial court further found an ordinarily prudent driver would not have anticipated the stop line because the traffic light was at least six car lengths passed the stop line and there was no sign to alert a driver to the stop line. The court also found the red light had changed to green simultaneously with Hummell reaching the stop line, and he was therefore not required to stop.
The State first contends the trial court erred in finding no reasonable suspicion because it erroneously required the State to prove Hummell actually committed a traffic offense. We agree with the State that it was not required to prove an actual traffic violation. See Johnson v. State, 365 S.W.3d 484, 488-89 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, no pet.). But we do not agree that the trial court's determination was based on its failure to do so. Although the State need not prove the offense was committed, it was required to show the officers had an "objectively reasonable" basis for believing the offense was committed. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The State next asserts the objective evidence shows the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing Hummell committed the traffic offense. The State relies on the videotape. The deferential standard of review applies when a trial court's determination of historical fact is based upon a videotape recording admitted into evidence. Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Montanez, 195 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). That said, a trial court cannot ignore "indisputable visual evidence" shown on a videotape. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). According to the State, the videotape provides such evidence.
However, the videotape is not as clear as the State suggests, due not only to the time of night but also its failure to provide helpful depth perception.
We have reviewed the videotape in light of Sanchez's testimony as well as the bird's eye view of the area. Reviewing all this evidence in the light most favorable to Hummell, the evidence shows Hummell passed a faint line on the road on Henderson, but this line was a significant distance from the intersection, and not where one would have anticipated a stop line. Sanchez testified the alleged stop line was three to four car lengths from the intersection. Moreover, from a review of the videotape, the marking was not even visible until it would have been too late to stop. Further, there was another line on Henderson that was closer to the intersection, where one would expect to find a stop line. There was no evidence Hummell did not stop at this line, and it is undisputed that Hummell stopped before entering the intersection. We conclude the trial court could have properly determined that Sanchez did not have an objectively reasonable basis for believing Hummell committed the offense of failing to stop at a clearly marked stop line. We resolve the sole issue against the State and affirm the trial court's judgment.
MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
110833F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V.
ADRIAN ANTHONY HUMMEL, Appellee
No. 05-11-00833-CR
Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. MB- 1054314B).
Opinion delivered by Justice O'Neill, Justices Richter and Lang-Miers participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, we AFFIRM the trial court's order.
Judgment entered August 17, 2012.
MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
JUSTICE