“Whether prosecutorial misconduct was intended to goad the defendant into seeking a mistrial is a question of fact for the trial [justice] to decide.” State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 87 (R.I.2000). On appeal, we “will not disturb the trial [justice]'s finding on that factual issue if it is supported by competent evidence.”

We have stated that, where a defendant has moved for a mistrial and asserts on appeal that double jeopardy bars his retrial because of prosecutorial goading, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact. See State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 87 (R.I. 2000); see also State v. Diaz, 521 A.2d 129, 133 (R.I. 1987); State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339, 1346 (R.I. 1986). A trial court's finding as to "whether prosecutorial misconduct was intended to provoke the defendant into seeking a mistrial is a factual question that is appropriately decided by the trial court."

Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Hull , 754 A.2d 84, 87 (R.I. 2000) ). "On appeal, we ‘will not disturb the trial justice's finding on that factual issue if it is supported by competent evidence.’ " Id.

As this Court has stated on numerous occasions, "where a defendant has moved for a mistrial and asserts on appeal that double jeopardy bars his retrial because of prosecutorial goading, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact." State v. O'Connor , 936 A.2d 216, 220 (R.I. 2007) ; seeState v. Hull , 754 A.2d 84, 87 (R.I. 2000) ; see alsoState v. Diaz , 521 A.2d 129, 133 (R.I. 1987) ; State v. Gordon , 508 A.2d 1339, 1346 (R.I. 1986). We note that "[a] trial court's finding as to ‘whether prosecutorial misconduct was intended to provoke the defendant into seeking a mistrial is a factual question that is appropriately decided by the trial court.’ "

State v. LaPointe, 525 A.2d 913, 914 (R.I. 1987) (sustaining a conviction for first-degree sexual assault even though the evidence of the sole prosecution witness might be characterized as mildly vague and contradictory, where it was "exact as to the crucial elements" and there was nothing in the record indicating that trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence); see also State v. Nania, 786 A.2d 1066, 1068 (R.I. 2001) ("[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is solely the function of the trial justice." (citing State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I. 2000) )). Jennifer's disclosures to Grinnell were determined by the Family Court justice to be accurate and truthful because "no four year old girl would have [such information] but for it having been something that she actually experienced."

The state argues that the circumstances in Bouffard's case are distinguishable from those presented in State v. Studman, 468 A.2d 918 (R.I.1983) and its progeny because in those cases, a single violating justice executed consecutively two (or more) presumptively concurrent suspended sentences. See id. at 919; see also State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 87–88 (R.I.2000). The state contends that in Bouffard's case, however, two different violating justices executed two presumptively concurrent suspended sentences for two separate violative acts.

Additionally, "[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court." Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 (citing State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I. 2000)). Furthermore, this Court has stated that:

Assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court. See State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I. 2000) (citing State v. Sparks, 677 A.2d 1250, 1251 (R.I. 1995) (per curiam)). "When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred."

"[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is solely the function of the trial justice." State v. Nania, 786 A.2d 1066, 1068 (R.I. 2001) (citing State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I. 2000)). In the instant case, the trial justice's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.

"[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is solely the function of the trial justice." State v. Nania, 786 A.2d 1066, 1068 (R.I. 2001) (citing State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I. 2000)). In the instant case, the trial justice's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.