Opinion
22-K-45
03-31-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LEE HUDSON IN RE STATE OF LOUISIANA
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 19-4039
Panel composed of Judges Robert A. Chaisson, Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg
The State seeks supervisory review of the trial court's granting of defendant's motion in limine to exclude a detective's opinion testimony regarding the alleged guilt of defendant. For the following reasons, we grant this writ and reverse the trial court's judgment granting this motion.
On September 9, 2019, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with sexual battery upon a known juvenile wherein the child was under the age of thirteen. La. R.S. 14:43.1. Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude opinion testimony regarding the alleged guilt of defendant. In this motion, defendant asserted that the State may attempt to introduce defendant's videotaped statement into evidence at trial and that certain testimony should be excluded. He explained that during the interview, the detective made statements that he believed defendant committed the alleged acts with which defendant was charged. Defendant argued that the detective's testimony regarding his alleged guilt was improper and must be excluded.
The State contended that police officers are not prequalified experts in the field of typical police work, such as obtaining a statement from a suspect. The State asserted that comments such as these were typical in everyday police work and should not be considered opinion testimony. The State argued that the detective's opinion during his questioning of defendant that defendant was being untruthful, that the witnesses/victim were being truthful, and that the defendant is guilty is:
(1) rationally based upon how the detective perceived those individuals; and (2) helpful to understand why the detective proceeded as he did during the interview and afterwards.
On November 16, 2021, the trial court granted defense counsel's motion in limine to exclude improper testimony and ordered the prosecution to redact the videotaped interview. In this writ application, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion in limine and ordering the State "to redact the videotaped interview of the defendant as to remove all statements by an interviewing detective which directly or indirectly implicate the guilt of the defendant." For the following reasons, we agree.
Our review of the law supports the conclusion that a detective's comments regarding a victim and/or a defendant's truthfulness based on his own observations is admissible. Pursuant to La. C.E. art. 701, the testimony of a lay witness in the form of opinions or inferences, who is not testifying as an expert, is limited to those opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the perception of the witness and are helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. State v. Keller, 09-403 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/29/09), 30 So.3d 919, 930-31, writ denied, 10-267 (La. 9/17/10), 45 So.3d 1041. An officer may testify as to matters within his personal knowledge acquired through experience without first being qualified as an expert. State v. Nelson, 14-252 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/15), 169 So.3d 493, 506, writ denied, 15-685 (La. 2/26/16), 187 So.3d 468.
"Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." La. C.E. art. 704; State v. Higgins, 03-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1234, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). In other words, the fact that an opinion or inference embraces an ultimate issue in a case does not preclude its admissibility. La. C.E. art. 704, Comment (c); State v. King, 99-1279 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/25/00), 760 So.2d 540, 543, writs denied, 00-1452 and 00-1498 (La. 3/16/01), 787 So.2d 298.
In State v. Carter, 10-614 (La. 1/24/12), 84 So.3d 499, 511-13, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 823, 133 S.Ct. 209, 184 L.Ed.2d 40 (2012), the defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to read the defendant's statement into evidence because the statements included annotations by the transcribing officer that communicated the officer's impressions of the defendant's veracity. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the deputy's comment that the defendant was lying in his statement was otherwise admissible as an opinion rationally based on the deputy's first-hand perceptions. See also, State v. Moses, 367 So.2d 800, 805-06 (La. 1979)(officer's opinion as to whether witness's answers were responsive, whether statement seemed sincere, and whether statement sounded made-up were admissible common sense inferences based on observation and experience).
In State v. Hubbard, 97-916 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/27/98), 708 So.2d 1099, writ denied, 98-643 (La. 8/28/98), 723 So.2d 415, this Court found that the detective's testimony that he felt the victim was not deceitful was not an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. It further found that the prohibition against an expert witness expressing an opinion as to guilt or innocence was inapplicable to the testimony of the detective who was not called as an expert.
In Hubbard, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing a nonexpert witness in a criminal proceeding to give his opinion testimony regarding an ultimate issue of fact in violation La. C.E. art. 704. The defendant contended that during the examination of Detective Cambre, the State asked questions relative to the detective's evaluation of Ms. Johnson's veracity. The detective testified that in his opinion, she was not being deceitful when she told him what happened. This Court noted that La. C.E. art. 704 did not apply because the detective was neither called nor qualified as an expert witness. Further, this Court found that the detective did not express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as he only stated that he felt that the victim was not deceitful. This Court stated that the limitations on the testimony of non-expert witnesses, such as Detective Cambre, were found in La. C.E. art. 701. This Court concluded that since the detective was testifying only as a non-expert witness, he was allowed to make an inference regarding the victim's veracity from his own observations.
The above as well as other Louisiana cases indicate detectives have been allowed to testify at trial as non-expert witnesses and to make inferences regarding a defendant's or a victim's veracity from their own observations. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 701 and 704; Carter, supra; Hubbard, supra; State v. Alvarado, 13-201 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/30/13), 2013 WL 5459757, writ denied, 13-2579 (La. 4/11/14), 137 So.3d 1214 (the prosecutor asked the detective, "Seven [sic] days after, she came with this scheme about what took place that night, right?" and the detective replied, "Yes, it seemed it was some kind of self-serving defense that she had come up with."); State v. Dobbins, 05-342 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/05), 920 So.2d 278, 285 (prosecutor asked the detective if he believed defendant was being truthful with him, and the detective responded negatively).
During defendant's statement in this matter, the detective informed defendant of the allegations against him by his former girlfriend's daughter (M.) and told defendant that his former girlfriend's daughter went into great detail regarding a couple of incidents involving oral sex and touching of her breasts and vagina. The detective asserted that M. was consistent in her responses when questioned about the incidents and that he was convinced "something had happened" but that he did not know to what extent. The detective asked defendant numerous times to give his side of the story and to explain why M. and her brother (S.) would make up these allegations, especially since the children seemed to have affection for him. Defendant continually denied the allegations. He also noted that the elapsed time since the alleged incidents occurred because he and their mother had parted in 2015, but they did not make the allegations until 2019.
The detective initially advised defendant of his rights, after which defendant signed the form indicating he understood his rights and was waiving them.
Based on our review of the statement, we believe the detective was merely commenting on the veracity of the victim's statement and utilizing normal interrogation techniques in order to obtain defendant's confession. The detective told defendant that M. had given a detailed and consistent account of defendant's abuse. He said that he believed "something had happened" and asked defendant to give his side of the story or explain why M. and S. would make those allegations if they were not true. When defendant still did not confess, the detective tried to appeal to defendant's emotions, noting that he could receive forgiveness if he was sorry for what he did. But, defendant did not confess.
For the reasons stated herein, we find that the detective's comments are admissible and that the statement does not require redaction. We therefore grant the State's writ and reverse the trial court's judgment granting the motion in limine.
WRIT GRANTED
SJW
RAC
HJL