Opinion
No. 111,293.
2014-10-31
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Michael A. HITE, Appellant.
Appeal from Harvey District Court; Richard B. Walker, Judge.Michael A. Hite, appellant, pro se.Jason R. Lane, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Harvey District Court; Richard B. Walker, Judge.
Michael A. Hite, appellant, pro se. Jason R. Lane, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., PIERRON and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Michael A. Hite appeals his convictions of driving while suspended (DWS) and speeding. He contends that the requirement to have a driver's license infringes on his constitutional right to travel. Thus, Hite argues that the district court erred in finding that he was required to have a driver's license while driving his car. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the district court's judgment.
On May 14, 2013, the State filed an amended complaint charging Hite with one count of DWS (second offense) and one count of speeding. A magistrate judge conducted a bench trial on August 19, 2013, and found Hite guilty of both counts. Hite appealed, and the case proceeded to a bench trial before the district court on January 8, 2014.
At Hite's trial, the State called Deputy James Slickers of the Harvey County Sheriff's Office as a witness. Slickers testified that on May 6, 2013, he observed a vehicle driven by Hite on Highway K–196 in Harvey County, Kansas. Slickers used his radar unit to confirm that Hite was driving 80 miles per hour in a 65–mile–per–hour zone. Slickers initiated a traffic stop. During the stop, he checked his mobile data terminal to determine whether Hite had a driver's license and discovered that Hite's driving privileges were suspended. The State also introduced into evidence a certified copy of Hite's driver's record which showed that he had a prior conviction for DWS.
Hite did not present any evidence on his own behalf. However, he offered a document entitled “Papers of Evidence,” which the district court treated as a motion to dismiss. Hite's motion consisted of an article entitled “U.S. Court Decisions Confirm ‘Driving a Motor Vehicle’ is a Citizens Right and Not a Government Granted Privilege,” written by Jack McLamb for the Aid & Abet Police Newsletter. The district court denied Hite's motion to dismiss. Before announcing its ruling, the district judge stated:
“I understand the message that Mr. Hite wants to send here and that is he believes that the traffic laws as written impinge upon his rights, and that's an issue he'll have to take up with other courts, if he wishes to, because I simply can't recognize those arguments. The only thing I can take a look at, as far as [his] guilt or innocence, is whether or not the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Mr. Hite, has violated the law as alleged.”
The district court found Hite guilty of both counts and sentenced him accordingly. Hite timely appeals his convictions.
On appeal, Hite argues that driving a motor vehicle is a citizen's right and not a government-granted privilege. Thus, according to Hite, the requirement to have a driver's license infringes on his constitutional right to travel. The State responds that operating a motor vehicle in Kansas is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the State's police power. It asserts that licensing requirements for drivers are reasonable regulations due to the inherent dangers associated with operating a motor vehicle.
This court previously addressed a claim virtually identical to Hite's in State v. Hershberger, 27 Kan.App.2d 485, 5 P.3d 1004, rev. denied 269 Kan. 937 (2000). In that case, the defendant appealed his DWS conviction, arguing that state law requiring him to have a valid driver's license violated his constitutional right to travel. In addressing the defendant's claim, this court began by clarifying that the United States Constitution recognizes a fundamental right to interstate travel, not intrastate travel. See 27 Kan.App.2d at 492–94. This court stated that the right to interstate travel had been recognized in cases where a statute or ordinance was designed to deter interstate travel or penalizes someone who exercises that right and the law does not serve a compelling state interest. 27 Kan.App.2d at 492.
The Hershberger court examined K.S.A. 8–1501 et seq. , the uniform act to regulate traffic and establish rules of the road, and concluded these laws were not designed to deter interstate or intrastate travel and did not penalize a person for exercising the right to travel, 27 Kan.App.2d at 493. The court stated: “States have a compelling interest in ensuring that motor vehicles are operated in a safe fashion on public roads and highways.” 27 Kan.App.2d at 493. In furtherance of that interest, the court found that states may adopt “ ‘[a]ny appropriate means ... to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway’ without violating due process. [Citations omitted.]” 27 Kan.App.2d at 493.
The Hershberger court further recognized that the issue of whether driving is a citizens' natural right was “laid to rest” in Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department, 211 Kan. 763, 508 P.2d 991 (1973). 27 Kan.App.2d at 493. In Popp, our Supreme Court stated:
“ ‘It is elementary that the right to operate a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is not a natural or unrestrained right but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulations under the police power of the state in the interest of the public's safety and welfare. [Citation omitted.] ... The privilege is granted to those who are qualified, who comply with reasonable police power requirements in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is withheld from those who do not.’ “ Hershberger, 27 Kan.App.2d at 493 (quoting Popp, 211 Kan. at 766).
See also State v. Bowie, 268 Kan. 794, 798, 999 P.2d 947 (2000) (approvingly citing the above holding from Popp ).
The Hershberger court consulted the decisions of appellate courts across the country and found there was a uniform consensus among state courts that statutes requiring driver's licenses and vehicle registrations do not impermissibly impair a person's constitutional right to travel. 27 Kan.App.2d at 493–94. Accordingly, this court determined that the defendant's argument that he was not required to have a driver's license was without legal merit. 27 Kan.App.2d at 494.
We adopt this court's reasoning in Hershberger. In Kansas, the right to operate a motor vehicle on a public street or highway is not a natural unrestrained right, but rather a privilege subject to reasonable regulations in the interest of public safety or welfare. The State has a compelling interest in ensuring that motor vehicles are operated in a safe manner on public roads. In furtherance of that interest, the State may adopt any appropriate means to ensure competent drivers, including requiring drivers to have a license and penalizing those people who drive on a suspended license.
For these reasons, we reject Hite's claim that the requirement to have a driver's license infringes on his constitutional right to travel. Thus, we conclude the district court did not err in finding Hite guilty of DWS (second offense) and speeding.
Affirmed.