Opinion
No. COA10-1463
Filed 19 April 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 July 2010 by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Catawba County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Adrian Dellinger, for the State. Jon W. Myers, for defendant-appellant.
Catawba County No. 09 CRS 1521.
Chansler Corda Hill ("defendant") appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle. We find no error.
Christine Cofer ("Cofer") owned a 2007 Nissan Sentra ("the Sentra"). The Sentra was equipped with a feature whereby the key only needed to be inside the Sentra in order for it to start and move. On the night of 22 October 2008, Cofer returned home after shopping, parked the Sentra, and went inside her house. Cofer intended to drop her keys into her purse, but instead inadvertently dropped them between the seats of her car. Cofer's husband left for work at 2:00 a.m. the next morning, 23 October 2008. He came home from work at 5:00 a.m. and noticed the Sentra was gone. Cofer discovered the Sentra missing when she woke up at 7:00 a.m. to go to work.
Cofer called 911 to report that the Sentra had been stolen. She also provided a report to the Catawba County Sheriff's Department ("the Sheriff's Department"). Around 2:00 p.m., a co-worker called Cofer and informed her that she saw the Sentra being driven in Hickory by a male. Cofer reported this information to the Sheriff's Department, who in turn contacted the Hickory Police Department ("HPD") and requested that they search the area for the Sentra.
At approximately 5:00 p.m., Cofer was driving around Hickory in a rental car, spotted the Sentra, and followed it. Cofer called 911 from her cell phone and gave the dispatcher street by street directions as she traveled. Cofer observed the driver, later identified as defendant, stop the Sentra and let two passengers out. Cofer then stopped her rental car next to her Sentra and told defendant, "Please don't plan on going anywhere." Defendant responded by asking her who she was. When Cofer did not identify herself, defendant stated that he did not know why she was following him and drove away.
Cofer continued to follow defendant in her rental car until defendant eventually parked. Defendant exited the Sentra and again asked Cofer what she wanted. While defendant walked away from the Sentra, he dropped the car keys to the ground. Cofer continued to follow defendant down the street as he walked.
Officer Shanna Hudson ("Officer Hudson") of the HPD responded to the radio call about Cofer following the Sentra. When Officer Hudson arrived at the scene, she saw defendant walking down the street. Officer Hudson stopped defendant and asked him to sit in the back of her patrol car. While he sat in the patrol car, defendant told Officer Hudson that he had borrowed the car from another person. Defendant gave Officer Hudson a description of the person, but was unable to provide the person's name. Defendant also showed Officer Hudson where he had discarded the car keys.
Deputy Adam Joseph ("Deputy Joseph") of the Sheriff's Department also arrived at the scene. Defendant spoke to Deputy Joseph and told him "someone traded him the car for crack." Deputy Joseph then placed defendant under arrest.
Beginning 20 July 2010, defendant was tried by a jury in Catawba County Superior Court for one count of possession of a stolen vehicle. At the close of the State's evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge which was denied by the trial court. Defendant did not present any evidence. On 21 July 2010, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty. The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of ten months to a maximum of twelve months in the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant appeals.
In his sole argument on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
The standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss "is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense." State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 449-50, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider all of the evidence "in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence." State v. Davis, 130 N.C. App. 675, 679, 505 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1998). To convict defendant for the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-106, the State must present substantial evidence that defendant (1) possessed a vehicle (2) while knowing or having reason to believe that the vehicle has been stolen or unlawfully taken. State v. Bailey, 157 N.C. App. 80, 83-84, 577 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2003).
Defendant contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence establishing that he "knew or had reason to believe" the Sentra was stolen. "Whether the defendant knew or should have known that the vehicle was stolen must necessarily be proved through inferences to be drawn from the evidence." State v. Baker, 65 N.C. App. 430, 436, 310 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1983) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In Bailey, the State offered the following evidence at trial:
(1) Defendant was found driving the [vehicle] several hours after it was stolen; (2) defendant claimed the vehicle belonged to a "friend," but would not give that friend's name; (3) [the owner] testified that he had not given anyone permission to drive the [vehicle] on the day in question; and (4) defendant was found with [the owner]'s group of keys in his possession.
157 N.C. App. at 84, 577 S.E.2d at 686. This Court held that based upon this evidence, "a strong inference can be deduced that defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the vehicle was stolen," and therefore, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 84, 577 S.E.2d at 686-87.
The evidence presented in the instant case is substantially the same as the evidence presented in Bailey. In the instant case, the State presented evidence that (1) defendant was identified as the person who was driving the car several hours after the car was reported stolen; (2) defendant claimed he had either borrowed the automobile from another person or that he had traded someone crack for it, but could not provide police with the person's name; (3) the owner of the car did not authorize anyone to take it; and (4) when defendant was confronted by the owner, he parked the Sentra, exited the car and dropped the car keys to the ground. This evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, constitutes sufficient evidence to allow the jury to determine that defendant knew he possessed a stolen vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss. This argument is overruled.
No error.
Judges STEELMAN and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).