This Court has declined to adopt a strict, mechanical standard of compliance with the requirements of section 15A-1022. State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C. App. 668, 670, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (2000) (declining to adopt a technical approach to compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 where the trial judge failed to make some of the inquiries required by the statute); see State v. Williams, 65 N.C. App. 472, 481, 310 S.E.2d 83, 88 (1983) (declining to adopt a technical approach to compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 where the trial judge made none of the inquiries required by the statute). Failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of the statute, without more, does not entitle defendant to have the judgment vacated.

This Court has made clear that a trial court's failure to strictly comply with the requirements of § 15A–1022 does not automatically entitle a defendant to have his guilty plea vacated. State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C.App. 668, 670, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (2000). Instead, a defendant, in order to have his plea set aside, must demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced as a result of the noncompliance.

Gilmore at 471, 542 S.E.2d at 699. The State argues that this case is controlled by the cases of State v. Williams, 65 N.C. App. 472, 310 S.E.2d 83 (1983), and State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C. App. 668, 531 S.E.2d 896 (2000). These cases hold that, when the trial court fails to strictly comply with the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 in taking a guilty plea, non-compliance is not reversible error per se, but must be evaluated upon a prejudice analysis.

In examining prejudicial error, courts must "look to the totality of the circumstances and determine whether non-compliance with the statute either affected defendant's decision to plead or undermined the plea's validity." State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C. App. 668, 670, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (2000). "In this regard, the transcript of plea signed by defendant, along with what questions the trial court did ask of him, are particularly relevant."

"[J]ust because the trial court failed to comply with the strict statutory requirements does not entitle defendant to have his plea vacated." State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C. App. 668, 670, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (2000). However, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since "it is error under the statute and constitution" for the court to fail to inquire of the defendant regarding the matters enumerated in the statute, so as to ensure his plea was voluntary and the informed choice of the defendant.

Nor does the record indicate any evidence or statement of facts presented by the State with respect to the charge, written statement by defendant, testimony regarding the charge, or other factual basis for entry of defendant's plea. We acknowledge the State's argument, based on this Court's decision in State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C. App. 668, 531 S.E.2d 896, (2000), that where a defendant simply alleges technical non-compliance with G.S. § 15A-1022, but fails to show resulting prejudice, vacation of the plea is not required. However, in Hendricks, although the record failed to establish that the trial court itself personally addressed defendant as to all statutory factors as required by the statute, the record indicated the trial court did make some of the required inquiries, and further, the transcript of plea between the State and the defendant "covered all the areas omitted by the trial judge."

While Defendant asserts "there is no record that [he] ever accepted a plea agreement that required three separate judgments [,]" his signed transcript of plea expressly provides that his "offenses shall be consolidated into the three Class F felonies for sentencing[.]" See State v. Hendricks , 138 N.C. App. 668, 669-71, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898-99 (2000) (finding no prejudice where the trial court failed to conduct a full plea colloquy under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 but the defendant's signed transcript of plea included all the required inquiries). Indeed, Defendant does not allege any particular prejudice arising from the error, nor does he claim that he would have pled differently if the trial court had fully complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(b). See State v. Williams , 65 N.C. App. 472, 480-81, 310 S.E.2d 83, 87-88 (1983).

To gain relief, Defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the error: that he would have otherwise rejected the plea agreement had he been informed of his maximum sentence. See, e.g., id. at 27, 687 S.E.2d at 704; State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C. App. 668, 670, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (2000); State v. Williams, 65 N.C. App. 472, 479-80, 310 S.E.2d 83, 87-88 (1983). In assessing whether Defendant was prejudiced, the Court "'must look to a totality of the circumstances' surrounding the acceptance of the plea 'and determine whether non-compliance with the statute either affected defendant's decision to plead or undermined the plea's validity.'"

The present case, like Gilmore , is one in which there is no record that the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1022 were met. Thus:We acknowledge the State's argument, based on this Court's decision in State v. Hendricks , 138 N.C.App. 668, 531 S.E.2d 896 (2000), that where a defendant simply alleges technical non-compliance with G.S. § 15A–1022, but fails to show resulting prejudice, vacation of the plea is not required. However, in Hendricks , although the record failed to establish that the trial court itself personally addressed defendant as to all statutory factors as required by the statute, the record indicated the trial court did make some of the required inquiries, and further, the transcript of plea between the State and the defendant "covered all the areas omitted by the trial judge."

Similarly, the relevant issue is not addressed on Form AOC–J–410. Although this Court has adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test for use in evaluating the voluntariness of guilty pleas tendered by adult defendants, State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C.App. 668, 669–71, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898–99 (2000), this Court and the Supreme Court have declined to require the use of such an analysis for purposes of evaluating the sufficiency of a trial court's compliance with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2407. In re T.E.F., 167 N.C.App. 1, 5–6, 604 S.E.2d 348, 351 (2004), aff'd, 359 N.C. 570, 614 S.E.2d 296 (2005).