Opinion
No. 8008.
Decided June 15, 1953.
Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, entered judgment of conviction, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, held that where court instructed that if the jury believed from evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not driving automobile recklessly or unlawfully, verdict of guilty would not be justified and that if jury believed from evidence beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was confronted with unavoidable peril, verdict should be not guilty, effect was to shift burden upon defendant to prove facts showing innocence beyond reasonable doubt, and instructions were error.
Reversed with directions.
1. CRIMINAL LAW. In criminal cases, the state has burden of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and both as to proof of state's case, and as to matters of defense, all that is necessary to entitle a defendant to acquittal is that there exist reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 2. CRIMINAL LAW. Rule that all that is necessary to entitle a defendant to an acquittal is that there exists a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, applies whether the defendant offers any evidence or not. 3. CRIMINAL LAW. In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, where court instructed that if jury believed from evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not driving automobile recklessly or unlawfully, verdict of guilty would not be justified and that if jury believed from evidence beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was confronted with situation of unavoidable peril, verdict should be not guilty, burden was shifted onto defendant to prove facts showing innocence beyond reasonable doubt and instructions were erroneous. 4. CRIMINAL LAW. Where instructions had effect of shifting burden to defendant to prove facts showing innocence beyond reasonable doubt, such error was not cured by reason of fact that jury was correctly instructed elsewhere on presumption of innocence. 5. CRIMINAL LAW. Instructions are to be considered as a whole. 6. CRIMINAL LAW. The giving of instructions which are in irreconcilable conflict is error.
State v. Laris, 78 Utah 183, 2 P.2d 243.
Jensen v. Utah R. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349.
Jensen v. Utah Railroad Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349; State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647.
See 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec. 1217. Homicide in connection with negligence in operation of an automobile. 26 Am. Jur., Homicide, sec. 215; 99 A.L.R. 756.
Grant Macfarlane, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
E.R. Callister, Jr., Atty. Gen., for respondent.
James L. Hendricks was convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter.
This appeal challenges the propriety of giving two instructions to which he took due and timely exception. These are:
Inst. 11
"Mere negligence is not sufficient to justify a verdict of involuntary manslaughter. * * * If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not driving his automobile recklessly or unlawfully or with a marked disregard for the safety of others, and that such manner of driving was not the proximate cause of the accident, then you will not be justified in bringing in a verdict of guilty."
Inst. 12
"* * * If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was suddenly confronted with the situation of peril which he could not avoid, then you are instructed to bring in a verdict of not guilty." (Emphasis added.)
It is elementary that in criminal cases the State has the burden of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Both as to the proof of the State's case, and as to matters of defense, all that is necessary to entitle the defendant to an acquittal is 1, 3 that there exist a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And this is so whether the defendant offers any evidence or not. Instead of indulging the defendant with his presumption of innocence, the burden was shifted upon him to prove facts showing his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. This was prejudicial error.
State v. Laris, 78 Utah 183, 2 P.2d 243.
The fact that elsewhere in the instructions the jury were correctly instructed on the presumption of innocence does not cure the instant error. Although the 4, 6 instructions are to be considered as a whole, where they are in irreconcilable conflict, they could but confuse or mislead the jury.fn2
Reversed, with directions to grant a new trial.