Opinion
No. 5-166 / 04-0894
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Margaret L. Lingreen, Judge.
Leonard Haynes appeals the sentence entered on his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Leonard Haynes pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c) (2003). The district court sentenced Haynes to a prison term not to exceed ten years, but did not waive or reduce the mandatory one-third minimum sentence. See Iowa Code § 901.10. Haynes appeals, contending (1) counsel was ineffective in failing to request that the court specify its reasons for waiving the mandatory one-third minimum, and (2) the court erred in failing to articulate both at the sentencing hearing and in its written order that the one-third mandatory minimum sentence was being waived.
A sentence imposed in a criminal case is reviewed for correction of errors at law and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion exists when the sentencing court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999). Haynes has the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion sufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of the validity of the district court's sentence. See State v. Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1989).
Iowa law provides that a person convicted of a violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c) "shall not be eligible for parole until the person has served a minimum period of confinement of one-third of the maximum indeterminate sentence provided by law." Iowa Code § 124.413. However, the district court may, at its discretion, sentence the person to a term less than provided by the statute if mitigating circumstances exist and those circumstances are stated specifically on the record. Iowa Code § 901.10.
Here, pursuant to the original plea agreement reached between the State and Haynes, the State agreed to not ask for the mandatory minimum of one-third. At the sentencing hearing, the parties repeated the particulars of the agreement, and the court expressly indicated its intention to follow the agreement, stating "I'm not imposing the third." Haynes, however, questioned the deal, asking the court how long he would have to serve pursuant to the one-third mandatory minimum. The court again expressed its clear intent to follow the recommendation, and replied, "This is a theoretical discussion, because everybody is recommending to me that I not require you to serve the minimum of one-third. That is to your benefit." After further discussion on the record, the State again recommended that the minimum be waived. The court later proceeded to sentence Haynes to a prison term not to exceed ten years, but its order did not mention a waiver or reduction of the mandatory one-third minimum. The court's written sentencing order noted that part of its reasoning for the particular sentence was "the plea bargain with the County Attorney's Office." This again lends support to Haynes argument that the court's intention was to waive the mandatory one-third minimum, as that sentencing option was specifically recommended in the plea agreement.
Haynes' basic claim on appeal is that "[t]his is a simple case of the court's failure to see that its intentions were properly memorialized" and that counsel was ineffective in failing to request that the court include the proper language waiving the mandatory one-third minimum. Based on our review of the plea and sentencing proceeding we believe it cannot be seriously disputed that the district court was not going to impose the one-third minimum. We conclude the sentence entered by the district court, which conflicted with its clearly stated intentions, evinces an oversight, which can be seen as an abuse of discretion. State v. Jorgensen, 588 N.W .2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1998). Upon his express questioning, Haynes was assured by the court it was not intending to impose the one-third minimum. While courts generally have wide discretion in sentencing matters such as this, here the court delimited the breadth of its own discretion by its on-the-record comments and assurances. A departure from those statements could be deemed irrational, inaccurate, or untenable: in other words, an abuse of discretion, albeit unintentional. We therefore affirm Haynes' conviction, but remand with instructions for the district court to reconsider its sentencing order to clearly reflect its intention.