Opinion
No. 51821-6-I.
Filed: May 3, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 02-1-02598-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 02/07/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Douglas McBroom.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Harrold — Informational Only (Appearing Pro Se), Doc # 238225, 16700 177th Ave SE, P.O.BOX 777, Monroe, WA 98272-0777.
Todd Maybrown, Allen, Hansen Maybrown PS, 600 University St. Ste 3020, Seattle, WA 98101-4105.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Prosecuting Atty King County, King County Prosecutor/appellate Unit, 1850 Key Tower, 700 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Donald James Raz, Attorney at Law, King County Courthouse Rm W554, 516 3rd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-2385.
William Harrold intentionally shot and killed his young daughter. A jury found him guilty of first degree murder. Harrold appeals, contending the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering Harrold to pay restitution to his sister-in-law, an aunt of the murder victim, for the cost of grief counseling. But because the restitution imposed was authorized by statute and within the discretionary powers of the trial court, we affirm.
FACTS
Late one evening, Harrold called a close friend to discuss problems he was having with his eleven-year-old daughter Tiffany. Concerned about Harrold's state of mind, the friend contacted Harrold's brother and made arrangements to meet at Harrold's house. When the two of them and the wife of Harrold's brother, Cecelia, arrived at the residence, they found Tiffany dead in her bed of a single gunshot wound to the head. Harrold was arrested and charged with first degree murder. A jury found him guilty.
A restitution hearing was held on May 17, 2001. After considering the evidence presented, the court ordered Harrold to pay $9,854.83 in restitution, including an amount to be paid to Cecelia for the cost of psychotherapy treatment. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Harrold challenges the award of restitution to Cecelia for the cost of psychotherapy treatment. Harrold argues that Cecelia was not a victim of the murder and therefore should not have been awarded restitution. We do not agree.
For an individual to be awarded restitution under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, he or she must be a `victim.' State v. Kisor, 82 Wn. App. 175, 183, 916 P.2d 978 (1996). RCW 9.94A.030(44) broadly defines victim as `any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.' Although Harrold committed and was convicted of only one criminal act, the homicide generated loss or injury to more than one victim. See State v. Donahoe, 105 Wn. App. 97, 101, 18 P.3d 618 (2001) (holding restitution may properly be awarded to collateral victims of the charged conduct).
The restitution statute, RCW 9.94A.753, confers broad power on the trial court to impose restitution. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). Thus, the court need only find that a victim's injuries were causally connected to a defendant's crime before ordering the defendant to pay restitution for the expenses which resulted. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d at 682 (holding foreseeability of injury not required). Such an award `shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering, or other intangible losses, but may include the costs of counseling reasonably related to the offense.' RCW 9.94A.753(3). When authorized by statute, imposition of restitution is generally within the court's discretion. State v. Dauenhauer, 103 Wn. App. 373, 377, 12 P.3d 661 (2000), review denied, 143 Wn.2d 1011 (2001). `A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision rests on an untenable basis.' State v. King, 113 Wn. App. 243, 299, 54 P.3d 1218 (2002), review denied, 149 Wn.2d 1015 (2003).
Former RCW 9.94A.142 (2000), recodified as RCW 9.94A.753 (Laws of 2001, ch. 10, sec. 6).
Harrold argues that Cecelia was not a victim because she was only related to the young murder victim by marriage and that this `familial relationship does not render [Cecelia] a `victim' within the meaning of the restitution statute, particularly where the State presented no evidence to suggest that [she] had any personal relationship with this young victim.' At the restitution hearing, however, Harrold's trial counsel acknowledged that `there was great emotional damage or injury to all involved because of the loss of this child' and that `there is a causal relationship between the emotional trauma or shock that [Cecelia] suffered and the counseling.' Given these admissions, the necessary causal relationship between the murder and Cecelia's need for counseling was established. The murder of Cecelia's eleven-year-old niece left Cecelia in need of professional counseling, which is the kind of expense for which restitution is clearly authorized.
Harrold also suggests that the award is inappropriate because Cecelia could not recover counseling costs in any civil action against Harrold. Even if that were true, however, `[t]he court's authority to order restitution in a criminal proceeding is not dependent upon the viability of related civil claims.' State v. Ewing, 102 Wn. App. 349, 353, 7 P.3d 835 (2000). A trial judge conceivably might, depending on the facts of a particular case, decide that the cost of counseling is so remotely connected to the crime committed by the defendant that it is not `reasonably related to the offense.' But, given the plain language of the restitution statute and the link in this case between the murder and Cecelia's need for counseling, we cannot say the trial court lacked tenable grounds for ordering Harrold to pay restitution for the cost of Cecelia's counseling. We find no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
GROSSE and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.